HCJ 5819/24 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Minister of Defense

High Court of Justice 5819/24

High Court of Justice 27156-08-24
High Court of Justice 55368-08-24

Vice President Noam Sohlberg:

1. We have before us motions that were crowned as "motions for the issuance of orders from justice as well as in accordance with the Contempt of Court Ordinance". The petitions are primarily concerned with the petitioners' claim that the state's respondents are not complying with the provisions of our judgment.

Background in Summary

2. The petitions filed in this proceeding focused on the demand toenforce the mandatory conscription on members of the ultra-Orthodox public, and to implement the judgment given in the case of High Court of Justice 6198/23 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Minister of Defense (June 25, 2024) (hereinafter: High Court of Justice 6198/23), in which it was held that "the executive branch does not have the authority to order not to enforce the Defense Service Law on yeshiva students in the absence of an appropriate legislative framework," and that "since an exemption is not enshrined in legislation, the state must act to enforce the law" (emphasis added).
3. On November 19, 2025, the judgment was handed down in the petitions, in which we ordered an absolute order with two heads – one economic-civil, the other criminal. As part of the first heading of the absolute order, it was determined that the government must formulate, within 45 days, an effective policy on the economic-civil level. In this context, it was determined that "the measures chosen must be such that it can be assessed with high probability that they will be effective as a whole, and will bring about real change; Naturally, in such a case, it will be necessary to attribute great weight to the positions of the relevant professional bodies (including the fact that it will not be possible to ignore and refrain from considering measures that the professional bodies believe will be highly effective)"; that the said policy must apply equally to those who have been declared evasives; and that "the continued provision of benefits that are given in a direct or indirect connection to evasion of the duty of conscription should not be allowed", while emphasizing that "most of the measures on the agenda concern the denial of benefits granted by the state; not infringement of granted rights".
4. At the top of the second part of the absolute order, which deals with the criminal realm, it was determined that "the state's respondents must act with due diligence and as quickly as possible, in order to take real criminal proceedings against those who have been declared to be evaders from among the ultra-Orthodox public"; and that "a relevant criterion for this is that it is required to reach an egalitarian situation as soon as possible, within the framework of the existing limitations (in terms of resources and the like), so that the rate of evaders from the ultra-Orthodox public against whom criminal proceedings have been taken will not be lower than that of other publics."
5. Since then, no real steps have been taken to implement the ruling. Indeed, on January 18, 2026, about two weeks after  the date on which it was already required to formulate, according to the ruling, an enforcement policy on the economic-civil level, the issue came up for discussion at the Cabinet meeting, and it was decided to establish a ministerial team to examine the relevant enforcement measures in this context, and to submit its recommendations to the Prime Minister within 30 days. However, 30 days passed without such recommendations being submitted. Beyond that, nothing has been done in favor of advancing the handling of the issue.
6. In the course of the hearing of the applications, the government argued, once again, that in its view, the correct and only way to advance the issue of the enlistment of members of the ultra-Orthodox public is through the enactment of an appropriate law. As we noted further in the judgment, the government did not support this position with a relevant factual basis and with relevant reasons and reasons; in any event, the main difficulty in this position is that it is inconsistent with the law. We discussed this at length in the judgment, and there is no need to repeat what is stated there (see paragraphs 57-60). Nor is it superfluous to mention that already in Decision 682 of June 25, 2023, the government announced its intention to "formulate a new legislative arrangement", but even after almost 3 years, no such arrangement was enacted (in fact, declarations of intention to formulate a legislative arrangement in this matter have been heard continuously for about 8 years, since the state's respondents began filing requests for an extension to suspend the validity of the judgment in the High Court of Justice case 1877/14 The Movement for Quality Government v. the Knesset (September 12, 2017)). Hence, in any case, the power of this explanation  will  not endanger
7. It was further argued on behalf of the Government, by the Cabinet Secretary, that "there is a substantial gap" between what was stated in the Notice of Update that was submitted for our review, and the opinions of the various ministries. Thus, according to him, there is no staff work that indicates the effectiveness of the measures detailed in the Notice of Update, and there are even legal difficulties with respect to them. A review of the Opinions that were attached shows that the matter is not so simple. In any event, if the government believes that one step or another is ineffective, it is clear that it could, within the framework of the implementation of the judgment, have decided to take other steps, to demand that this or that ministry deepen the work of the staff in lieu of the work that was presented, and so This was not done. Moreover, during the oral hearing, we asked, more than once or twice, what alternative, more effective steps the government deems appropriate to take, in place of those detailed in the update notice. We  have not received a response. Nor is it superfluous to mention in this context that the measures on the agenda, or close to them, are included in the bill that the government is promoting to regulate the issue of conscription. As we noted in the judgment  , "Given that the bill – in which the government itself claims that the way to resolve the issue lies – explicitly specifies these enforcement measures, it will not be easy to accept an argument on behalf of the government that such economic measures are not effective at all in its view" (ibid., para. 64; for details of some of the steps listed in the bill, see paragraphs 63-64).
8. The significance of this is that the provisions of the judgment are not complied with. We emphasize that this is not 'only' a matter of fulfilling the provisions of the judgment, but rather of enforcing the law; The provisions of the Defense Service Law [Consolidated Version], 5746-1986 (hereinafter: the Defense Service Law), which establishes a general and equal duty of conscription, are  not implemented; nor are they enforced. This conduct contradicts basic concepts regarding the rule of law (High Court of Justice 18225-06-25 Gilon v. The Movement for Quality Government in Israel, para. 3 (August 10, 2025); see also: High Court of Justice 2144/20 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Speaker of the Knesset, para. 4 (March 25, 2020) (hereinafter: High Court of Justice 2144/20));  High Court of Justice 4247/97 Meretz faction in the Jerusalem Municipality v. Minister of Religious Affairs, para. 6 (December 15, 1998)).
9. This is all the more true, taking into account the sequence of proceedings on the agenda. As may be recalled, what led to the filing of the petitions in this case in the first place was the refraining from acting to enforce the obligation to enforce the duty of conscription enshrined in the Defense Service Law on members of the ultra-Orthodox public, even after the ruling in the High Court of Justice case 6198/23, in which it was explicitly determined that action must be taken to enforce the law. Thus, time after time, there are no actions to enforce the mandatory conscription  .

