In fact, the clause enumerates a number of contractual provisions: receipt of a letter of recognition from the Israeli government; Notifying the JNF of receipt of the letter of recognition; Approval of the Holy Synod of the Settlement Agreement; the approval of the JNF's authorized institutions for the settlement agreement; and the signing of the settlement agreement within 7 days of the government's approval. It should be noted that the question of whether these contractual provisions are stipulations that impose obligations on one of the parties to the agreement, or whether they are external suspension terms to the contract, the fulfillment of which "brings to life" other obligations in the contract - is also an interpretive question. We will examine the matter and the question of whether these conditions were met.
(1) Receipt of a letter of recognition from the Government of Israel
- We noted that the receipt of the letter of recognition was a condition, as it was uncertain and external to the parties and depended on the decision of the Israeli government (Peaceful and Plant, at p. 585). The wording of the section ("Immediately Upon receipt of the letter of recognition") we learn that the receipt of the letter of recognition is the first condition that should have been met, and that it "triggered" the other provisions of the agreement according to which the parties were required to move forward for the purpose of executing the particular.
The difficulty that arises with regard to this condition stems from the provision of clause 6.2 of the Particular, in which it is stated that "The summary stated in all of this detail and everything related to it will be void if the government's approval is not received by August 15, 2007, unless the parties agree to postpone the said date" (emphasis added - 10). As we know, the letter of recognition was signed only on December 24, 2007, about four months after the date stated in the particular. Does this delay lead to the conclusion that the suspension condition was not fulfilled and thus prevented the perfection of the particulars as a binding contract? Or did the parties agree to postpone the date set in accordance with the provision of clause 6.2 SIFA?