The conclusion I have reached is that the exemption (P/8) did not release Ben Shahar from his duty not to interfere with Knopf in handing over the leased property to the appellant when it was already vacant on May 1, 1971. He breached this duty and the breach was the direct and exclusive cause of the failure to deliver the leased property to the appellant within the time agreed upon between him and Knopf.
- In order to understand the other two considerations of the trial court in rejecting the cause of action for breach of contract, I will preface and cite section 62(a) ofthe Torts Ordinance [New Version], which states:
"A person who knowingly and without sufficient justification causes a person to breach a legally binding contract between him and a third person is committing a tort against that third person, but the third person will not be able to pay compensation for this tort unless he has suffered pecuniary damage as a result."
The learned president on duty says about this (p. 18):
"The problem is that there is not the slightest testimony that Ben Shachar knew about the fulfillment of the lease contract, P/2, between Hasid and Knopf. Attorney Eiger openly admitted that he did not inform Ben Shachar of the existence of the lease with Hassid. And Hasid also did not inform Ben Shachar of the fulfillment of the contract. Ben Shachar knew at most that a Chassid was interested in renting the rented one."
As is well known, the defendant on the ground of causing a breach of contract is not obligated to know the content and terms of the
The contract, and it is sufficient if he had general knowledge of its existence that would justify the court's determination that he caused the breach of that contract "knowingly". It is sufficient for this purpose if he "closes his eyes", whether in order not to know about the existence of the contract or not to know that his action will cause a breach of the contract. As an example of the recent case of turning a blind eye, the words taken from the English judgment Emerald Construction Co. Ltd. V. Lowthian (1966) 1 W.L.R. 691, 700-701 also from Lord Dunning: