Tefek (Tel Aviv) 31664-11-22 State of Israel v. Gol Shorosh - part 8

Defendant 1:

69. Defendant 1 is 46 years old, married and the father of two minors, and according to him, in the past two years his family has undergone a tragedy during which his wife's brother was murdered by accidental gunfire. According to Defendant 1, this has a real impact on the situation of his children (documents D/8 were presented).  This matter comes among my considerations when determining the sentence.  Defendant 1 worked as a janitor for 15 years, but following a conviction in the previous case, which was discovered in the framework of the aforementioned investigation, he was forced to resign from his job and worked as a warehouseman.  According to his counsel, defendant 1 is currently unemployed and, as stated, is in insolvency proceedings (D/6), pays the sum of ILS 4,000 per month, and his wife earns about ILS 5,500 per month (D/7).
70. I have given my opinion that in the framework of the previous case, Defendant 1 was integrated into a rehabilitative process, and even began treatment privately before the indictment was filed and before he was integrated into the treatment by the Probation Service. In addition, in the previous proceeding, he was sentenced to one month in prison to serve community service, when the court recognized the rehabilitation he had undergone.  This is also reflected in his report, where it was detailed that Defendant 1 participated in a lengthy rehabilitation process, cooperated with the treatment authorities, and the impression is that the treatment was effective for him and helped him critically examine his conduct and problematic patterns.  Although the treatment that Defendant 1 underwent related to the previous case, the Probation Service noted that Defendant 1 recognized the connection between his conduct in the previous case and the offenses in question, namely that on the formal level, Defendant 1 made efforts to present a functioning and adaptive façade, but in the virtual space, which he perceived as anonymous and enabled, he tended to act in a boundary-breaking manner, had difficulty considering the consequences of his actions, and concentrated on satisfying his needs.
71. I did not find it appropriate to adopt the recommendation of the Probation Service and sentence defendant 1 to imprisonment with community service. This is in light of the scope of punishment, which was determined on the basis of the degree of harm to the values protected by his actions and by virtue of the principle of proportionality.  Nor do I find that the circumstances in the case of Defendant 1 justify an exception to the punishment for rehabilitation considerations despite the therapeutic process in which he participated, and taking into account the nature of the treatment and all the circumstances.  As is well known, it has already been determined that rehabilitation considerations are not the be-all and end-all, alongside many other considerations (Criminal Appeal 8232/11 State of Israel v.  Anonymous (April 23, 2012)).  It was also determined that even where there is a factual basis that attests to rehabilitation: "Not in every case where the therapeutic process is progressing in a positive direction, the authority set forth in section 40D of the Penal Law must be exercised.  otherwise, it will be found that the exception empties the rule of content..." (Criminal Appeal 126/22 State of Israel v.  Anonymous (April 27, 2022), para.  16)).
72. However, there is a good way that defendant 1 took in the treatment and in all its circumstances in order to influence the location of his sentence within the boundaries of the punishment compound. This is also taking into account that the Probation Service noted that Defendant 1 expresses sincere remorse, acknowledges the damage he caused, and demonstrates empathy for the victims of the offenses.  Defendant 1 even deposited ILS 13,400 in the court's coffers for the benefit of the victims of the aforementioned offense, and the Probation Service's assessment is that the treatment helped reduce the risk in his situation in connection with the proceeding in question as well.  Defendant 1's remorse and his assumption of responsibility is of great significance, and it is also reflected in his confession at the beginning of the proceeding, which saved considerable judicial time.
73. When determining the sentence of Defendant 1, I considered his conviction in the previous case, as well as the well-known importance of deterrence considerations in economic offenses, including deterrence of the public (Criminal Appeal 3927/16 State of Israel v. Bar Ziv (February 23, 2017); Criminal Appeal 677/14 Dankner v.  State of Israel (July 17, 2014); Davidovich ruling), so that it is not easy to determine a sentence at the bottom of the punishment compound next to them where there is an additional previous conviction, even if the person has confessed and assumed responsibility and has no criminal record.
74. Notwithstanding the aforesaid, exceptionally, when at the end of the day the punishment is individual, I found that the special concrete circumstances of Defendant 1 justify this in his case - so that Defendant 1 would be sentenced to an actual prison sentence of 13 months at the bottom of the punishment range. This is in view of the special circumstances detailed above, the passage of time since the offenses were committed, and with an emphasis on the good manner in which he handled it, which, in the assessment of the Probation Service, even reduced his dangerousness.  In addition, in light of the difficulty for his family, including his minor children, in the difficult family circumstances and the tragedy they experienced up close.  As for the fine - it will amount to ILS 55,000 after considering the above and his financial situation.

Defendant 2

75. Defendant 2, about 44 years old, is divorced for the second time after a difficult separation process, and is the father of two minor children. According to his report, he has worked over the years in the field of marketing and sales of financial instruments in the capital market, and currently works as a freelancer in the field of marketing and selling fashion products.  According to the report, Defendant 2, who grew up in a complex family environment, is diagnosed with anxiety and depression disorder and is suspected of narcissistic personality disorder, and has deceptive and manipulative patterns.  A psychiatric opinion was also submitted in his case from another proceeding (D/10) and it was noted that he needed psychotherapeutic treatment if there was motivation to do so, and continued follow-up and psychiatric treatment in any framework in which he would be found.
76. Defendant 2 also confessed at the beginning of the proceeding after the indictment was amended as part of the mediation proceeding, and took responsibility for his actions, thus saving judicial time and the need for witness testimony. This matter was considered in his favor.  The same is true of the fact that, like Defendant 1, he deposited the sum of ILS 13,400 in the court's coffers is transferred to a plea for punishment, and this also is an expression of taking responsibility.  However, before the Probation Service, Defendant 2 limited his responsibility for committing the offenses in the framework of TradePro, and projected responsibility on Defendant 1, and the Probation Service's impression is that Defendant 2 has difficulty knowing and understanding in depth his problematic situation and patterns.  In addition, the impression is that defendant 2's ability to benefit from a therapeutic process is low, and he shows difficulty in expressing empathy.  The Probation Service did not make a therapeutic rehabilitative recommendation, and its assessment is that in the case of Defendant 2, a concrete and deterrent punishment is required that will set a clear boundary in order to reduce the risk.
77. In addition, Defendant 2 has a previous conviction from 2023 in two cases, for offenses from 2021 and 2022, including assault on a spouse, threats, violation of a court order, harassment, and more. Admittedly, these are not offenses of the nature of the matter, and according to his counsel, these are offenses related to "a dispute regarding custody and removal from the children", and their execution according to the criminal record at a later date than the commission of the offenses in the case at hand - so it would be incorrect to say that despite his previous conviction and the sentence imposed on him, he continued to commit offenses, and to consider this to be severe.  However, it is impossible to ignore the existence of the conviction for which even Defendant 2 served a 10-month prison sentence.  Therefore, she will be given appropriate and measured weight when determining the sentence.  As in the case of Defendant 1, when determining the sentence of Defendant 2, I also considered the passage of time since the offenses were committed, as well as according to him in the framework of the plea for punishment, when he stated, inter alia, that he had donated the sum of ILS 20,000 to soldiers following the war.  In addition, I considered the impact of the sentence on his family, including his minor children, as well as deterrence considerations that are of great importance in such offenses.
78. After examining the overall circumstances, I did not find that the sentence of defendant 2 should be placed at the upper level of the punishment compound as the accuser's petition, and in the circumstances, his sentence would be set at the lower part of the punishment range, but not at the bottom of it, to 12 months in prison. The fine will be set at ILS 40,000, given all the circumstances.

Defendant 3

79. Defendant 3, 36 years old, is married and the father of two minor children, and the medical condition of one of his children is complex (and will not be detailed for reasons of privacy (see medical documents D/2)). Defendant 3 also suffers from a complex medical condition since his birth.    Lubin elaborated on this in his testimony and in the opinion he submitted (D/3).  According to Defendant 3 to the Probation Service, his health condition even makes it difficult for him to lead a normal lifestyle.  According to the Probation Service, Defendant 3's medical condition led to a loss of his self-confidence over the years, and he too was in the background of his commission of the offenses, which he committed, inter alia, out of a desire to feel a sense of friendship and to be a significant factor to others.  The Probation Service noted that Defendant 3 has difficulty recognizing the internal factors that underlie his conduct, has difficulty feeling empathy for the victims of the offenses, tends to minimize his actions, and concealment and obscurity are evident in his conduct.  At the same time, factors of chance were noted in the form of taking a certain responsibility, the absence of a criminal record, and a change in his field of work that reduces the economic temptations in which he was subjected.  The Probation Service is under the impression that the conditions for a rehabilitative proceeding that may reduce the risk in the case of Defendant 3 are not ripe, and the recommendation is for a concrete punishment that sets a boundary, taking into account his health condition and the health condition of his son.
80. On behalf of defendant 3, Ms. Guy testified and her opinion was submitted (D/5). According to the opinion, Defendant 3 showed insight and responsibility for committing the offenses, but difficulty was noted at length with regard to the emotional realm.  Guy noted that defendant 3 has a great need for acceptance and approval from the environment and has narcissistic characteristics and a tendency to impulsivity.  Under her impression, at the time of the commission of the offenses, Defendant 3 was focused on himself and his success and was unable to give any thought to the consequences of his actions on the victims.  Even to her impression, today he is ashamed and remorseful, as well as aware of his wrong decisions and motivation to function properly.  A review of the opinion shows that even before her, Defendant 3 reduced his actions to some extent, and that, like the Probation Service, to her impression, there was an emotional deprivation related to the circumstances of his life at the basis of the commission of the offenses.
81. The significant gap between Ms. Guy's opinion and the report relates to the fact that according to her, contrary to the Probation Service's assessment, Defendant 3 is currently able to identify the distortions in thinking at the time of the commission of the offenses. In addition, in her opinion, there is a possibility that in his chronic medical condition, imprisonment would endanger his life (without clarifying where the expertise for such a determination comes from).  Guy also noted that a prison sentence is liable to strengthen the psychological injuries of Defendant 3 and harm his chances of rehabilitation, and her recommendation is that he be punished that will allow him to continue working, manage the bankruptcy proceedings and participate in the couples therapy in which he is undergoing.  What is detailed in the opinion is also among my considerations, but since the opinion was given without Ms. Guy reviewing the Probation Service's report, he is the professional body authorized by the court to examine the case of Defendant 3, and after hearing her testimony and my impression of her, I found that the conclusions and impressions of the Probation Service were preferable to its conclusions, insofar as they contradict them.
82. Counsel for defendant 3 reiterated during the argument for the sentence the medical condition of defendant 3, and submitted the opinion of Dr. Lubin, who also testified on behalf of defendant 3.  All this is in order to persuade that a sentence of actual imprisonment behind bars would endanger the life of defendant 3 in a manner that justifies a different punishment in his case, while referring to criminal appeal 5669/14 Lupoliansky v.  the State of Israel (December 29, 2015) (hereinafter: the Lupoliansky judgment).  According to her, as stated, the punishment range in the case of Defendant 3 begins with a restraining order, and alternatively, there is room to deviate from the punishment range due to the fear for his life from serving a prison sentence behind bars.  As is well known, as emerges from the Lupoliansky judgment, paragraphs 221-222, and the subsequent judgments, when deciding in this context, the court must examine whether a prison sentence behind bars would indeed endanger the life of the defendant, and even if it has been proven to be so, it must consider the severity of the acts for which he was convicted.  It was determined that even a defendant who is seriously ill or whose imprisonment situation causes him great suffering may be sent to prison, and the starting point is that the medical officials in the IPS are prepared to treat prisoners whose medical condition is serious.  It was clarified: "Therefore, our words do not constitute the establishment of a rule according to which a claim for shortening life expectancy carries, in part or with, immunity from an actual prison sentence." (See also: Criminal Appeals Authority 2914/21 Kahlon v.  State of Israel (June 14, 2021)).
83. In our case, after examining the main points of Dr. Lubin's testimony and opinion as detailed at the beginning of the sentence, I have not found that they justify deviating from the scope of punishment that was determined.  My conclusion is that there is no factual basis for the danger to the life of defendant 3 if he were to be sentenced to imprisonment as claimed by his counsel, and certainly not in a manner that justifies avoiding this punishment insofar as it is the appropriate punishment in the circumstances while deviating from the scope of the punishment.  Nor did I find it necessary to deviate from the penalty range for reasons of rehabilitation, given the details in the report of defendant 3.  In addition, I did not find that Kola deviated from the scope of punishment based on the proposed Amendment 128 tothe Penal Law as a petition filed by his counsel.
84. However, the circumstances of defendant 3, including his health, family condition, and his characteristics, were considered by me when determining his sentence within the scope of the punishment compound. In this framework, I also considered the defendant's current refusal to work in an environment that could "deteriorate" him to commit additional offenses, as well as his recent words to the punishment.  In addition, he has no criminal record, and the fact that he confessed and saved a lot of judicial time after the mediation process and the amendment of the indictment, and that he cooperated fully in his interrogation already.  In addition, time has passed since the offenses were committed.  In the case of defendant 3 as well, I considered the considerations of deterring the individual and the many because of their importance in the offenses in question, and I gave weight to the recommendation of the Probation Service for a concrete and limiting punishment.  Taking all of these into account, and giving appropriate weight to the medical condition of defendant 3 and the medical condition of his son and the effect of the sentence on him, along with deterrence considerations, the sentence of defendant 3 will be sentenced in the lower part of the punishment compound that was determined but not at the bottom, and will be served with community service, so that he will be sentenced to 9 months in prison to be served with community service, along with a fine of ILS 25,000, giving weight to the above and his financial situation.
85. Therefore, I sentence the defendants to the following sentences:

