"However, as we have both learned, until we are required to argue the nullity of a law, we must, first and foremost, interpret the law in its language and purpose; to continue to determine the areas of his retirement, and by the way of this interpretation, the burden was placed on us to do our best and to try to reconcile the provisions of the law with the provisions of the Basic Law." (High Court of Justice 9098/01 Genis v. State of Israel, IsrSC 59(4) 241, 257-258 (2004) [emphases added - A.C.]).
In a similar vein, the President noted D. Beinisch In Parashat The Law on the Imprisonment of Unlawful Combatants, because:
"... In our legal system, there is a presumption according to which the legislature must be given awareness of the content and implications of the Basic Laws on any law enacted after them. In accordance with this presumption, a provision of the law is examined while attempting to interpret it in such a way that it is consistent with the protection that the Basic Law interprets on human rights..." (ibid., at p. 351).
Indeed, this Court has repeatedly ruled, time and again, that a reasonable interpretation of a law is preferable to a decision on the question of its constitutionality (see and compare, Hoffnung, at pp. 66-67; High Court of Justice 4562/92 Zandberg v. Broadcasting Authority, IsrSC v.(2) 793, 814 (1996); High Court of Justice 3267/97 Rubinstein v. Minister of Defense, Piskei Din 52(5) 481, 524 (the President) A. Barak) (1998); High Court of Justice 5113/12 Friedman v. Knesset of Israel, [Posted inNevo] Paragraph 5 of the judge's opinion A. Arbel, and the judge's opinion A. Fogelman (August 7, 2012)). Why, then, do my colleagues choose to cancel the Section 30A to the law, instead of interpreting it reasonably, while providing a solution to the constitutional difficulty they voted on? It should be noted that a solution that provides a reasonable interpretation of the law dealing with the period of possession, under the revocation of the law, was adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States in the matter of Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001), which is mentioned by my colleague the Judge Fogelman in paragraph 74 of his opinion. In that case, the Supreme Court of the United States invoked a law that allowed, in its language, the detention of illegal aliens in custody For a period That is not limited in time. The majority opinion in that case focused on the significant constitutional difficulties inherent in the period of detention of infiltrators, which is not limited in time (Name, at p. 690: " A statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious constitutional problem"). However, instead of striking down the law, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled, in a majority opinion, that it should be interpreted in a manner consistent with constitutional standards (Name, at pp. 696-697). Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled (by the judge Breyer) because it is possible to hold an illegal alien in custody only for a reasonable period of time necessary for his deportation. In this context, a presumption has been established that a period of six months is reasonable, after which the detainee must be released from custody if there is no real probability of his deportation in the future (Name, at p. 701). The important point for our case is that in the relevant law that was examined by the Supreme Court of the United States There was no trace of the six-month time period. In other words, the six-month threshold set there, as a non-rigid threshold, was the product of Interpretation Judgmental. This solution was preferred over the sweeping repeal of the law (see the minority judge's criticism Kennedy, who claimed that the majority justices "invented" the six-month threshold ("The 6-month period invented by the Court…"), Name at p. 708).