Section 30A It is one of the components that are precisely designed to prevent this state from reaching this state. Unfortunately, in light of the difficult situation in Africa, millions of people are looking for a Western destination country to reach. The responsibility of the state to those who have reached its territory is not the same as that of those who are outside its borders. For years, the state has left its physical and normative boundaries breached. Now that we have come to this point, the state must literally "pay" for this, even in terms of compassion and humanity towards the guests who have long been crowded in our cities, even if we are dealing with uninvited guests. I discussed this above in our discussion In Chapter 4' to the law. However, in contrast to the specific public to whom instructions are directed Chapter 4', the state may take and act in order to prevent the arrival of additional uninvited guests from now on, by placing a normative watchtower in the form of Section 30A to the law, next to the physical barrier of the fence.
While one may wonder about the effectiveness of removing several thousand infiltrators from city centers to stay centers, this is not the case with the effectiveness of the Section 30A to the law. The data brought by my colleague Justice Vogelman in paragraph 38 of his judgment speak for themselves. Only 19 infiltrators entered our country after Amendment No. 4 to the law (of which only 13 remain in custody). The dramatic decline in the number of infiltrators raises reflections on the second unknown in the equation regarding the nature of the infiltrators, and strengthens the assumption that the economic motive has a real weight in choosing the destination country for infiltration. In any event, it seems that the law contributed to the purpose of curbing the phenomenon of infiltration by deterring potential infiltrators.
The claim that the state is "firing a powerful cannon" in the form of holding custody for a period of up to a year, in response to a small-scale phenomenon of new infiltrators, is flawed on the assumption that there is no causal connection between the normative barrier in the form of Section 30Aand the dramatic decline in the number of infiltrators after the amendment. However, as noted, the question of causal connection is one of the two missing points in the equation, and when we come to invalidate a Knesset law, we must take into account the possibility that there is indeed a causal connection between the provision of the law and the result of a large decrease in the number of infiltrators. One of two: if the normative barrier in the figure Section 30A The law has contributed to this result by deterring infiltrators by force, since it is clear that the amendment has achieved its purpose, and anyone who did not infiltrate as a result of the amendment in any case does not have his liberty violated in custody. And if there is no To the section 30A Any contribution of its own to the dramatic decline in the number of infiltrators, when applied to such a small number of infiltrators, dulls the general view of the intensity of the infringement on freedom.