To Defendant 1

1. Actual imprisonment for 13 months.  The defendant must appear on September 6, 2025, at 9:00 a.m.  at Nitzan Prison, in order to serve his sentence, unless he is required to report to another prison, as part of the early screening procedures, if they are carried out.  The defendant shall bring with him personal equipment, an identity card or passport, and a copy of this sentence.  It is suggested that the defendant coordinate his entry into prison, including the possibility of early screening, with the Diagnostic and Screening Branch of the Israel Prison Service, at 08-9787377 or 08-9787336.
2. Imprisonment for 4 months, which he will not serve unless he commits within 3 years from the date of his release the offenses for which he was convicted under the Securities Law.
3. Imprisonment for 6 months, which he will not serve unless he commits any offense of fraud or theft under the Penal Law within 3 years from the date of his release.
4. A fine of ILS 55,000, which will be paid in 36 equal and continuous installments as of November 2, 2025, or three months in prison in lieu of it.  No payment will be made on time - the balance will be payable immediately.  The sum of ILS 13,400 deposited in the court's coffers will be used to pay the fine, subject to any prohibition by law.

To Defendant 2

1. Actual imprisonment for 12 months.  The defendant must appear on September 6, 2025, at 9:00 a.m.  at Nitzan Prison, in order to serve his sentence, unless he is required to report to another prison, as part of the early screening procedures, if they are carried out.  The defendant shall bring with him personal equipment, an identity card or passport, and a copy of this sentence.  It is suggested that the defendant coordinate his entry into prison, including the possibility of early screening, with the Diagnostic and Screening Branch of the Israel Prison Service, at 08-9787377 or 08-9787336.
2. Imprisonment for 4 months, which he will not serve unless he commits within 3 years from the date of his release the offenses for which he was convicted under the Securities Law.
3. Imprisonment for 6 months, which he will not serve unless he commits any offense of fraud or theft under the Penal Law within 3 years from the date of his release.
4. A fine of ILS 40,000, which will be paid in 36 equal and continuous installments as of November 2, 2025, or two months in prison in lieu of it.  No payment will be made on time - the balance will be payable immediately.  The sum of ILS 13,400 deposited in the court's coffers will be used to pay the fine, subject to any prohibition by law.

Defendant 3

1. Actual imprisonment for a period of 9 months to be served by way of community service according to the opinion of the supervisor of community service at Geha Hospital, 1 Helsinki St., Petah Tikva. At the request of defendant 3 and with the consent of the accuser, defendant 3 will report on October 30, 2025 at 8:00 a.m.  at the Barkai Unit, Public Works, Central Branch, 53 Salame St., Tel Aviv.  It is clarified that there may be changes in the workplace and working hours.  The meaning of failure to perform community service was clarified to the defendant.

1. Imprisonment for 4 months, which he will not serve unless he commits within 3 years from the date of his release the offenses for which he was convicted under the Securities Law.
2. Imprisonment for 6 months, which he will not serve unless he commits any offense of fraud or theft under the Penal Law within 3 years from the date of his release.
3. A fine of ILS 25,000, which will be paid in 25 equal and continuous installments starting July 10, 2025, or 45 days in prison in lieu of it.  No payment will be made on time - the balance will be payable immediately.

The Secretariat will forward a copy of the sentence to the Commissioner of Public Service and the Probation Service.