I am of the opinion that this principle derives from basic intellectuals with respect to any situation in which a mistake is discovered, and an error discovered in our judgment does not constitute any exception.
- In applying the aforesaid to the circumstances of the case at hand, I am of the opinion that the correction of the mistake requires the acceptance, in essence, of the application before us.
For this purpose, let us assume that the respondent's counsel, immediately after the words of my colleague, the judge Y. Elron, would have gone out for a short consultation and reiterated and announced that in light of the court's words, the respondent retracts her request to convict the applicant of the offenses of rape by fraud and indecent act by fraud, but insists on the conviction of the applicant for the offense of assault and wishes to argue in this matter. Suppose that the Applicant's counsel had announced, in response, that in these circumstances she wishes to argue regarding the exercise of the authority under Section 216 30The Criminal Procedure Law, in order to convince us not to convict the applicant of the offense of assault as well.
In my opinion, there is no doubt that in these circumstances, my colleagues and I, respecting the respondent's notice, would have heard arguments regarding the use of the authority under Section 216 30The Criminal Procedure Law, and at most convict the applicant of the offense of assault.
Moreover, even in the course of the proceedings as in practice - the delivery of a notice on behalf of the Respondent about a week later - but assuming that there would not have been a mistake in understanding the Respondent's position in her notice of September 26, 2024, I can testify that I would not have joined the judgment convicting the Applicant of fraudulent rape offenses after the Respondent withdrew her request to convict him of this offense.
Whatever the circumstances, my position is that we should aspire to an outcome that nullifies the applicant's conviction for the offenses of fraudulent rape.
- My colleagues, Justice Stein and Justice Y. Elron, who joined his opinion, are of the opinion that the motion before us should be dismissed, while leaving the judgment in the appeal to stand. Their position, in essence, is based on the view that, at the end of the day, and despite the misunderstanding of the respondent's position, the applicant's conviction for the offenses of fraudulent rape is grounded in law; on the view that the appellate court has the authority to convict the applicant of the offenses of fraudulent rape despite the respondent's retraction of its request to convict him of these offenses; and the opinion that this authority should be exercised in our case.
My opinion is not the same as that of my colleagues, but before I explain my opinion, I would like to remove from the chapter two arguments that the Applicant has repeatedly repeated, and which in my opinion have no substance: