Taking into account the date of its signing, the end of the period of the agreement was therefore in June 2018, when both parties have the right to notify in advance that the period will not be extended and that the agreement will come to an end.
- Given these provisions, this case should have taken into account from the outset the possibility that the agreement would not last as both parties had hoped and even expected, with all that this entails.
In fact, a notice of flames given in July 2017 led to the termination of the agreement in January 2018, which was only about 5 months earlier than the end of the original period of the agreement.
- On the theoretical and principled level, the agreement allowed Lehavot to bring the agreement to an end, with advance notice, long beforehand. There was no minimum period before which Lehavot would not be able to make use of its right to bring the agreement to an end. For example, Lehavot could have given notice of the termination of the agreement in June 2016 (a year after it came into effect) and then would have reached an end as early as December 2016. See above the reference to the testimonies on behalf of Danan according to which the first period of the agreement was also intended to be a kind of pilot, examination, And so on.
The fact that it is not in dispute that the parties hoped and hoped for a long and prosperous engagement does not confer rights beyond those granted in the agreement or proved by evidence, especially since the agreement includes a provision according to which there shall be no effect of any understanding, undertaking, representation and the like, express or implied, to the extent that they existed, prior to its signing.
- In these circumstances, there may also be an inherent difficulty in establishing a causal connection between the alleged violations and the damage alleged in this issue, as required by compensation for a breach under Section 10 of the Drugs Law and Case Law (Matter Cooper, section 42).
- In view of the conclusion regarding the rejection of the requirement in this component, There is no need to go into the many issues discussed In his case by the parties, including in lengthy investigations, including: the question of the classification of salary costs (and I am inclined to accept that the accounting classification as investments or expenses[8] does not raise or lower our case); The reasonable scope of the training period in each field, the identity of the employees whose employment should be attributed in each period to the flames and whether the entire employment of each of these employees or only a relative part and which should be attributed to this activity, and more.
Loss recorded in the books
- The demand in the amount of ILS 564,191 (section 101)II. above) refers to the loss caused to Danan as a result of "that in the first year she was forced to bear losses from the activity of installing the products" and "a loss recorded in the books due to the cessation of the activity" (paragraph 8 of the statement of claim). In its summary, Danan refers to this component as "loss from discontinued activity."
- The amount of the demand is based on an explanation of Danan's audited reports (M/125, p. 2251) and stems from various expenses, including work, car, rent, etc., which were allegedly incurred as part of the activity with Lahavot.
Danan deals with this demand together with the demand for expenses for the fulfillment of the agreement (while arguing that, contrary to the expert's position, there is no overlap or duplication between some of the sums in these requirements). Here, too, the position is that if it were not for Lehavot's conduct, Danan would have "enjoyed the fruits of its investment over the years" (paragraph 40 of its summaries).
- These demands were rightly discussed. Here, too, we are dealing with a demand for reliance compensation, for expenses incurred in reliance on the obligation to fulfill the contract, and which are intended to place the contractor in the place where he would have been had the contract not been concluded.
As explained above, this requirement is inconsistent with the requirement for subsistence compensation. Other comments mentioned above also apply to her. What was said in the previous chapter is also relevant here. The demand in this regard is denied.