A contempt of court proceeding under section 6 of the Contempt of Court Ordinance of 1929 is a special proceeding, which is located in the "twilight zone between the civil proceeding and the criminal proceeding" (Criminal Appeal 519/82 Greenberg v. State of Israel, PD 37(2) 187 (1983)). The purpose of this proceeding is to bring about the existence of a judicial order, and to execute it by means of a fine or imprisonment (Miscellaneous Criminal Applications 4445/01 Gal v. Katsovashvili, IsrSC 56(1) 210 (2001)). The basic concepts are that a contempt of court proceeding is not a punitive proceeding in its essence, but its main purpose is to enforce the judicial decision that was given with a forward-looking view (Civil Appeals Authority 3888/04 Sharbat v. Sharbat, 49 PD 59(4), paragraph 8 of the judgment of Justice Arbel (2004)). The measure imposed by virtue of a contempt of court proceeding is of the nature of coercion to commit an act, or to cease to act, and is not concerned with staining the violator of the order with a punitive stain (Criminal Appeal 1160/98 Shizap Marketing, Initiation and Construction Projects v. Ashkenazi, PD 55(1) 230 (2000); Criminal Appeals Authority 7148/98 Ezra v. Zelezniak, PD 35(3) 337, 346 (1999); Civil Appeal 371/78 Hadar Lod Taxis v. Biton, PD 34(4) 232, paragraph 8 of the judgment of Justice Barak (1980)). Hence, there is no room for taking a proceeding under section 6 of the Ordinance, where enforcement of the judicial order is not possible (The Greenberg Case, ibid.). On the other hand, if the execution of the order is physically and legally feasible, and there is a reasonable concern that the order will not be fulfilled in the future, there is room to initiate contempt of court proceedings, in order to enforce its existence with a forward-looking view.
A contempt of court proceeding is an extreme enforcement proceeding whose consequences by way of imposing a continuous fine or imprisonment can be very harmful. The ongoing fine is liable to severely harm a person's pocket, and imprisonment severely harms his personal liberty, which is a basic right of the person, recognized in theBasic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Against this background, the use of enforcement means under the Ordinance must be done sparingly, as an exceptional matter limited to situations in which all other means have already been exhausted and have not been effective, and there is only a contempt of court proceeding left to ensure the enforcement of the judicial provision ( The Greenberg Case, ibid., at p. 192). Since the contempt proceeding is aimed at the future, as a deterrent against the violation and the prevention of the continuation of the violation in the future, and it does not bear a punitive nature, where the violation has been completed and can no longer be corrected, no proceeding will be taken in accordance with the Contempt of Court Ordinance. Particularly important for our purposes is the principle that a judicial order whose enforcement is required must have a clear and unequivocal content, and be based on solid foundations. An order that is ambiguous and ambiguous, or whose meaning is not sufficiently clear, does not apply the mechanisms of a contempt of court proceeding to its violation. (Parashat Sharbat, ibid., paragraph 12; The Ezra case v. Zlozniak, ibid., at p. 348)."
- On November 28, 2002, a judgment was given (when my position was joined by Justice Boaz Okun and Judge Hannah Ben Ami) in an appeal against the decision of the Jerusalem Magistrate's Court, to obligate a woman to pay ILS 300 for each day on which she does not carry out a judgment to dissolve the sharing of the apartment shared by her and her husband. The Magistrate's Court's judgment requires cooperation between the parties, since the division of the apartment is a division in kind (see: Other Criminal Appeal (Jerusalem) 1006/01 Fortuna Breda Lucky N. Menashe Barda, [Published in Nevo],).
In that case, I saw fit to present the dual view of contempt of court proceedings: the solution to the concrete problem of the litigants, and the need to respect the rule of law, in general. And this is what I wrote in my opinion in the aforementioned judgment (paragraph 46):