We are not only dealing with the right of the creditor (who became the winner after the judgment - i.e., 'one to whom a judgment was acquitted' - within the meaning of this term in section 1 of the Execution Law), but also the effect of the effectiveness of the execution system on the general public, as part of the trust of the entire population in the judicial system; for what would it look like for a court that toiled and bothered to issue a judgment, but this judgment is not implemented in the Writ of Execution?!
It is clear to all that at the end of a criminal proceeding, when a court orders the defendant's imprisonment, this is done immediately, and the policeman or court guard takes the defendant from the courtroom to the detention room, and from there to the prison. Thus, it is clear and clear to the public that the judicial system decides, and its instructions are carried out.
It is appropriate that equal law should also apply to a judgment in the civil field, because the public's trust in the judicial system is indivisible."
- In Parashat Felman The aforementioned was the focus of the discussion, the enforcement of the alimony ruling, through the Execution Office, including: the use of a means of delaying exit from the country, but the matter can also be applied, by way of analogy, to our parasha, in which I must decide whether there is room to take a collection and enforcement proceeding of "Execution of Honesty", i.e., the appointment of a receiver, after a judgment.
- The conclusion deriving from the "new" role of the litigants, After The issuance of a judgment requires thinking through other "glasses", in the direction of increasing the effectiveness of the execution of the judgments, not only for the sake of the specific winner, but also as part of the court's tasks to strengthen the rule of law and increase the public's confidence in the court system, as I also said in the Felman The above.
- From this, I conclude that today, after 1992 (the date of the enactment of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty), an even more expansive interpretation should be given, than in the past, to the courts' powers to appoint receivers, after a judgment has been rendered.
- In any event, there is no justification - as the respondent's counsel argued before me - to limit this power of appointing a receiver, after a judgment.
- I will reiterate that there is a difference between a temporary receiver and a receiver after a judgment has been rendered.
In the Telepaz case, we saw that there are different approaches with respect to the authority to appoint a temporary receiver, which, in my opinion, can be resolved, so that the dispute between the judges is not classified as a dispute of principle. It seems to me that there is much in common about the separating judgments of the various judges in the Telepaz case, when the different result stems from the assessment of the facts in the specific case, when the legal rule is common to them, and it is applied on a factual-evidentiary basis: the greater the fear of asset smuggling, and the fewer means, such as temporary foreclosure, the more they will not help, then the appointment of a temporary receiver should be allowed. On the other hand, when the "battle picture" is ambiguous, there is a growing concern that the careless and too quick use of a temporary receiver's "weapon" could "liquidate" a business, which will then be very difficult, if at all, to re-establish it, when it becomes clear that there was no place to appoint a temporary receiver in the first place (and this is in the spirit of the words of the Honorable Justice Edmond Levy in the aforementioned Telpaz case , as cited above in paragraph 85).
- After presenting the normative basis, at some length, I may proceed to a detailed examination of the situation of the parties in the case before me, for the purpose of examining the applicants' request to appoint their attorney as receiver over the respondent's assets, the limitations and special powers included in the application, and which were brought at the beginning of this decision (see: paragraph 22 above).
From the General to the Individual on the Issue of the Appointment of the Receiver
- I noted that according to the case law (see, for example, the Cohen-Reich, as stated above in paragraph 45), there is no need to prove, as a prerequisite for an application for the appointment of a receiver after a judgment, that the attempts to enforce the judgment failed in the Writ of Execution.
In that case, no execution case was opened at all, and despite this, the Supreme Court approved the decision of the District Court's president on duty to appoint a receiver.
- In the case before me, the applicants made an attempt (TEST-CASE), and the thick book they submitted to me proved that 51 proceedings yielded only ILS 150 (see: paragraph 39 above).
Hence, the Applicants have shown, correctly, that the Execution Mechanism is incapable of enforcing the judgment.
- President Shamgar also explicitly states in the Roth (Name, p. 116, between the letters A-B), that there are cases in which the Execution Office is unable to enforce a judgment against the debtor, and then the appointment of a receiver is required after the judgment.
- Even the lack of the authority of the head of the Execution Office to appoint a receiver for all of the debtor's assets, but only for a single and located asset, by virtue of Section 53 to the Execution Law (which I dealt with above, in paragraphs 49-53) strengthens the applicants' request.
- Moreover, the positions presented by the respondent himself in the cross-examination, on January 14, 2008, and the words of his lawyer, Adv. Shilo, at that hearing, are such that they can be summarized by the fact that the spirit of the respondent's words is as follows: I am sure that I am right. I am sure that both the arbitrator and the court are wrong. I believe that in the future it will turn out that I was right. Therefore, I have no intention of cooperating or helping to carry out the judgment that was handed down against me. For my part, I will take any procedure that will lead to postponement and delay in the implementation of the judgment, and I will certainly act in a "sit and don't" manner. As far as I am concerned, this is what the respondent thinks, and sometimes the respondent also says, the collection of the sums that were awarded to my debt is the problem of the winner. As long as I have a lawyer who succeeds in 51 proceedings to prevent the collection of the ILS 20,000 that was awarded to me, and at the end of those proceedings, I was charged only ILS 150, I am willing to continue on this path, for another 20 years, and the main thing is that the winner will not receive any money whatsoever, which I - subjectively - am sure he does not deserve.
- The court is not a "thought police." I cannot order the respondent to think that the judgment is just, correct, and reflects the legal situation in the State of Israel. The respondent can believe, in his heart, that he is deprived and that an unjust judgment was given against him by the arbitrator (I do not believe so, as I explained in my judgment above; see: paragraphs 13-20 above).
- In any case, the court is in charge of the rule of law. As long as my judgment (which gives effect to the arbitrator's award) has not been amended, changed or annulled by the Supreme Court, it is my duty to take every legal proceeding so that the judgment will be enforced, both in order to ensure the rights of the applicants, and in order to achieve the public, educational, and even deterrent goal.
Leaving the status quo (and this, in fact, is what the respondent and his lawyer are striving for) is inconsistent with the declaration of allegiance given by me before my appointment as a judge, in which it is stated: "I pledge to remain loyal to the State of Israel and its constitutions, to administer a just trial, not to bias the law and not to show kindness" (section 6 of the Basic Law: The Judiciary).