On the procedural level, too, the proceeding of dishonest execution under the aforementioned Regulation 388 is a residual proceeding. These proceedings lead to each other, and where a writ of execution order has been issued, there is no longer room to turn to the Writ of Execution offices for the realization of the assets on which the receiver was appointed. The reason for this is that where an applicant can actually receive the same remedy - in court and in the Execution Office, he must apply to the Execution Office, since this is the main remedy in law. The authority granted to the court is an authority of integrity, which naturally lies in the back gallery of rights. Therefore, it is inconceivable that a case in which the winner will face the prerogative of which proceeding to turn to; For every situation - the proper procedure is intended for it, and therefore the provisions of the law exclude each other. The main way to implement a judgment is through the Writ of Execution Law, and only when the court realizes that this path is likely to lead to a dead end, must it consider whether it is necessary to turn to the remaining path - the path of honesty."
- Browse Other Municipality Requests 621/83, which is mentioned by President Shamgar (see the previous paragraph), as a reference to this Section 53 The Execution Law does not allow the appointment of a receiver for all of the debtor's assets, but only for a specific asset, reveals that this issue was not at all a central discussion in that case of Civil Appeal 621/83 The above. This figure was mentioned, by way of reference To Article 53 to the Execution Law (ibid., Piskei Din 41)(2), p. 664, opposite letter G), with respect to the receiver's fees in the same case, the respondent in the appeal. Therefore, according to the rules of "ratio" (the reason for the cessation), as opposed to the "obiter" (saying by the way), I do not believe that what is said Other Municipality Requests 621/83, constitutes sufficient reference for the proposition presented in the Roth, based on Civil Appeal 621/83 The above.
- However, it seems to me, that the center of the argument lies in the rest of the remarks, when President Shamgar presents the broad authority of the judge, as opposed to the administrative role of the head of the Execution Office.
However, in my opinion, the head of the Execution Office can be granted powers such as those of a judge, in the field of receivership, just as he has powers in legal issues, no less complicated, such as: the claim of "I repaid".