(b) The continued existence of the agreement contradicts the public interest of legally charging taxpayers, especially in light of the "extreme" gaps between the uniform tariff set in the agreement (ILS 8 per square meter) and the tariff that applies to the buildings - ILS 49.99 per square meter. Therefore, the "discharge rule" applies.
(c) The agreement expires because in tax law each tax year stands on its own.
(d) The agreement is not limited in time and therefore can be terminated with reasonable advance notice to the other party.
- In its ruling, the court rejected the last two arguments, but accepted the first two. In my opinion, even the first reasons do not justify it. In the circumstances of the case, release from the agreement.
- I will begin with the second reason: Indeed, Regarding the built-up area There is prima facie a large gap between the tariff set in the agreement and the tariff that applies (according to the respondent). However, the built-up area is only a small area of the 30,000 square meters on which the station is located, and in fact it constitutes only 2% of it. As I have shown, the gaps between the parties are in fact not "extreme." This is, according to the second corrective assessment, a gap of about ILS 26,000 for the entire site. The Respondent criticizes the Appellant, who stands by her arguments despite the fact that the amount in dispute is small. But the opposite is also true: Does the negligible amount of the controversial tax "justify" a release in the name of the public interest? My answer to this is in the negative. It should also be remembered that further clarification of the dispute requires additional litigation in the Appeals Committee and the courts, and at the end of the day - it is difficult to know, without clarifying the disputes, whether it is indeed even a sum of ILS 26,000, or a smaller amount.
- With regard to the first reason mentioned, as well as with regard to the second reason: my opinion is that if we say that the authority must always collect a "true tax", because if it does not do so, it will constitute a prohibited discount on property taxes, then this will prevent the authorities from compromising in matters of property tax. Never, a compromise that does not bring about the legal exhaustion of the disputes between the parties, Maybe Miss the demand to pay "real tax." However, as we have seen, in the case of Aloni Complex It was ruled that the payment of real tax is only One Among the conflicting considerations that must be taken into account. Compromises are also important, which save unnecessary litigation, even when there is no exhaustion of the law. In my opinion, if we uphold the judgment of the first instance, it will be difficult for local authorities to reach further compromises, since the nature of compromises is that they may lead to a discount in the payment of municipal taxes or non-payment of "real tax". However, there is a public interest in ending disputes by way of compromise, and in the circumstances of the case, this interest outweighs the requirement to pay a "true tax".
- Therefore, and in light of the ruling established in the matter Aloni Complex, I am of the opinion that there was no justification for the partial release from the agreement, and the respondent must collect tax only as stated in the settlement agreement.
- The appellant and the respondent submitted, separately, and after the hearing of the appeal, various motions for the attachment of references to judgments rendered in this court. I have examined the applications and the attached judgments and have not found that they are sufficient to change my conclusion. I will only note that the judgment inAAA 11137/04 Yakubowitz v. Iblin Local Council ([Published in Nevo], December 1, 2005) is different from our case, since First There we were talking about an agreement regarding arnona liability that has no documentation and was even denied by the respondent there (contrary to our case, in which there is an explicit written agreement dated December 31, 1996 that was not denied), and secondly, there it was not clear what was behind the alleged agreement and it was determined that it was not an agreement that reflected a compromise and an average or one intended to save the costs of litigation (again, in contrast to our case, where the court explicitly ruled that the contract reflected "a fair compromise between the factual and legal claims of the two parties" and when the consideration of Savings in litigation costs and in the public interest of ending disputes by means of compromise). I also reviewed the "notice" submitted by the Respondent on January 18, 2008, which included a reference to additional reference. I did not find that it would change my conclusion. As to the judgment in AAA 980/04 Hevel Yavne Regional Council v. Ashdod Bonded BTax Appeal ([Published in Nevo], September 1, 2005) to which the Appellant referred: Indeed, in the same matter, my colleague Justice Arbel determined that she Leaning According to the position that even in the case of a change in an incorrect classification, a local authority is required to apply for and obtain the approval of the ministers as aforesaid before the change Regulation 4 30Arrangements Regulations in the State Economy, a matter that was not carried out in our case. However, the matter was ultimately left there in need of consideration, and in any event, in my opinion, the respondent did not show justification for being released from the agreement between the parties, so that the question of changing the classification does not arise at all (and see and compare also with the position of my colleague Justice Arbel inCivil Appeal Authority 11304/03 Credit Cards to Israel in Tax Appeal v. Haifa Municipality, paragraph 15 ([Published in Nevo], 28.12.2005)).
