Conclusion
In this case, the Authority breached the duty of fairness, both in its overall conduct vis-à-vis the appellants, and explicitly in the duty to act in an equal manner and to base its decisions on a proper factual basis. The Authority, in breach of its duty to exercise its authority as quickly as possible, has harmed the best interests of the children, in contravention of its obligation under the Refugee Convention. The best interest of the children, as I have determined in the past, and as appears from all the professional opinions submitted by the experts in their case, as well as from the documents of the Committee of the Ministry of Education, which were not contradicted in any way by the Authority, is to remain in Israel. It is also in their interest to ensure their status, so that the cloud of expulsion is lifted from their heads immediately, and also that the rights to which they are entitled under the Convention are given to them in an orderly manner.
The Authority's conduct has led to the fact that children born in Israel, who are educated in the state's educational institutions from early childhood, children who were arrested when they were 4 and 9 years old, are now 10 and 15 years old, without the Authority taking action on their case, and without their best interests being examined by professionals on behalf of the Authority. During these years, on the one hand, the children experienced difficulties stemming from the uncertainty of their status, but at the same time, the children's connections to Israel, to significant figures in their surroundings and to their friends were strengthened. Therefore, their best interest requires a final decision on the matter, which is, in the circumstances of our case, the receipt of an A/5 visa that will give them certainty that they are entitled to remain in Israel and receive all the rights they require. It is in the best interest of the children today that their case be decided and the cloud of uncertainty will be removed, at least for the period of their childhood, and for the purpose of preserving the family unit, until the 3rd appellant, the girl S., reaches the age of 18.