Conclusion - Operative Instructions

10. Against the background of the aforesaid, and since no concrete steps have been presented that indicate an intention to act to enforce the duty of conscription, and to comply with the provisions of the judgment, which stemmed from clear and unequivocal provisions of the law, there is no choice but to order operative measures, which are nothing but the direct implementation of the judgment. For the avoidance of doubt, there is no dispute that the way forward is for the government to determine how to implement the legal duty that applies to it. Thus we said in the judgment: "Our role, at least at this stage, is therefore not to order the advancement of specific measures, one kind or another, but only to insist on the general legal duty imposed on the government, and to outline guidelines for its compliance; The exact way in which this duty will be implemented will be determined by the government. This is the case at this time, but as long as the breach of the duty continues, it is possible that we will be required to do more in the future." After about six months, in which no action was taken to comply with the provisions of the law and to implement the judgment, we are forced to do so.
11. Before we dive into the substance of the operative measures, it is necessary to revisit the broad context of the matter. In accordance with the prevailing legal situation, the obligation to conscript imposed by the Defense Service Law  applies equally to members of the ultra-Orthodox public (paragraph 33 of the judgment and the references therein). This has been the normative situation for about 3 years (since Chapter C1 of the Defense Service Law expired on June 30, 2023). During this period, as everyone knows,  "a difficult and terrible war broke out. Many were killed; thousands were wounded, both physically and mentally. Families were torn apart, reservists lost their livelihoods; many soldiers and civilians will carry with them scars that this period has left them for the rest of their lives. We have all gone through a great upheaval, as individuals and as a community" (paragraph 74 of the judgment). Against this background, we were also informed, in the course of the hearing of the petitions, that the IDF is short of thousands of soldiers and fighters. Thus, the provisions of the law, the right to equality, the pressing security need, and the backs of those who bear the burden and those close to them are all trampled under the weight of the ongoing and extensive evasion of the duty to enlist. However, "all this, and those concerned, who are in charge of the issue of conscription  , are in their own hands" (ibid.). Actions for the purpose of implementing the provisions of the law and enforcing the conscription of members of the ultra-Orthodox public are not being carried out.
12. In the judgment, we also noted that "difficult times sometimes require difficult steps; in such severe and extreme circumstances, exceptional, exceptional remedies are required. The current state of affairs, of a conscious and ongoing violation of the Mass Law, with such a severe violation of equality, is unacceptable, all the more so given the urgent, necessary security need to recruit additional conscripts (and later reserves). We have reached the point of pikuach nefesh. Even now, too many, too many of those engaged in the work continue to issue the haftir as in the past, without hearing the cry of those who bear the burden and those close to them, and without providing a proper response to the enormous security challenges. [...] This can no longer be allowed. Not whispering. In our souls, this is literally" (ibid., para. 76). Indeed, this is not the court's way of giving operative instructions of the kind at But the distance between the normal and accepted state of affairs and the current state of affairs is unbridgeable. Under the circumstances of the matter, it seems, and with great regret, that there is no escape. True, we do this with a heavy heart, very heavily, but after countless attempts to take a more moderate path,  there is no choice left.

Operative Provisions - The Economic-Civil Sphere

13. First, it is important to frame things as they are. As far as the measures on the agenda are concerned, we are dealing with the denial of benefits; we are not dealing with a violation of vested As is well known, "a beneficial economic policy [...] does not create an acquired right to continue the policy, even when a person bases his long-term economic planning on the existence of the policy. It is true that there may be an expectation that the policy will continue, but this expectation does not amount to merit" (HCJ 3644/06 Landes v. Ministry of Finance, para. 9 (March 29, 2009) (emphases added); See also, among many: Civil Appeal 8473/08 Haifa Assessor v. Reichbach, para. 24 and the references there (August 26, 2012)). In any event, we are also not dealing with a 'punishment' (see and compare: High Court of Justice 6314/17 Namnam v. Government of Israel, para. 10 (June 4, 2019); these words were said in a different context, but they are also valid in our case).
14. This, of course, also has implications for the explicit requirement of authorization, since with regard to this requirement, it is necessary to understand "the nature of the harm at The law of infringement of the core of a basic right (constitutional or otherwise [...]) is not the same as the law of infringement of the margins of the right – and certainly there is no law of infringement of the right as the law of denial of a benefit that does not amount to an acquired right" (High Court of Justice 1550/18 The Secular Forum Association v. Minister of Health, paragraph 2 of the opinion of Justice N. Hendel (April 30, 2020); emphasis added). Therefore, as a rule, the degree of authorization required for the purpose of denying benefits granted by virtue of a benevolent economic policy that does not amount to a vested right does not necessarily establish a requirement for primary legislation (as implied by the government's position); This is even more true where we are dealing with benefits that were not granted in the first place by virtue of primary legislation, but rather by virtue of administrative decisions.
15. To be precise: even if the issue of conscription of members of the ultra-Orthodox public, with all its derivatives, is not included in the direct purpose for which a particular benefit is given, there is no impediment, in terms of the rules of administrative law, to bring it into the full range of considerations, and to make its granting conditional on the regulation of the status of those who are liable for conscription vis-à-vis the military authorities. This, knowing that "it has already been held in the past that there is nothing wrong with the various branches of the executive branch acting with general public considerations in mind, even if these deviate from the subjects of the specific field in which they are responsible" (HCJ 612/81 Shavo v. Minister of Finance, IsrSC 36(4) 296, 301 (1982)). This is appropriate, broadly, with regard to "legitimate general considerations"; in particular, with regard to considerations of equality, national security, and the promotion of the rule of law – these are the relevant considerations in our case (see: Yoav Dotan, Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion, 2, 614-619 (2023), and the variety of references therein). This is even more so, in view of the importance and intensity of the public interest at stake. Hence, it is clear that promoting enlistment for military service is a legitimate general purpose, which the state authorities are entitled, as a rule, to consider when determining the conditions of entitlement to receive a particular benefit. This is without the possibility of harming basic rights in a disproportionate manner, and provided that there is a basis to assume that the entitlement to that benefit will indeed affect, positively or negatively, the possibility of advancing this purpose.
16. In the judgment, we said that in the framework of formulating policy on the economic-civilian level, it is required that the measures to be chosen be such that it can be assessed with high probability that they can bring about a real change in the picture of conscription; and that "in such a case, it will be necessary to attribute great weight to the positions of the relevant professionals (including the fact that it will not be possible to ignore and refrain from considering measures that the professionals believe will be highly effective)" (ibid., para. 66). In the update notice submitted on behalf of the state's respondents, various benefits were presented, which were classified according to the degree of effectiveness and applicability attributed by the professionals in the government ministries to the contingent on arranging legal status vis-à-vis the military elements. These benefits have been distributed to three groups relevant to our case:

(1) Benefits that are already provided subject to arranging legal status with the military, but there is room to improve the manner in which this requirement is implemented.