It is true that ignorance of the details of the contract does not remove liability for tort when a person knowingly and without justification causes another to breach it. However, knowledge of the very fulfillment of the contract is a major element, and the burden of proving the connection of the party's actions with the breach is on the plaintiff.
(See Weinfeld and Yolowitz, supra, p. 446, and Thomson's trial , supra). And besides the mere knowledge of the existence of a specific contract, it is also necessary to prove the intention to cause its breach, as Justice Jenkins said in the aforementioned Thomson trial:
"Actual knowledge of the existence of a particular contract, an intention to bring about the breach of that contract, and unequivocal persuasion, inducement or procurement of the employees concerned to break their contracts of employment to the extent necessary to achieve that the end, must, in my view, be shown".
- Can it be said that in Ben Shahar, the three aforementioned tests were met? I am not prepared to answer this in the affirmative. With regard to his ignorance regarding the fulfillment of a contract between Knopf and Ben Shachar, I have already taken a position; And like my esteemed colleague Justice Y. Cohen, I do not intend to address the question of whether constructive knowledge is sufficient to support the wrongdoing that is the subject of the hearing, because even constructive knowledge should not be attributed to him. In the absence of knowledge of the existence of a contract, in any case, the intention on his part to cause its breach falls short; As for the act of the Ben Shahar party that caused the breach of contract, my esteemed colleague, Judge Ben Porat, sees the very fact of the rent of possession of the leased property and the failure to vacate it at the time when a hasid was supposed to take possession of it according to his contract. I am not of the opinion that for the purpose of the tort of causing a breach of contract, an overt act in the form of active intervention is necessary. It is possible to find certain circumstances in which taking a "sit down and do not do" position will lead to the desired result, where it is the failure to take action that is required in the circumstances of the case, that will lead to a breach of the contract. It is therefore possible that in an appropriate case, sitting without action will also be considered a prohibited intervention that completes the tort; Of course, provided that the other elements mentioned regarding the knowledge of the fulfillment of the contract and the intention to bring about its breach have been met.
In the Torquay Hotel Co. trial The aforementioned Justice Denning brought the opinion that the time has come to expand the tort so that it applies to direct intervention with the intention of preventing the performance of a contract, even if the intervention does not lead to its breach. For this purpose, he listed the foundations that must be fulfilled in this language: