At first glance, this is a clear stipulation that places the act of signing as a condition without which there is no need to perfect the contract, in the sense of "in the absence of a signature - there is no contract". However, a careful reading shows that things are not as they see. This, first and foremost, is due to the simple reason that the signature requirement that appears in the section refers to Draft A or B - and to them only. On the other hand, the signature requirement is not mentioned as a condition for the binding status of the DetailsAll. It is therefore clear that the validity of the particulars was not revoked, but due to the fact that the Patriarch and the representatives of the JNF did not sign it.
- Tracing the reason why the detail was not signed only strengthens this conclusion. As emerges from the evidence and the findings determined by the District Court, it becomes clear that not only did the lack of signature not stem from a lack of discretion, but that the entire purpose of the particular's existence and the ceremony of its reading were done in order to Express the final opinion of the parties and to grant Binding Validity to the agreements they reached, and this Without that they would be required to sign it (the signing ceremony of the brief, in the presence of two retired judges, was much more "festive" than the handshake and the launch of a toast as described). Other Municipality Requests 692/86 Yaakov Butkovsky & Co. - Import & Marketing Company inTax Appeal v. Gat, IsrSC 44(1) 57 (1989) (hereinafter: the Botkowski), where the court recognized discretion even in the absence of a signature on the document). The parties did not sign the particular, in view of the assumption of the Patriarch at that point in time, who saw himself prevented from committing on behalf of the Patriarchate as long as he did not receive the letter of recognition from the Government of Israel. This was testified by Attorney Elhanani, who noted that "in terms of the agreements, everything was finalized and formulated," but the fact that the Patriarch had not yet received the approval of the Israeli government for his tenure bothered him, and he claimed that he could not sign because he had no official status in Israel. Therefore, "we searched for creative ways of formulating an agreement, giving external expression to the final opinion of the parties without the patriarch violating the principle of the appointment," with the understanding that "the ceremonial will give expression to the binding, concluding and finalized nature of the matter" (transcript of October 31, 2017, p. 59). And:
"The other side comes and tells me that this is the agreement to which I am committed... I just have a formal problem in the State of Israel that my status is not recognized, so I don't sign, but I am willing to commit and declare and create a binding structure in any way you propose so that you can rest assured that it is final, valid and binding. [...] that the Patriarch should maintain his principle that he does not want to sign because he was not recognized, and on the other hand, he is willing to commit, and this path was chosen" (Transcript of December 14, 2017, p. 118).