We do not believe that the evidence was obtained unlawfully, but for the sake of completeness, we will note what was said in relation to the disqualification of evidence obtained unlawfully in the Criminal Appeals Authority 3294/15 Kasai v. State of Israel (December 20, 2018):
"As is well known, the court has discretion that allows it to disqualify the admissibility of evidence, if the evidence was obtained unlawfully and its acceptance substantially violates the defendant's right to a fair criminal trial. This is the doctrine of jurisprudential invalidity [...] There are, therefore, two conditions for the application of the doctrine of judicial invalidity:
The first condition - according to which the evidence was obtained illegally by the law enforcement authorities, and there is a connection between the use of the improper means and the obtainment of the evidence;
and the second condition - according to which the admission of the evidence will substantially violate the defendant's right to a fair trial, which is not in accordance with the condition of the constitutional "limitation clause". In the framework of this condition, the court will consider, inter alia, the nature and severity of the illegality involved in obtaining the evidence; the extent of the impact that the improper means had on the credibility of the evidence, the nature of the offense, and the social damage and benefit involved in the disqualification of evidence."
At the end of the day, the severity of the violation of the right to privacy is light and does not justify the disqualification of the evidence, given the benefit that arose from it, since it led, together with other evidence, to the location of the Chevrolet vehicle's route. It should be emphasized that the harm that the defense claims is limited to the fact that the investigative unit was able to trace the movements of the vehicle used and thus link the alleged defendant to the commission of the murder. In other words, it was not claimed that intimate details about his life were revealed, such as those that have other implications for him, his family, or for the violation of the individual's privacy. In our opinion, such an infringement of the privacy of a person who allegedly committed a serious offense is not among the cases that the Protection of Privacy Law is intended to protect. Is it conceivable that a person who is caught committing the offense of murder, even if it was due to evidence obtained in violation of his privacy, in the sense of tracing his actions, could object to the receipt of the evidence on this ground?