Estate Case (Jerusalem) 22123-09-23 T.M. v. A.M. - part 2

Existence of a Will in Favor of the Objector

1. According to the law, a will is made by hand, by witnesses, before an authority, or orally (section 18 of the law).  This is a closed list.  The courts did not recognize the will in any other or additional way.  S. Shohat, N. Feinberg, Y. Plomin, Inheritance and Estate Law (2014), p. 91 (hereinafter – "Inheritance and Estate Law").
2. A will is required for the fulfillment of basic conditions, without which there is no such thing, as defined in section 25(b) of the Inheritance Law, 5725-1965 (hereinafter – the "Inheritance Law"):

"In this section, the "basic elements of a will" are:

(1) In a handwritten will as stated in section 19, the entire will is written in the testator's handwriting;

(2) In the will of witnesses as stated in section 20 – the will is in writing and the testator brought it before two witnesses; (3) In a will before an authority as stated in section 22 – the will was made before an authority or submitted to the authority, by the testator himself;

(4) In an oral will, as stated in section 23, the will was made by the testator himself in front of two witnesses who heard his tongue while he was lying down from evil or when he saw himself, in circumstances justifying it, in the face of death."

1. The case law distinguished between fundamental (constitutional) formal elements, without which the document does not constitute a will, and dynamic formal elements.  If there is a defect in the will or a lack of a fundamental formal component, the court will not be able to ignore this and execute the will using section 25 of the Law, and in such a case the default is to issue an inheritance order according to the law.  (Inheritance and Estate Law, p. 103).
2. With regard to an oral will – a will that was  made orally, Section 23 of the Law stipulates  5 cumulative requirements for the purpose of giving validity to a will, two of which are essential and fundamental requirements for the existence of an oral will, in the sense of an element without which there is none, the existence of which cannot be waived and whose deficiency cannot be overcome by using section 25(a) of the Law, since they are anchored in section 25(b)(4) of the Law as basic components of a will of this type.
3. In addition to the basic requirement that the testator's words be said in front of two witnesses, the oral will requires that at the time of making the will, the testator must be "lying down" or "one who sees himself, in circumstances that justify it, facing death."
4. The expression "lying down" is a phrase that indicates a defined state of health of the deceased at the time of making the will, and it refers to a person who suffers from a serious illness and is lying on his deathbed.  In order to meet this requirement, an authoritative medical certificate is required, and it should not be concluded solely on the basis of the proximity of time between the date of making the will and the date of death that it is indeed a person who is lying ill.  (See: Inheritance and Estate Law, p. 117 and the references in the case law that appear there).
5. The burden of proof, in circumstances in which a will was made orally, is on the applicant to execute it, as opposed to a written will, when the burden is placed on the person who objects to its execution, since the will has the presumption of its validity.  This is a heavy burden of proof in view of the lack of the required level of security regarding the testator's will and the circumstances of making the will.  (See: Estate File (Family Tel Aviv-Yafo) 47098-04-21 A.  P. v. v.  P (May 23, 2022)).
6. With regard to a will in witnesses, the existence of a written will (not necessarily the testator's handwriting) and the existence of two witnesses at the time of the testator's signature on the will, are constitutional elements that cannot be cured by virtue of  section 25(a) of the Law, and have been recognized as two conditions without which the document cannot be executed as a will by witnesses (Inheritance and Estate Law, pp. 93, 108-109).  As for a written will, the existence of a testator and the fact that the will is written entirely in the testator's handwriting are the essence of a handwritten will, and it is anchored as the basic components in section 25(b) of the Law.  (See: Inheritance and Estate Law, p. 106).
7. In our case, after considering her arguments, I have not found that the objector has substantiated the claim that there is a will in her favor, whether oral or written, as will be detailed below.
8. First, already in my decision of December 26, 2023, it was made clear to the objector that insofar as she insists on her claim to the existence of an oral will, she must take a separate and appropriate legal proceeding for the execution of a will in accordance with the provisions of the law, and in the framework of which she must prove the basic conditions necessary for the purpose of proving an oral will in accordance with section 23 of the Inheritance Law.  It was made clear to the objector that without opening an appropriate proceeding, it would not be possible to discuss her claim for the execution of a will in the framework of the proceeding at hand.
9. Such a proceeding has not been taken by the objector to this day, and this reason is sufficient to reject her arguments regarding the execution of a will.
10. Even on the merits of the matter, after examining its evidence, I have not found that there is even prima facie evidence of the existence of an oral will in accordance with the provisions  of section 23 of the Inheritance Law, or any other valid will (a written will or a will in witnesses – as first claimed in the objectionor's summaries).
11. The objector has not been able to prove at all that we are dealing with a "lying down" will, or that it was prepared in circumstances in which the deceased saw himself facing death, and from the transcript of the conversation that was submitted it is not clear that this was his condition.  In addition, no witnesses or medical document were brought on her behalf to substantiate this claim.
12. In order to substantiate her claim of the existence of a will, or alternatively to the desire of the deceased to bequeath her entire estate, the objector referred only to the transcript of the conversation that she claimed took place on January 15, 2023, between the deceased and social workers.
13. However, from the content of the transcript, which was submitted by the objector as Appendix 1 to the objection,  it is not possible to learn about the existence of a will, since it lacks an instruction from the deceased, and at most it contains a general statement on the part of the deceased, according to which he expressed his desire for the objector to come to live with him: ..."I am dying for her to come here, for she to live here, if I give someone the inheritance it is for her because she grew up without a mother,  She grew up without her mother from the age of 16 who rejected her, in the end there was an unpleasant situation" (pp. 44-43-66 to the transcript that was attached as an appendix to the objection statement and the opposing affidavit).
14. Moreover, the transcript does not clearly indicate when the conversation took place, when according to the objector herself it was a conversation that took place in the last month of his life (see in this regard the objector's summaries on p. 15, paras. 27-28 of the prot. "He died less than a month after he said these words orally"), and it is not claimed by her that the conversation took place while he was lying down or when he saw himself.  In the face of death, which is, as stated, the basic condition for the existence of a will in a criminal appeal (see above).
15. According to the case law, a distinction must be made between an oral will and an expression of a desire to make a will.  The case law held that "...When a person expresses a desire to make a will.  But for some reason it did not reach the point of making a will.  The provisions of section 23 have not been fulfilled"; See: Civil Appeal 717/71 Nicolas v. Custodian of Absentee Property, IsrSC 27(1) 682 (1973); Inheritance and Estate Law, p. 96.
16. This was also determined in Family Appeal (Tel Aviv-Jaffa District) 26843-07-23 Anonymous v. Anonymous (February 25, 2024), that: "A preliminary and basic requirement for the drafting of any will is the intention to make a will by means of this action and not only to express a future intention to make a will (see: Civil Appeal 717/71...).  In addition, as held in other municipal applications 1978/05 Anonymous v. Anonymous [published in Nevo] (January 10, 2007): "In any event, it seems that there is no dispute that a will constitutes a document that comes to regulate the division of a person's property following his death...Therefore, this document must include an inheritance provision, or at least some detail as to what will be done (and perhaps not done) with a person's property upon his death... Indeed, over the years, the court has been very careful when interpreting the testator's true will, when this will was not expressed in the will itself.  This was while a distinction was made between cases in which the court was required to interpret the meaning and essence of the inheritance provision that appears in the will and cases in which the inheritance provision was not determined in the will at all or the identity of the heirs was not defined.  In all those recent cases, the court's tendency was to determine that a judicial determination as to the nature of the inheritance provision, as well as as to the identity of the heirs, is outside the scope of its legitimate action, a place that was not explicitly defined by the testator." (My emphasis – H.G.).
17. See also that.  Shilo in his book "Commentary on the Inheritance Law, 5725-1965", p. 214: "Mere talk that relates in general to the will of the deceased regarding what will be done with his property after his death, or a request to make a written will – even if the details of the will were made orally – are not recognized as oral wills."
18. The command must be clear and unequivocal, and this must be strictly observed  , especially when dealing with a "lie down" will that is given orally by the testator.  See: Estate Case (Family Tel Aviv-Yafo) 47098-04-21 A.  P. v. v.  P (May 23, 2022).  As determined in this regard in other municipal applications 99/63 Peleg and Dan Erez v. Attorney General, IsrSC 17 1122 (1963) by the Honorable President Olshan: "I would like to emphasize that the court's approach should generally be the assumption that an oral will should not be executed.  Even if there is no flaw in the wording of the speech that constitutes the will, the aforementioned assumption must be adopted, but if so, the circumstances surrounding the making of such a will are such that they are undoubtedly convincing, that the matter is indeed a real will, that is, with a clear intention that the speech will act as a will, and that there is also a plausible reason for the absence of a written will."
19. In our case, the wording of the transcript submitted in support of the oral will argument does not indicate that the deceased said these words out of a desire and intention to make a will, but rather as a general statement, or an expression of desire to make a will in the future; In addition, the second basic condition according to which the deceased was on his deathbed or that he saw the face of death at the time of making the alleged "will" was not proven.
20. In light of the aforesaid, and taking into account the caution required in examining the existence of an oral will, I have not found that the conditions required to prove an oral will are met, and this argument is rejected.
21. In the summaries, counsel for the objector argued for the first time that the transcript of the recorded conversation can be viewed as a "written will" or a "will in witnesses" of the deceased.
22. Counsel for the objector admitted that the alleged will "was indeed without a signature without a date" (p. 15, s. 33 of the protégé), and that the two witnesses before whom the deceased made the statements were not summoned to testify and affidavits were not even submitted on their behalf – "... And it's also true that these 2 witnesses didn't submit affidavits not that it's required by law, but it's a defect that can perhaps be cured if they did submit it later..." (pp. 15, paras. 28-30 of the prot.); According to him, it is possible that these defects can be cured, since there is documentation and a conversation that was recorded, so that the words were heard from the deceased's voice.
23. I am unable to accept these arguments, which were made for the first time in the framework of the summaries.
24. Beyond the fact that we are dealing with contradictory factual claims (after all, if we are dealing with a written will, this is inconsistent with the claim of an oral will, and it is not claimed that there are two different wills in our case); these arguments are inconsistent with the objector's own statement in paragraph 2 of the affidavit of her main testimony that the deceased  did not leave behind a will: "I know that there is no will in my favor.  It is possible that my father prepared it and threw it away because we talked about it" – that is, even according to the opponent's opinion, there is no will.
25. Even if the language of the transcript was worded as a clear and unequivocal grant provision, and as stated, this is not the case, the basic elements of the alleged "will" were not met, since it is clear that this is not the deceased's handwriting – a condition required for recognition of a written will, and the argument that the transcript can be seen as a written requirement for the recognition of the will by witnesses is also far-reaching, beyond the fact that, as stated, the affidavits of the witnesses were not submitted.  I have not found that it is possible to cure such material defects and to legalize the transcript as a written will or witnesses by means of circumstantial evidence and mere conjectures.
26. The objector tried to hold on to the claim about the "deceased's will" not to sell the farm and that the farm or carpentry shop would be transferred to her by inheritance; It is true that it is a mitzva to fulfill the will of the deceased, but in circumstances in which the deceased did not leave behind a will, it is not possible to comply with the presumed will of the deceased that has not been perfected into a will, and one must act according to the default set out in the Inheritance Law – Inheritance according to the law.
27. It should be noted that in circumstances in which legal proceedings were conducted between the deceased and the respondent in this court prior to the deceased's death, in which he was represented by an attorney, he was prima facie able to make a will lawfully, to the extent he wished to do so.
28. In light of the aforesaid, the objector's first argument – regarding the existence of a will, whether orally or in writing or in front of witnesses – is hereby rejected.

The argument that the respondent is not considered a "spouse" of the deceased within the meaning of the Inheritance Law

1. The main dispute between the parties is a legal dispute regarding  the status of the deceased's widow – whether she is considered a "spouse" who inherits the deceased according to the law in accordance with the formal test of defining the status at the time of death – as the Respondent claims; Perhaps a substantive approach should be taken according to which the Respondent cannot be considered a "spouse" in circumstances in which the deceased and the Respondent were separated for several years prior to the death of the deceased – I will address this dispute below.

Who is a Spouse - The Normative Framework

1. Section 10 of the Inheritance Law states that in the absence of a will, the heirs according to the law are: "one who was his spouse at the time of the testator'  s death" (collective dispute (1)); and "the children of the testator and their descendants, his parents and their descendants..." (referred to in a collective dispute (2) as "relatives of the testator").
2. Section 11 of the Inheritance Law deals with the scope of the "right of inheritance of a spouse", and specifies the share of the spouse in the inheritance in relation to the testator's relatives.
3. The Inheritance Law does not explicitly define who is a "spouse" for the purposes  of sections 10 and 11 of the Law, when a number of opinions were heard in the case law on this matter.
4. The formal approach – according to which where a get has not been arranged, or at least a "get" has been arranged, the parties should be regarded as  married couples according to the Inheritance Law.  According to this approach, the question of the nature and nature of the relationship between the married spouses and each other is of no importance, including in cases where the couple lived separately at the time of death; and a "spouse" is someone who was married to the testator at the time of his death, according to a formal examination of the status at the time of the deceased's death.  See: Family Appeal (Tel Aviv District) 38845-10-12 Anonymous v. L.A. (January 7, 2015) (hereinafter – "AP 38845-10-12"); Family Appeals Authority (Jerusalem District) 73437-01-18 Anonymous v. Anonymous (April 24, 2018); Estate Case (Tel Aviv Family) 56476-01-24 Anonymous v. Anonymous (January 21, 2025); Family Case (Living Family) 43380-01-16 Anonymous v. Anonymous (July 27, 2021); Estate Case (Beer Sheva Family) 19786-10-20 Anonymous v. H.S. (September 16, 2024).
5. The substantive approach – according to which the actual relationship between the spouses and its nature must be examined.  In accordance with this approach, a "marriage on paper" is devoid of the content of a relationship, including a long-term separation and along with the management of another marital relationship, expropriates the right of inheritance of the "spouse" registered as such, even if the couple has not actually divorced.  See: Estate File (Family Tel Aviv-Jaffa) 108091-08 Estate of the deceased Y.A.  z"l v. R.A. (August 11, 2012) (judgment of the Honorable Judge Shifra Glick, which was overturned in District Court in FamilyAppeal 38845-10-12; hereinafter – "Civil Appeal 108091/08"); Estate Case (Nazareth Family) 541/08 The late C.B.Z. vs. C.A.  (July 19, 2010); Estates Case (Haifa Family) 2120/08 Estate of the late Anonymous v. Anonymous (January 20, 2010); Estate Case (Haifa Family) 12601-03-09 Anonymous vs. Anonymous (2.11.2009).
6. The mixed approach – which combines the two approaches and maintains that the formal approach is the starting point, but does not superfluous a material examination of the circumstances of the case and the nature of the relationship between the spouses.  See: Family Case (Family Tel Aviv-Yafo) 3688-09-18 A.K. v. A.K. (April 6, 2020), paragraph 13 of the judgment.
7. Despite the different approaches that were heard in the case law, in the end, the case law preferred the formal test, according to which a "spouse" according  to sections 10-11 of the Inheritance Law is the spouse who at the time of death was married to the testator.
8. This was clarified by the Honorable Judge Schneller in Family Appeal (Tel Aviv District) 38845-10-12 Anonymous v. L.A. (January 7, 2015), who ruled that the formal test is the test according to which it is necessary to find out who is the spouse who legally inherits the testator (in the absence of a will), and as long as the law in this regard has not been changed, no other interpretive method should be taken that examines the nature of the marriage from a substantive point of view. As he said there:  "Sections 10 and 11 of the Inheritance Law deal with those who are married, as a definition of status.  Indeed, the courts were willing to expand the definition of those who would be considered married, even if they were not married couples recognized by religious law, ...  However, in my opinion, there is no place to move from a status test to a test of intentions or an examination of the relationship between the spouses, ...  To the extent that the legislature has its say, including as it appears in the Monetary Law Bill, with legislative harmony as detailed therein, then indeed it is possible and will be required to examine the circumstances of 'separation' as detailed in the said proposal."
9. With regard to the aforementioned memorandum of law, which the objector also mentioned in her arguments, the Honorable Judge Kobi Vardi held there: "... There is no room to precede the latter (the Property Law Bill) by means of 'judicial legislation', when at this time, as also noted in the explanatory notes to the Financial Law Bill, the provisions of the law are formal in nature, and responding to the individual in an extreme case, before the legislative change is made, can harm the rule and certainty of inheritance law."
10. The formal approach was approved by the Supreme Court in Tax Appeal 4532/20 Anonymous v. Anonymous (July 19, 2020) (hereinafter – "Tax Appeal 4532/20"), by the Honorable Judge Mazuz, who made it clear explicitly, unequivocally: "The claim regarding a non-uniform approach in case law regarding the interpretation of the term 'spouse' in the Inheritance Law is fundamentally inaccurate.  In the case law of this court it was clarified that the term "spouse" should be interpreted with respect to the provisions of sections 10-11 of the Inheritance Law as relating to their formal status, without attributing significance to the nature of the relationship: "This court has ruled, on various occasions, that the question of whether a certain woman is the spouse of a certain person will be decided according to the need to grant a get in order to put an end to her relations with him, even if it is a matter of doubtful marriage and a demand for a get to be strict.  Thus, the nature of the relationship that existed between the spouses is also of no importance, nor is the fact that they lived separately at the time of the testator's death" (Civil Appeal 247/97 Sabag v. Sabag, IsrSC 35(4) 49, 55 (1999).  See also: Additional Hearing 14/66 Feldman v. Feldman, IsrSC 20(4) 693 (1966); Civil Appeal 524/87 Attorney General v. Biham, IsrSC 44(3) 485, 489 (1989); In Tax Appeal 9607/03 Anonymous v. Anonymous, paragraph 15 (November 29, 2006))."
11. The Honorable Judge Mazuz added there that it is not for nothing that the rulings of the family courts, which adopted the "substantive approach", were mostly annulled by the appellate court.
12. From the aforementioned case law it appears that the formal approach is the practice even in extreme cases of very prolonged separation (such as: a separation of nearly 40 years after the husband left the country, during which the wife had a relationship with a new spouse (common law) for about 36 years – the circumstances of the case heard in Family Appeal 38845-10-12 and  the Estate Case 108091/08; or circumstances in which most of the years of marriage – 47 out of 63, the wife suffered from mental illness and even a guardian was appointed for her and the husband was granted a marriage permit and he remarried and divorced – the circumstances of the case discussed inTax Appeal 4532/20).
13. In this regard, the words of the Honorable Judge Hagai Brenner in Family Appeal 38845-10-12 are appropriate, according to which: "... I am also of the opinion that the word "spouse" in section 11 of the Inheritance Law, ...  It refers to a person who, at the time of the testator's death, there was a marital relationship between him and the testator.  This assertion is also true in those extreme cases, such as in our case, in which we are dealing only with a formal marriage relationship that has had no real content for decades.  ...  To all of this, it should be added, in the spirit of the words of my colleague Lieutenant Vardi, that the creation of a slippery slope should be avoided as much as possible, in which whenever there is a separation between married spouses, even if it is a short separation in time, the question will arise again as to whether this is a matter of separation at such a level that it can negate the right of inheritance of the surviving spouse.  This will give rise to a multitude of disputes and litigation and create legal uncertainty." (Emphasis mine, H.G.).
14. This approach has also found support in the professional literature.  See: Inheritance and Estate Law: "In the matter of inheritance, the question of what the relationship was between the spouses is of no importance, nor the fact that they lived separately at the time of the testator's death.  Other Municipal Applications 247/97 Sabag v. Sabag IsrSC 55(4) 49 The possibility of denying a woman who has received a divorce permit from the court was indeed recognized as a spouse under the Inheritance Law.  However, the use of this option should be limited to the special circumstances of the case..... In our opinion,  there is no room to expand the use of the option raised in the Sabag case with respect to cases in which the couple decided to divorce, signed a divorce agreement, approved it in the court and even separated from each other, and not even in a case where before the date of the divorce arrangement the deceased suffered a stroke that prevented the arrangement of the get...  The same is true in the following cases: prolonged separation (only five years); the actual division of the property according to a divorce agreement signed; The declaration of a woman as a rebel and the woman's inactivity to annul this judgment (Estates Case (Haifa) 12601-03-09 S. S. v. The General Apostle [published in Nevo] (November 2, 2009); also happened in the Estates Case (Tel Aviv) 108091/08 H. A. v. R. A. [published in Nevo] (August 11, 2012).  In both of these cases, the get was not tripled and no marriage permit was granted, as in the Sabag case, where the deceased even married a second wife..."  (ibid., at pp. 63-64).
15. Thus, the case law unequivocally preferred the formal test as it emerges from the judgment of the Honorable Judge Mazuz Bin Tax Appeal 4532/20.

