Another aspect relates not only to constitutional review. Suppose that there were indeed some constitutional flaws in various aspects of the law. Even given this assumption, it is important to emphasize, in my view, that in the constitutional discourse, disproportionate results should be avoided. We should strive for a reality in which specific difficulties are met with specific remedies, while preserving the overall framework of the law as much as possible. In the present case, for example, my colleague Justice Fogelman also notes that he does not object to an open or semi-open accommodation facility (paragraph 97 of his opinion; paragraph 40 of his opinion on the matter Adam). Given this starting point, I do not understand why it is not possible to order a cure for the specific flaws that occurred in the law while maintaining the general framework that the legislature outlined with great effort. For example, it is possible to order without difficulty the cancellation of the requirement to report three times a day – according to the opinion of the President, to which I join. The same is true of the indefinite period of stay in the open facility, in the opinion of those who believe that this is an unconstitutional clause: even according to their approach, it was possible to set a maximum period of detention in the open accommodation facility, or at least to direct the legislature in the work. Just as at the stage of constitutional review one must look at the details, so too at the stage of constitutional remedy.
Another way to moderate the constitutional remedy, and thus to conclude, is to interpret the sections of the law. There was a dispute among the members of the panel regarding the "initiated judicial review". According to the President's approach, Section 30D(a) Authorizes the Custody Review Tribunal to approve the transfer of the infiltrator from the open detention facility to custody. Hence, the law creates a mechanism of judicial review initiated in relation to the transfer to custody (paragraphs 37-40 of his opinion). According to Justice Vogelman, on the other hand, it is difficult to reconcile this interpretation with the language of the law and with the grounds for criticism exercised by the tribunal over the decisions of the Commissioner (paragraph 197 of his opinion). Further to my approach presented above, I am of the opinion that An interpretation that upholds the law is preferable to its repeal. In my understanding, a fair reading of the sections is consistent with the state's position and allows such an audit to be conducted. However, even if we assume that the interpretation is more inclined to that proposed by my colleague Justice Vogelman (and I do not think so), I am still of the opinion that in order to preserve the rule that laws should not be repealed, it is better to adopt the interpretation proposed by the President to the law. In fact, adopting this interpretation will not only reduce the possibility that the law will be repealed on constitutional grounds, but will also better fulfill the purpose of the law by establishing a binding constitutional norm.