He says in his book on torts (fifth edition, p. 682) that the cause of the breach of contract is a tort that requires intent and that the liability was not expanded to include negligent conduct on the part of the defendant. Although in some judgments in England it has been held that a blind eye on the part of the defendant or reckless behavior can replace actual knowledge, in those judgments it was not a matter of knowledge of the existence of a contract, but of knowledge of its terms (see, for example, Emerald Constructions v. Lowthian (1966) 1 W.L.R. 691, 700).
In Winfield and Jolowicz's book, On Tort (10th edition, p. 447), the learned authors summarize the halakha as follows:
"It has been said more than once that Reuven must act with knowledge of the existence of contractual relations between Shimon and Levi, and therefore the question arose as to the exact essence and degree of knowledge required of the actual contract and its terms. It seems that this question does not have to cause difficulties, since the real principle is that Reuven should have intended to cause a breach of a contract between Shimon and Levi or should have acted recklessly indifferent to the question of whether the contract was breached or not. It is clear that for this purpose Reuven must have some knowledge of a contract between Shimon and Levi, but there is no need for a precise definition of the scope of that knowledge, since it will vary from case to case, depending on Reuven's behavior."
- I do not need to rule in this case, whether constructive knowledge of the existence of the contract is sufficient to establish liability for the tort of causing a breach of contract, because in my opinion, even if the answer to this question is in the affirmative, it has not been proven that Ben Shachar had constructive knowledge of the existence of the contract between Knopf and Hassid. In order to maintain such knowledge, negligence is not enough, but it is necessary to close one's eyes or be reckless, which amounts to indifference. The circumstances detailed above do not justify the conclusion that Ben Shachar had constructive knowledge that Knopf and Hasid entered into a contract. When the appellant failed to prove the basic "knowingly" in section 62(a) of the Torts Ordinance, her claim was lawfully dismissed, and her appeal should be dismissed.
Judge Beisky: 1. I also see no reason to interfere with the court's finding that Ben Shachar had no knowledge of the existence of a lease contract between respondent No. 1 (hereinafter: Knopf) and appellant No. 1, G. Hassid. Not only did not direct testimony to this come from the mouths of the two, but from the evidence and the circumstances it can be learned that at least Knopf (to a large extent also a Hasid) did not disclose the connection between them in an interlocutor. On the other hand, both of them knew, prior to the engagement and at the time of signing the contract, that Ben Shahar was not going to evict the leased property on the day his contract was about to expire, i.e., on April 30, 1971. To this they confessed; In response to a direct question on the subject, a Chassid said: "I answered him that if Ben Shachar turns his back and refuses to turn around, I will not be able to complain to him, because it was forced upon him just like I did..." Because of this clear knowledge, the lease was intended to begin with.