From the rule to our matters, we are:

1. Since there is no dispute that in the present case the deceased was married to the respondent at the time of his death, in view of the formal test set in the aforesaid case law, the respondent is entitled to inherit him as his spouse in accordance with the provisions  of sections 10-11 of the Inheritance Law, and there is no room for the opposing arguments in this regard.
2. I will add that even from a material point of view, it does not appear that this is an exceptional circumstance, when we are dealing with a separation of about four years, during which part of the time the respondent continued to come to the condominium from time to time.  See in this regard: pp. 13, 21-22, 24-25, and p. 14, paras. 6-7 of Prot. of January 6, 2025; and her testimony at the hearing of the  threatening harassment proceeding and the protection order 6238-02-21 "... We have been married for 36 years.  We haven't lived together for two and a half years... He lives in a moshav **, and I live with my mother in ****.... Every Friday or Thursday, I go to meet my daughters... I'm coming to cook Shabbat dinner with them... And if I help them along the way.  That's how it has been for two and a half years..." (p. 1, paras. 8-18 of Prout. of February 3, 2021)).
3. This is also supported by the words of the deceased in the statement of defense he filed in the property claim that took place between the couple, where he clarified that "... The plaintiff still lives in the house and she works in the house as mature and actually lives between two houses..." (paragraphs 7 and 28 of the statement of defense of June 28, 2020 submitted toClaims after the settlement of litigation 11124-03-20).
4. In addition, in the circumstances at hand,  no divorce proceeding  was initiated by any of the parties in the court.  In this regard, the respondent testified in her interrogation that the deceased – "... did not want a divorce", and she did not file a divorce claim despite the separation (see pp. 15, paras. 1-3 of the protégé), so the deceased himself stated in paragraph 7 of the aforementioned statement of defense, where he explicitly claimed that the woman still lives in the house and that she is doing her own in it, and that she has not filed any divorce claim.
5. Admittedly, in paragraph 13 of the objection of March 3, 2024, the objector claimed that the defendant and her deceased father were in divorce proceedings; However, she did not produce a shred of her reference regarding a divorce proceeding that took place between the couple in the Rabbinical Court, even after my decision of October 22, 2024, I granted her request for information, inter alia, about the proceedings in the Rabbinical Court, when in her affidavit, to which she attached various documents that she had received as part of the discovery of the documents,  No document was attached attesting to such a divorce claim, which was denied by the respondent and is inconsistent with the deceased's own declaration.
6. Our eyes see that the circumstances of the case at hand do not rise to extreme circumstances in which the substantive approach is sometimes used in rulings, which, in any case, as stated, was not properly accepted in the case law.
7. With regard to the Sabag case (Civil Appeal 247/97 Sabag v. Sabag, IsrSC 35(4) 49, 55 (1999)), to which the objector referred, it was clarified in the case law that the court's determination there was given in the definition of an "obiter"; In addition, the court did not address the question of a substantive interpretation of the provision  of section 10 of the Law, but rather a substantive interpretation with respect to the term "married" within the scope of the provision  of section 146 of the Inheritance Law (which deals with a testator who, at his death, was married to more than one wife).and therefore it was held that it is not possible to draw conclusions from the Sabag case with regard to a substantive interpretation of the term "spouse" that appears in sections 10 and 11 of the Law.  (See Family Appeal 38845-10-12, paragraphs 23-24 of the Pass, transfer of the place of hearing of the Honorable Judge Schneller).
8. In any event, it seems that it is not possible to conclude from the circumstances of the case in our case, and after that, as stated, the judgment of the Supreme Court was given in the aforementioned tax appeal 4532/20,  which clarified that the formal test is the relevant – and this is the binding rule today.
9. The judgment given in the case of Estate (Nazareth Family) 541/08 of the late C.B.Z. v. C.A.  (July 19, 2010), to which the objector referred, deals with the interpretation of "spouse" under  section 146 of the Inheritance Law; and in any event, I did not find that it is possible to infer from his circumstances (where the deceased's first wife was mentally ill and the husband tripled Gita and received a permit to marry the second wife from whom he had 5 children) for our purposes.
10. As for the rest of the rulings to which the objector referred in her claim, some of them were annulled by the Court of Appeal (Estate Case 108091/08) and some of them were given in unique circumstances, from which it is not possible to draw an inference to our matter.
11. Therefore, the argument that the respondent should not be regarded as the spouse of the deceased for the purposes of the Inheritance Law is also rejected.
12. In light of the aforesaid rule, the objection to the granting of the inheritance order is rejected.
13. The Respondent will submit a formal inheritance order for my signature within 7 days, in the form that will be agreed upon by the Attorney General.
14. In view of the rejection of the claim and taking into account the conduct of the objector that led to the delay of the proceeding, including the date of filing the amended objection (see: my decision of February 21, 2024); the delay in the submission of a principal witness affidavit of more than a month without filing an appropriate application (see: my decision of December 30, 2024); and so on, I find that she should be charged with legal expenses in the sum  of NIS 10,000, to be paid to the respondent within 30 days.

The judgment was allowed to be published after omitting identifying details.