Civil Lawsuit in a Rapid Hearing (Tel Aviv) 65691-01-24 Premium Credit Solutions Group Ltd. v. Sharon Ragforker - part 4

The balance of ILS 39,500 + from a tax appeal will be paid within 7 working days from the date of receipt of the approval in principle/approval for the loan/outline for providing credit/offer for financing from the credit entity/a document from the credit entity describing the loan request and signed by the customer at the company's request and no later than the date of the first receipt of the funds from the financing body, even if the principal chose to postpone and/or not take part and/or waived the actual loan, and/or if the client has changed the loan outline at his discretion.  In any event, the possibility of ordering an extension of up to 14 days from the date of approval in principle or receipt of the earlier of the money will be examined, and at the sole discretion of the representative."

49. Clause 24 of the agreement, which relates to the procedure for cancellation of a transaction, states that:

"If the Principal chooses to cancel the Agreement after the date of its signing, it will be obligated according to the following steps:

Stage 1 Collecting documents 25% of the legal fees, Stage 2 Contacting the credit institutions 50% of the fee amount , Stage 3 Receiving the approval in principle/approval of the loan/outline for providing credit/proposal for financing from the credit entity/document from the credit institution describing the loan application (receiving approval from one or more parties) 100% of the amount of the legal fees.  The Principal approves in signing this Agreement in advance the execution of each of the aforementioned stages and will have no claim in the matter."

50. As to the manner in which the amount of the fees was determined according to the agreement, the plaintiff's CEO explained that his determination was made on the basis of "how much value did I give the client" and elaborated and explained that the fee was made as a derivative of the value of the loan that the defendant was required to obtain against the value of the collateral that was available to him (which is the apartment owned by him and his spouse - see pp. 20-22 of par).
51. In addition, the anchors set out in the agreement for the payment of the said fees are quite reasonable, and depend on the degree of investment and work performed by the plaintiff up to the relevant stage, where the entitlement to receive the full fees arises upon receipt of approval in principle for the granting of the loan from the lending entity. Such a stipulation has a clear business rationale.  In transactions to assist in raising funding, the main work of the assisting body is to obtain approval for the granting of the loan.  From the moment the approval is received, the choice is in fact entirely in the hands of the applicant for financing, and it is difficult to lend a hand to a situation in which the assisting body invests its time and energy, obtains approval for the provision of a loan from some financing entity, and at the end of the day the client will regret it and all the labor of the assisting body will go down the drain without compensation for its work.
52. Indeed, similar stipulations have already been approved as reasonable stipulations in case law (compare, for example, Small Claims Appeals Authority 16640-11-21 P.I. Israel Finance Group in Tax Appeal v.  Mor [Nevo] (January 11, 2022)).
53. According to the defendant, the plaintiff wanted to secure the legal fees in the amount of ILS 40,000 while distributing promises of a loan at a good interest rate and on reasonable terms, but after signing the agreement, she did not make any great effort to obtain him a loan as she promised (paragraphs 10-11 of his affidavit). The defendant also complained about the terms of the loan that the plaintiff claimed was approved for him by Delta Capital Group.
54. However, I am not persuaded that the terms of the loan that the plaintiff managed to obtain for the defendant are "unreasonably worse than is customary".
55. The defendant complained about the amount of interest according to the approval for a loan obtained for him by the plaintiff, which he claimed was an interest rate of 19.14%, which is contrary to the provisions of the Fair Credit Law. However, in this regard, I was persuaded by the explanation of the plaintiff's CEO, Mr. Peleg, and the client portfolio manager, Mr. Meller, that the interest obtained for the defendant, in his personal data and in his individual circumstances, was not unusual.
56. I will begin by saying that I was convinced that the defendant's opening conditions were quite difficult from the outset, and that the task of locating a party who would agree to grant him a loan was not simple, when it was clear from the outset that as long as approval for the loan was obtained, it would be done at a fairly high interest rate, and certainly higher than the interest rate customary in the banks.
57. In the meantime, Mr. Nir Peleg, the plaintiff's CEO, clarified how the plaintiff determines the most appropriate financing strategy for the specific client in accordance with an analysis based on customer quality, transaction quality and safe nature (p. 17 of para.  Peleg clarified that the plaintiff generally works with 75 credit institutions, but in any given case she examines which of the entities she will work with in the specific case, and argued that in the defendant's specific case, the plaintiff found only 4 of the 75 entities that might have been suitable due to the defendant's unique situation (p.  18 of par).
58. Peleg clarified that there are clients who are not accepted by the plaintiff (p. 17, 30 p.m.), noted that in relation to clients in insolvency or receivership proceedings, the supply of financing entities with whom it is possible to work is reduced by about 90%, but clarified that the plaintiff believed that it would be able to obtain financing for the specific defendant, and as he claimed:

"There are interest players in the market of the finance world OK and there are people who need to solve their problems, in our case in this specific case we don't have an interest player here and we were also told that the interest rate that will be the interest rate is relatively high as a result of the fact that we are, as a result of the fact that we are going to take a bridging loan in order to close and actually cancel the issue of receivership and as I said a person who has bankruptcy today, A receiver, foreclosures on the property, and so on cannot expect to receive bank interest." (p.  19, paras.  14-21).

