"As stated, the burden of persuasion regarding the deceased's incapacity to make a will rests on the shoulders of the person claiming it, and it is not enough to merely raise doubts, but there is a need for concrete and clear evidence... Certainly, the examination of the question of whether he knew - or did not know - to discern the nature of a will is always a factual examination in the circumstances of each case..."
[See Ltd. 3539/17 Anonymous vs. Anonymous (Published in Nevo, June 11, 2017) about the references cited there, and Civil Appeal 279/87 Rubinowitz v. Kreisel IsrSC 44(1) 760, 762].
When only general arguments have been raised that are not backed up even at the outset of evidence or by any factual description regarding the deceased's competence and her ability to discern the nature of a will or the manner in which the will was signed in comparison with other signatures of the deceased, the objections' arguments regarding the deceased's competence and her signature on the will should be rejected.
It should be noted that as will be detailed below and in all the circumstances, as proved by the evidence presented, the presumption of kosher established by law in relation to the deceased was not contradicted, and it was also proven that it was the deceased who signed the will herself.
The Burden of Proof - Defects in the Will:
- In the absence of formal defects in the will, the burden of proof is on the person who objects to the existence of the will.
"We have a ruling that 'a will that has no defect in terms of form is presumed to be true, and one who claims that it has no validity must prove it... And the opposite is true: a will that has a defect in terms of form is not a standing presumption, and one who claims that it should be fulfilled must first prove that it is a true will... The burden of proof imposed on the applicant is not only with regard to the veracity of the will, but also with regard to the testator's discretion that the document will serve as a will regarding the division of his property after his death." (Civil Appeal 493/83 Abu Sneina v. Taha IsrSC 39(4) 639, 643)