'In the matter discussed in the Tahoresh case, the plaintiff sued on the basis of an agreement for sharing the exploitation of a patent, and from what was stated at the end of the judgment ... It is implied that if the danger of destruction or disappearance of the property is proven... This court might have approved the appointment of the receiver there as well.'
...
It is true that in case law we can find statements from which it can be raised that there is no court from which a receiver is filed, where the application is filed in the form of an action for monetary relief; Thus, for example, it was stated in other municipal applications 132/77 Ganish v. Palmer Investments in a Tax Appeal, IsrSC 32(2) 64, at p. 68, that the appointment of a receiver 'is not suitable for purely financial claims', but these statements must be understood against the background of what was said therein. In the typical case in which a monetary claim is filed, the plaintiff will usually be able to maintain his rights until the claim is decided by obtaining other temporary orders, for example by issuing a temporary foreclosure order; In these circumstances, there is usually no room for the appointment of a temporary receiver, since it is only a remedy of an alternative nature; However, it should not be established as a sweeping rule that the court will never appoint a temporary receiver, just because the plaintiff demanded a sum of money, but it all depends on the special circumstances of the case."
- 73. About four years ago, when a debtor filed an application with the Supreme Court for leave to appeal against the decision of the Beer Sheva District Court, which appointed a receiver for all of his assets, for the purpose of executing a monetary judgment (the applicant was obligated, personally, to pay all the debts of the company he managed, and which was in liquidation proceedings), Judge Asher Grunis rejected the request for leave to appeal without the need for an answer (Civil Appeal Authority 5222/04 Dr. David Fischer v. Zvi Yochman, CPA, Liquidator, Piskei Din 59(3) 481, paragraph 7, at p. 486, opposite letter C; Hereinafter - "Parashat Fisher").
In the framework of his decision, Justice Grunis relates to the issues I raised above, and presents the legal situation, in a nutshell, as follows (The Fisher Case, ibid., paragraph 3, p. 483, opposite the letter G - p. 484, opposite the letter C):