The first - The argument that the respondent retracted the appeal. As the Respondent claimed and as my colleague emphasized, the judge א' שטיין, the Respondent retracted its request, which was the basis of the appeal that it filed, to convict the Applicant of the offenses of which he was charged in the indictment, but at the same time sought to convict him of another offense, and that too in the framework of the appeal she filed. The clear conclusion is that the Respondent did not withdraw the appeal and this was already evident from her notice of September 26, 2024 (which constitutes, according to the Applicant, a withdrawal from the appeal). At the same time, I will note that I do not see room to join the harsh criticism, in my colleague's opinion, of the very raising of the said argument, and against the counsel for the applicant who raised it.
The second - The Applicant argues (a claim that he repeated many times, both before us, in the petition to the High Court of Justice and in his request for an additional hearing), that he relied on the Respondent's notice of September 26, 2024, which was expressed, as it were, in the choice to focus on the argument regarding the use of the authority according to Article 216 to the Criminal Procedure Law and not to a conviction for the offenses of rape by fraud. The Applicant even went so far as to claim that as a result of the aforesaid, his right to defend himself was violated and the fairness of the entire proceeding was impaired. These arguments are completely baseless: the respondent's notice of September 26, 2024 was given after all the arguments of the parties, regarding the motion to convict the applicant of the offenses of fraud and indecent act of fraud, were heard. All that was given to the applicant was the right to complete an argument regarding the possibility of using the authority according to the Article 216 of the Criminal Procedure Law, and these words were expressed, unequivocally, in the decision given after the hearing, as follows: