The (partial) release from the agreement on the issue of property taxes in our case
- I am of the opinion that in our case as well, the respondent did not show sufficient justification for releasing from the agreement reached between the parties in 1996. The judgment that is the subject of the appeal was rendered, as noted, following the judgment of the District Court in the Mevo'ot Hermon. At the outset, with the first demand, there was a very significant financial gap between the payment that was required under the agreement, which was ILS 312,600, and the first corrective assessment. According to the first corrective assessment, the appellant was supposed to pay the sum of approximately ILS 1,500,000. On another corrective assessment, which is similar to the first corrective assessment in our case, the court criticized the Mevo'ot Hermon and rejected the claim that the property tax administrator had supposedly made a "mistake". The court added in the same matter that None The entire land division should be treated as "electrical facilities" in the category of "offices, services and commerce" and the nature of the area and the quality of the facilities on it should not be ignored. The court reached the conclusion that the land division (which is most of the area) is not an "electricity facility" and the charge imposed there on the electric company in the category of "offices, services and commerce" was canceled. In both cases, the one described in the Mevo'ot Hermon And the case that is the subject of the appeal was the release from the consent following legal advice given by that lawyer. There is no need to elaborate on the issue of the overall claim of release because in our case, and following the judgment in the Mevoot Hermon, The respondent retracted its attempt to be completely free from the agreement and issued the second corrective assessment, which is the assessment that is the subject of the appeal. Indeed, in Parashat Mevo'ot Hermon The District Court allowed a partial release from the consent. In our case, the respondent cancelled the total release and made do with a partial release. In our case, the financial expression of the partial release underlying the assessment The second It is completely marginal. This is 667 square meters out of 30,000 square meters, while with regard to the remaining 29,233 square meters, the respondent did not dispute in the framework of the partial release that it is only "occupied land" that should not belong to the category of "offices, services and commerce". As explained, a release from consent may be justified for reasons of public interest. In my opinion, taking into account the financial gap that remains, and the counter-arguments that the appellant has, which may even reduce the gap, the public interest does not "justify" the release and the litigation that the parties, in the first place, sought to prevent in the original agreement. As described above, the balance between conflicting interests should take into account the Intensity Harm to conflicting interests. Even assuming that the Respondent is correct in all of its arguments, and that the Appellant has no additional arguments that deserve to be considered, the intensity of the harm to the collection of the Truth Tax - according to the second assessment (as opposed to the first) - is small. And more: as in the case of Aloni Complex, even in his case, at least with respect to most of the area that the Respondent considers to be built-up area, it is not clear that it is precisely the Respondent's method that means the collection of "real tax", and that it is indeed a "building". This was indeed determined in the Mevo'ot Hermon, but no appeal was filed against the ruling in question.
- In an affidavit in support of the amended administrative petition, the IEC (the appellant before us) explained the background to the agreement entered into in 1996:
"18. For the sake of completeness of the picture, it should be noted that the dispute that existed between the Council and the Electric Company related to the manner in which the various parts located in the station were charged.
- As stated, the station covers an area of 28,690 square meters, and includes a command building, land on which electricity poles and power lines are scattered, branching boxes, anchors and other accessories, roads, as well as an area of land, which includes most of the station's area, which is land free of any object or property that has not been used in any way, and constitutes only a reserve for future development.
- In order to simplify the resolution of the dispute, the parties reached a compromise agreement whereby the entire station would be charged general property tax according to a uniform and single classification and tariff, which in fact expressed a kind of average between the various properties located in the station, each according to its area. Only in view of this agreement did the need to classify the various parts of the station with a classification and the appropriate tariff for each of them became obsolete.
- As stated, the tariff that was finally set for the area of the station, i.e., ILS 8 per square meter, in fact expressed a kind of average among the various properties located in the station, each according to its area. In agreeing to impose such a charge with respect to the entire area of the station, the IEC took into account the fact that the station has a command building with an area of 165.5 square meters, an area of land that constitutes the 'parade area' which is exempt, according to the law of municipal taxes, or alternatively, at most can be charged as occupied land, as well as land that is free of any object or property that has not been used, but rather constitutes a reserve for future development. which is exempt from arnona obligation, since it is building land."
- In the response on behalf of the respondent, it was argued that it was not the IEC that gave up to the respondent with its consent to raise the uniform charge rate to 8 square meters, but rather the opposite. The Respondent was the one that conceded to the IEC by agreeing to a uniform tariff that was ILS 4.6 per square meter lower than the tariff approved by the ministers six months before the compromise, which stood at ILS 12.6 per square meter. Therefore, it is claimed, the IEC wishes to preserve the agreement signed seven years ago "since it is well aware that this agreement has benefited it significantly at the expense of the other taxpayers who pay their taxes lawfully to the Council" (paragraph 24 of the response). However, the respondent did not explain in her reply why she agreed She to a compromise made in 1996. The trial court explicitly ruled that the decision to sign the contract was "a conscious and considered decision that was the result of a compromise between the parties." It also ruled that "the contract reflected a fair compromise between the various factual and legal claims of the two parties." The Respondent therefore does not contradict the argument that this was a compromise and on average between the various properties on the site, and I will mention that according to the judgment in the Aloni Complex The "average" consideration was recognized as a legitimate consideration in the compromise.
- Later on, the respondent mentions in her response four reasons for canceling the agreement:
(a) The charging of the electricity poles, the parades and the census structure at the rate of occupied land constituted a prohibited discount on arnona.