In my opinion, there is a good distinction between "turning a blind eye" and not knowing out of sheer negligence. The latter exists when a person honestly believes, albeit carelessly, that there is no contractual relationship (for which he is sued). As the Honorable Justice Y. Cohen clarifies in his opinion, there are scholars who believe that negligence is also sufficient as a basis for the tort of causing breach of contract. In addition to the articles mentioned in his opinion, see also section 6.10 of the aforementioned book by Harper and James. However, in light of my conclusion, there is no need for me to take a position on this question.
The testimony of Mr. Aryeh Levin, which was by all indications reliable to the learned President on duty and which is prima facie neutral testimony, fits nicely with the content of the letter P/6 of February 22, 1971, on which I dwelt above. In the first part of the letter, Dr. Eiger says that he understands that Ben Shahar is not interested in entering into a new lease, and therefore his clients are about to rent the place to a new tenant and he will not be able to extend the lease with him. The lack of interest in entering into a new contract attests, at least prima facie, that at that time Ben Shahar believed that he would be able to vacate the place on time. The fact that at the end of the letter he hoped to receive an authoritative response from him, but he ignored the request and the risk that the leased property would indeed be handed over to a new tenant and did not reply. It is not only when the technical problems arose that the application that Mr. Levin testified about, but when Ben Shahar encountered the appellant's demand for payment of rent, he changed his mind and sent the letter to Knopf on April 21, 1971, in which he announced that he had no intention of leaving and that he supposedly had the status of a protected tenant in the leased property. It turns out that he conducted the negotiations at a certain point, but