Judge
Judge Y. Danziger:
- I join the detailed and in-depth judgment of my colleague Justice A. Fogelman.
I, too, as my friends, believe that thePrevention of Infiltration Law (Offenses and Jurisdiction) (Amendment No. 4 and Temporary Order), 5774-2013 does not meet the test of constitutional review and that Section 30A In its new version, it disproportionately violates the right to liberty and the right to dignity enshrined in theBasic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. In addition, the establishment of the residence center (Chapter 4 The law) unlawfully violates basic constitutional rights, in my opinion.
As my colleague, I am also aware that we have a duty to take a cautious, restrained and restrained approach when we come to exercise judicial review and examine the constitutionality of a law of the Knesset, which expresses the will of the people's elected representatives, especially when this examination is carried out with respect to a law that was enacted a relatively short period of time after this Court annulled the previous version of the law in the framework of the judgment In a High Court of Justice case 7146/12 Adam v. Knesset (16.9.2013).
It should be emphasized that we do not underestimate the particular complexity of the phenomenon of infiltration into Israel and its severe consequences, especially for the residents of south Tel Aviv. At the same time, the legislature is obligated to adopt a legislative solution that meets the constitutional requirements and that the harm it will cause to the infiltrators on the one hand and to the residents of south Tel Aviv and other cities on the other will be as limited and proportionate as possible.
- Therefore, I concur with the position of my colleague Justice Fogelman According to which the petition should be rejected In a High Court of Justice case 7385/14 and accept the petition In a High Court of Justice case 8425/13 and adopts the operative arrangements proposed by him in paragraph 197 of his judgment.
- After I joined the position of my colleague the judge Fogelman We have before us the learned opinion of my colleague the President A. Grunis. My colleague the President states that in the framework of constitutional review, great weight should be given to the "legislature's room for maneuver", especially when it is a "second round" of constitutional review, i.e., when the court examines an amendment made by the legislature to the law, after it was invalidated by this court in the "first round". On the level of principle, I accept the approach of my colleague the President, but I disagree with my colleague the President on the question of its application in the present case. In the end, I remained in my opinion, and as stated, I agree with the position of my colleague the judge Fogelman.
Judge