The dispute in the claim that is the subject of the appeal is about the non-delivery of the leased property to the appellant on May 1, 1971, as stated in P/2. The grounds on which the appellant relied were many, but I will touch on them only if necessary, since the appeal before us revolved, as far as the appellants were concerned, on a single ground, which was also rejected: the cause of the breach of contract P/2, which was expressed in Ben Shahar's continued possession of the leased property beyond the deadline.
- At the time of signing P/2, Knopf expressed the concern that Ben Shachar might delay in handing over the leased property, a concern that the appellant was also aware of. Therefore, Dr. Eiger registered August 1, 1971 as the date of commencement of the lease. However, the appellant agreed to release Knopf from responsibility for the delay in the evacuation, as appears from document P/8, addressed to Mr. Israel Knopf. It is stated there:
"I am referring to a lease that we signed today regarding the leased property on Ophir Street, Haifa Shemen Beach.
I am aware that the tenant who currently holds the leased property, i.e. Mr. Ben Shahar on behalf of the Fiberglass Products Planning and Manufacturing Company in a tax appeal, has not yet announced when he will vacate the leased property that he rented by April 30, 1971.
Therefore, I hereby inform the Honorable that the Honorable will not be responsible for the reversal because of the failure of the aforementioned Mr. Ben Shahar to leave on time."
On the basis of this document, Dr. Eiger was satisfied and registered that the lease began in May 1971.
Knopf's argument, which was also joined by Ben Shahar, was that S/2 was nothing more than an apparent contract signed as a means of pressuring Ben Shahar to leave the leased property on time. The claim was rejected. Their argument that contract P/2 is not a "legally binding contract" within the meaning of section 62(a) ofthe Torts Ordinance [New Version], which deals with the cause of breach of contract (quoted below) was also rejected. Their reasoning for this was that Knopf only appears in the contract as a landlord and signs it, even though he is only one of the owners, and it has not been proven that his sister-in-law tempted him to act on her behalf as well. Such a contract is not enforceable, and the only remedy is for compensation, and as such it is not a "legally binding contract" for the purpose of the tort we are dealing with. Ben Shachar now reiterates the two arguments that were rejected before us, as part of his response to the appeal.