59. Mahler also provided a similar explanation in his testimony, claiming that among the dozens of financing entities with which the plaintiff works there are 15-20 that deal with the non-bank niche that the defendant needed, and according to him:

"We contacted those who we know that his case can pass because in his case there were limitations that even the funds we work with because we know all the 15, 20, each one specifically what he knows how to approve, so we knew who the specific 3,4 were who could examine this case and as it was said here, 3 we showed the refusals of 3 who refused were the other ones that we thought were suitable criteria, We still got a refusal from them." (p.  33, s.  13-18 per par).

60. Meller, like Mr. Peleg, also noted that not every client is accepted by the plaintiff, and that screening was done after Mr. Meller's examination of the client's file, as was also done in our case (pp. 33, 28-32; p.  34, 1-7 per part).  In any event, Mr. Meller unequivocally claimed that at the time of signing the agreement with the defendant, the plaintiff believed that she would obtain him credit on the best terms (p.  34, para.  19).
61. Meller further argued that the security deposit for the defendant and his spouse's apartment in the amount of ILS 1,150,000 was insufficient and clarified that:

"In a deal like this, the fund feels good about the deal, the fund examines according to its regulations what is better for it, if you come with an asset of 3,000,000 or 4,000,000 and it looks better, then you don't have to ask for a guarantor because for the fund it's better, 650 out of 2,000,000 is 20%, 30%, here it's almost 70%, if the loan that is inflated because you don't pay all the interest, you understand? So you inflate up to 70% is a risk, a very high risk." (p.  35, 11-16 per par).

62. Mahler also clarified that since there were arrears in the payment of the defendant's debts to Obligo but also to Bank Mizrahi-Tefahot in the payment of the mortgage, contrary to what the defendant himself initially claimed to them, it was not possible to suffice with a loan of less than ILS 650,000. He further clarified that the details regarding the scope of the defendant's liabilities were discovered only in a meeting with Delta Capital Group (pp.  36-37).
63. As for the terms of the loan approved by Delta Capital Group, Mr. Peleg explained that the amount of the annual interest according to the loan approved for the defendant was 10% + P , with the shekel interest rate being 16.25%, which is added to the principal every month, so that the effective interest rate is 17.52%. According to him, the difference of 2% reflects the one-time costs of establishing a loan for the entire requested loan period of 18 months, and these are normative interest rates for companies of this type in accordance with the borrower's credit financial profile, and this was the best and most effective for the defendant in the circumstances (paragraph 21 of their affidavits).
64. Peleg explained in his testimony that the amount of the monthly repayment as proposed by Delta Capital Group (p. 337 of the plaintiff's notice of attachment of documents) was ILS 8,800 per month according to the calculation of the amount of interest in relation to the amount of the loan, but he explained that we should talk about a repayment of only ILS 4,500 because this is the amount that the defendant takes out of pocket every month in accordance with the financing approval, and that everything he did not pay on account of the interest he should have paid would be added in the end in the repayment of the loan to the fund.  In other words, the difference between ILS 8,800 and ILS 4,500 had to be repaid at the end (pp.  26, 24-32, p.  27).
65. Mahler also explained the cost of the defendant and his spouse's monthly credit according to the loan approved to them by Delta Capital Group, and clarified that the defendant and his spouse should have gotten out of a state of receivership and approached the plaintiff for a solution. Even if against a loan of ILS 650,000 the defendant had to repay ILS 113,000 after the loan period had passed, under the terms obtained for them they could have paid ILS 4,500 per month for part of the interest in the first period, and the rest would accrue to the end of the period, and at the end of the period the defendant was supposed to sell the apartment and remain with a balance in hand (p.  39 of par).
66. Meller noted in his testimony that an interest rate of 17.5% in the circumstances of the defendant, who was in receivership proceedings, was a good interest, and when asked whether this was presented to the defendant, he noted:

"Obviously, obviously, salespeople always sell these deals in this style and say that the interest you get is between Prime Plus 8 and Prime Plus 10 in those areas, OK? And of course it's up to the fund's decision, so when the fund met and heard the story and saw that even two borrowers weren't enough because they didn't just add the son, usually and I've been to many meetings at Delta they don't just add the son, here they didn't approve the case but said 'bring the son as well because the guarantor supports so that we can even examine it' and also the interest they brought after they added the son, " (pp.  34, paras.  23-30 per par).

67. In the margins, I will add and note that beyond general arguments referring to the provisions of the Fair Credit Law, 5753-1993, the defendant did not refer to a specific clause or provision that was breached in the framework of the agreement that is the subject of our discussion or within the framework of the terms of the loan that the plaintiff succeeded in obtaining for the defendant, and I am not persuaded of a concrete violation of the provisions of the said law with regard to the rate of the maximum cost of the credit as detailed in section (1) of the first addendum to the said law.
68. Therefore, in our case, there was no reason to cancel the agreement due to oppression in concluding it.

I am persuaded that the plaintiff has fulfilled all of her obligations under the agreement and is entitled to payment of her full fees

69. This is the place to add that I am convinced that the plaintiff acted with reasonable and proper diligence in order to try and obtain a loan for the defendant on the best terms for him.
70. In this regard, the plaintiff's representatives stated that immediately after the parties signed the agreement and the power of attorney was granted to the plaintiff, the plaintiff began to work vigorously in order to raise the requested loan for the defendant, on May 16, 2023, the defendant completed the paperwork in favor of submissions to various financing entities, and on March 31, 2023, the plaintiff approached various financing entities with a request for a loan. In the meantime, the plaintiff turned to DOI , a non-bank financing company; to A.R.  Credit Solutions Ltd., to the Gaia Fund and Delta Capital Group, together with all the relevant documents (paragraphs 5-7 of the affidavits of the plaintiff's CEO, Mr. Nir Peleg, and of Mr. Amit Mahler, a client portfolio manager in the plaintiff's mortgage operations department).
71. Peleg and Mr. Meller clarified that 3 of the 4 non-bank financing companies to which the plaintiff approached refused to provide a loan to the defendant, and on June 1, 2023, a frontal meeting was held by the defendant, accompanied by the plaintiff's representative at Delta Capital Group, which subsequently approved the granting of the loan on June 14, 2023, and the defendant obtained approval in principle for a loan in the amount of ILS 650,000 (paragraphs 8-10 of their affidavits and see also Appendices 10A; 10B; 10C of the plaintiff's notice of attachment of documents).
72. According to Mr. Peleg and Mr. Meller, the defendant signed the certificate in principle with his signature and forwarded it to the plaintiff ( paragraph 11 of their affidavits). Peleg added that this is a defendant whose apartment is under receivership, and therefore it is even more difficult to obtain a loan for him.  Despite this, and after receiving the approval in principle from Delta Capital Group, the plaintiff contacted one of the defendant's creditors (AAP Advance Finance) and received a reduction of ILS 50,000 from the debt for him, and even managed to obtain a discount of 10% of the receiver's fees for the defendant.  In addition, the plaintiff acted in an attempt to assist the plaintiff in redemption of his pension funds (even though she was not obligated to do so in the agreement) but the defendant did not move forward (paragraphs 12-14 of their affidavits, and Appendices 5-10c).  to the plaintiff's notice of attaching documents).
73. At the end of the day, therefore, the plaintiff succeeded in obtaining approval for the defendant for a loan in the amount of ILS 650,000 with Delta Capital Group.
74. The defendant did try to claim that this was an "impersonatory" approval for the granting of a loan from Delta Capital, and that it was not the same "approval in principle" that entitles the plaintiff to legal fees under the agreement. According to him, the plaintiff failed in her mission to raise the credit he was required to raise other than a loan with a reduced interest rate of more than 19% plus her fees (paragraph 12 of his affidavit).  However, I am persuaded that the document that Delta Capital Group issued to the defendant and which he signed on June 14, 2023 (Appendix 11 to the plaintiff's notice of attachment of documents) meets the terms of the agreement that entitle the plaintiff to her full legal fees.
75. First, the defendant himself admitted that the plaintiff did indeed succeed in obtaining him such a loan in the sum of up to ILS 650,000, even if he claimed that it was a loan with biting interest (paragraph 17 of his affidavit).
76. Second, the document referred to by the plaintiff as "approval in principle" (Appendix 11 to the plaintiff's notice of attachment of documents) does not bear the title "approval in principle" but rather the title "Application for Receipt of Credit and Preliminary Basic Data" (Appendix 11 to the plaintiff's notice of attachment of documents). However, an examination of the document shows that it contains all the details of the loan offered under the logo of Delta Capital Group, and it is clear that it constitutes an offer for the granting of a loan, since the "validity" rubric states that "this preliminary document was prepared on June 11, 2023, and the details mentioned therein are relevant for 7 days from the date it was prepared."
77. Third, Mr. Meller noted in his testimony that this is how Delta Capital issues its approvals in principle, and argued that the certificates it issues do not contain "approval in principle" (p. 42 of par).
78. Fourth, the defendant confirmed in his testimony that he was present with Mr. Meller at a meeting with Delta Capital and that he signed the same document entitled "Application for Initial Credit and Basic Data" (p. 10, s.  17 of par).  He added that according to his memory, he had come with Mr. Meller to the said meeting "in order to see if they would agree to the loan" (p.  14, s.  32).  To the best of his recollection, there was an introductory meeting and he did not remember that the loan was approved for him at that meeting (pp.  15, paras.  16-23).
79. On the other hand, Mr. Mahler, who himself attended the meeting together with the defendant, claimed that at the end of the meeting, approval in principle was received for the loan (pp. 37, s.  22; 24 par.).
80. Fifth, if there was no confirmation in principle, it is not clear why the defendant himself signed it, and even less clear how and why the defendant's wife and son also signed it. The defendant did claim that his wife and son, who are listed next to his name, were not present at that meeting and did not remember how they signed the same document (p.  11 of par), but he admitted that they were guarantors for him (p.  12, paras.  1-8).  He also confirmed that he had signed the promissory note in favor of Delta Capital Group (pp.  12-22).
81. The promissory note signed by the defendant and signed by his wife and son as guarantors in favor of Delta Capital Group was not authenticated by an attorney, but the defendant admitted that he was required to be authenticated by an attorney because otherwise "he will not receive anything" (p. 16, paras.  1-7), to teach you that in his understanding as well, it was a matter of approval in principle, which was of course subject to continued cooperation and signing of documents on the part of the defendant.
82. Sixth, according to clause 24 of the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant, the third stage of the plaintiff's work (in which the plaintiff is entitled to her full fees under the agreement) does not relate only to the possibility of obtaining "approval in principle" from the financing body, but also includes a number of options, including obtaining the approval in principle/approval of the loan/outline for providing credit/an offer for financing from the credit entity/a document from the credit institution describing the loan request (receiving approval from one or more entities).
83. Therefore, even if the same document bearing the logo of Delta Capital Group does not bear the title "Approval in Principle", since it specifies the terms of the loan, it is a document due to the fact that it entitles the plaintiff to its full fees under clause 24 of the agreement.
84. Therefore, I am convinced that the plaintiff acted with due diligence in order to obtain a loan for the defendant and succeeded in obtaining him approval in principle for the granting of the loan in a manner sufficient to entitle her to the full contractual fees.
85. In any event, even if the claimant argues that the document attached as Appendix 11 to the plaintiff's notice of the attachment of documents does not entitle the plaintiff to her full fees as stipulated in the agreement, I am persuaded that the impediment to obtaining approval in principle in practice lies solely in the defendant, in a manner that in any case entitles the plaintiff to her full salary.
86. Peleg confirmed that the defendant had transferred all the documents to the plaintiff for the purpose of obtaining a certificate in principle, but claimed that the defendant disappeared after this was obtained (p. 29 of par).
87. Peleg claimed that the defendant knew in real time at the time of the meeting with the representatives of Delta Capital Group that he had to sign the rest of the documents and that his invitation to sign them was oral, as he said:

"Okay, I couldn't invite him because he cut off contact very simply, so there's clause 24, let's go to clause 24, go to clause 24, sir, please.  You ask me, I'll bring you back." (pp.  28, 17-19 per par).

88. When Mr. Peleg was asked by the court whether the plaintiff had approached the defendant in order to come and sign the loan agreement, he answered in the affirmative and clarified:

"I'll explain to you, after...  We contacted the client in order to verify with his attorney the principal approvals and the promissory note, the client disappeared, evaporated, and therefore clause 24 was activated, because if I take you to the clause in the OK 16 contract, he is aware of the fact that in order to advance the process of receiving the funds, including checking the interest rates effectively, he must transfer all the relevant documents in his affairs and provide collateral and collateral to the accompanying parties in an orderly manner and on a fast schedule no later than 10 working days and in accordance with the request of the representative.  Lack of cooperation of more than 14 working days on the part of the client will be considered as cancellation of a transaction, cancellation of a transaction is section 24" (pp.  28, 28-32; p.  29, 1-6 per part).

89. Peleg further stated that Mr. Meller (and also Mr. Peleg himself) tried to contact the defendant from all of the plaintiff's telephone numbers in order to invite him to ask him to tell the documents in a good way, and claimed that the defendant was also told in front of the offices of the Delta Capital Group Fund that he had to go and sign the lawyer and at the end of the day the defendant cut off contact and did not agree to come into contact with the plaintiff's representatives until they contacted an attorney for the purpose of taking collection proceedings (pp. 29, 13-27; p.  30 12-11; 19-17; 26-23; p.  31, paras.  15-17).
90. Mahler also made similar statements in his testimony, noting that:

"We set up a meeting and I also chased him to sign, I also chased him to sign Delta's approval because he had to sign Delta's approval in order to move forward,...  And he wouldn't respond to my messages at all...  He didn't let us coordinate signatures with him, he didn't sign Delta's promissory note." (p.  41, paras.  2-11).

91. Meller stated that he sent the defendant many messages, and at the time of his testimony he searched for the details of his messages and correspondence with the defendant on his mobile device, in order to prove that he wanted to expedite the defendant in signing the loan approval, but the defendant gave irrelevant answers and texted the matter:

"Here I am and then he asked, 'Is there any progress?' I told him 'this' and then I sent it here, he tells me, 'I spoke to the appraiser on the phone and then he tells me that I am with the lawyer trying to postpone the eviction,' I said to him, 'What happens about the signing of the approval?' 'Good morning, I'm on my way to a lawyer, he's supposed to go into insolvency, I don't know what that means.'"

92. This is the place to add that the testimony of the defendant himself also indicated that he knew that he had to sign the loan documents and that his signature was conditional on a reduction in the interest rate (paragraph 26 of his affidavit).
93. I therefore determine that after the meeting at the offices of Delta Capital Group and the approval of the outline in principle for granting a loan to the defendant, the defendant should have returned with signed documents and additional approvals as a condition for the actual granting of the loan, and at this stage he disappeared and stopped cooperating.
94. In his aforesaid conduct, the defendant breached his obligations in clauses 15-16 of the agreement.
95. In clause 15 of the agreement, the defendant undertook that:

"He is aware of the fact that the execution of the consultation process requires cooperation on his part - and therefore the Client undertakes to be available for the purpose of carrying out the consultation process, until the signing of the mortgage/loan/financing agreement, in accordance with the reasonable representative's requests - and the Client undertakes to attend meetings/meetings in our case, in accordance with the client's request."

96. In clause 16 of the agreement, the defendant undertook that:

"He is aware of the fact that in order to advance the process of receiving the funds, including checking the interest rates effectively, he must forward all the relevant documents in our case and provide collateral and collateral to the accompanying parties, in an orderly manner and on a fast schedule and in any case no later than 10 working days, and in accordance with the representative's requests.  Lack of cooperation on the part of the customer for more than 14 working days will be considered as cancellation of the transaction."

97. Therefore, in the severance of contact with the plaintiff and in the absence of cooperation on his part - it was the defendant who breached the agreement with the plaintiff, and since the plaintiff fulfilled all of her obligations to him - she is entitled to her full fees.
98. Before signing, I will add and note that the defendant's claim that he did not actually take the loan that was offered to him and asked the plaintiff to improve the interest offer, but this did not help (paragraph 26 of his affidavit), and that in the end he took a loan of ILS 200,000 from Mizrahi-Tefahot Bank in order to pay off the debt to Obligo and return to a normal course of life (paragraph 27 of his affidavit) - cannot help him. This is not enough to exempt the defendant from his contractual obligation to pay the plaintiff's wages as agreed between them.
99. Since the plaintiff did not breach the agreement and acted in accordance with its wording, and since I have determined that the approval obtained for the defendant to grant a loan from Delta Capital Group on June 14, 2023 is de facto approval in principle as understood in the agreement, the defendant should have paid the plaintiff her fees by June 21, 2023. Since he did not do so and breached the agreement, the plaintiff's claim for payment of her full salary is to be accepted.

Conclusion

100. Therefore, the defendant has not been able to prove any defense claim against the realization of the promissory note in the execution proceeding in our case, and the claim is accepted in full.
101. The execution proceedings in case 512925-08-23 will be activated accordingly.
102. The debt in the execution file will also be supplemented by the plaintiff's expenses and attorney's fees in the amount of ILS 6,500 in the conduct of this proceeding.
103. The Secretariat is requested to present the judgment to the parties' counsel and close the case.

Granted today, July 13, 2025, in the absence of the parties.