- Therefore, if my opinion is heard, we will accept the appeal against the partial release and oblige the respondent to pay the appellant's expenses as applied by the Registrar and attorney's fees in the amount of ILS 25,000 including VAT.
After these things
- After I wrote my words, I received the opinions of my friends, whose position is different from mine. It seems that the dispute is not about the principles, but about their implementation. In my opinion, in the examination of "exemption" from an agreement, it is not only necessary to examine whether it is a matter of "true tax", especially when the dispute is about a relatively small amount, but weight should also be given to the interests of honoring agreements and ending disputes by way of compromise while reducing litigation. Moreover, since my approach there was no justification for the respondent's release from the agreement between the parties, I did not address the appellant's other arguments. However, as I noted at the beginning of my remarks, whether the release is justified, and in light of my determination of friendship, additional disputes arise. One of those disputes is the appellant's claim that the electricity poles and the parades - which are the main area on which a tariff was imposed not in accordance with the agreement - are entitled to an exemption from municipal taxes in the first place as they are such power lines and connection facilities In section 274B 30The Municipalities Ordinance. My colleague Justice Procaccia, who is joined by my colleague Justice Arbel, states in the matter of the various disputes that "the rulings of the trial court, both on the factual level and on the legal level, are correct, and that there is no reason for the intervention of an appellate court in them" (paragraph 48). However, the appellant argues that in the matter of the exemption according to Section 274B The court ruled one thing and the opposite.
- According to the appellant, the court ruled that the entire land division should not be treated as electrical installations classified in the category of "offices, services and commerce", but rather that occupied land should be separated from all the rest (including the pillars and columns), with the area of each column and arrangement being measured separately. However, with regard to the exemption under Section 274B The court ruled that the issue of property taxes is the entire site and that "there is no reason to break it down into components and examine whether there are elements within it that constitute infrastructure lines or connection facilities and grant them an exemption." According to the appellant, this is an internal contradiction, whereas the court would have adopted the approach that guided it in the central part of the judgment as well as in the Mevo'ot Hermon - If he comes to the conclusion that it is necessary to examine separately whether the columns and the arrangement are connection facilities Exemptions Arnona. An examination of the columns and the alignments in and of themselves leads to the conclusion that they "clearly" meet the required definitions In section 274b. The appellant also refers to the words of the District Court in the Mevo'ot Hermon There, Justice Maman explicitly ruled that "the Chief Legislature did not grant the exemption only to infrastructure lines or connection facilities located on the sides of the roads. In principle, there is no reason not to consider the facilities in the water treatment plant as connection facilities or infrastructure lines, which are exempt from municipal taxes." The appellant further argues that if the exemption argument is accepted, this will of course not exempt the entire area of the station - most of which is "occupied land" that does not benefit from an exemption - but only that small area occupied by the columns and columns (which is the main area in dispute in our case; see and compare in this context: Civil Appeal 975/97 Eilabon Local Council v. Mekorot Water Company, Piskei Din 52(2) 433 (2000); Civil Appeal 8558/01 Eilabon Local Council v. Mekorot Water Company, Piskei Din 57(4) 769 (2003)). Indeed, in the rulings of this Court we can find cases in which such infrastructure lines In section 274B The order was exempted even when they were Inside facility - not as determined by the trial court in our case - and only on Balance The land inside the facility was taxed (see: AAA 1860/06 Petroleum and Energy Infrastructures in Tax Appeal v. Kiryat Tivon Local Council ([Published in Nevo], 16.9.2008); Civil Appeal 2306/04 Petroleum and Energy Infrastructures in Tax Appeal v. Kiryat Tivon Local Council ([Published in Nevo], 7.11.2007)). However, since, as stated, according to my approach, there is no justification for the Respondent's release from the Agreement, the question of the exemption on the pages and arrangements within the Website does not arise, I do not express any position regarding it and I leave it to be examined.
Judge