The main distinction between section 30A according to Amendment No. 3 and Section 30A according to Amendment No. 4 is the length of the maximum period of custody. In fact, the maximum period of custody was reduced from three years to one year, and the amendment applies only to someone who entered Israel illegally only after Amendment No. 4 came into effect (for additional distinctions, see paragraph 44 of the judgment of my colleague, Justice Vogelman). This abbreviation is indeed a significant abbreviation. However, a one-year custodial period still violates the constitutional rights to liberty and dignity, and it appears that this cannot be disputed. Although the infringement is less than that of Amendment No. 3, it is still significant and severe, when liberty is deprived for a year behind bars.
- In the matter Adam The State presented two purposes that are at the basis of the Section 30A. One purpose was to prevent the infiltrators from settling in Israel and for the state to deal with the broad consequences of the phenomenon of infiltration. I was of the opinion there that this purpose does not give rise to a difficulty (however, see the doubts of my colleague, Justice Vogelman, in paragraph 103 of his judgment). It should be noted that this purpose is not mentioned by the State in the context of To the section 30A According to Amendment No. 4. The second purpose presented in the matter Adam, and is still presented today as a basis To the section 30A The purpose of the new is to prevent the recurrence of the phenomenon of infiltration that is actually directed at the population of potential infiltrators to reach the territory of the State of Israel. In the matter Adam I insisted that the meaning of this purpose is in fact deterrence, and even now the state is making it clear Section 30A It is intended to serve as a "normative barrier" that will change the incentives of potential infiltrators seeking to come to Israel. The difficulty that stems from this, I explained, is the state's use of incarceration of infiltrators in order to deter potential infiltrators:
"The difficulty of deterrence is clear. A person is detained not because he personally poses any risk, but because he or she poses a deterrent to others. It is not treated as an end but as a means. This attitude is undoubtedly another violation of his dignity as a person. "Human dignity sees man as an end and not as a means to achieve the goals of others" (Barak, Constitutional Commentary, at p. 421). "Human beings always stand as an end and a value in themselves. They should not be seen as merely a means and not as a product to be traded – no matter how noble the goal may be" (Kav LaOved HaRishon, at p. 399). I, too, have insisted that "a person should not be treated merely as a means to achieve external ancillary purposes, since this entails an infringement of his dignity", as we learn from the teachings of the philosopher Immanuel Kant (The Human Rights Division, paragraph 3 of my judgment)" (Human Matter, paragraph 86 of my judgment).