This definition of a state witness in section 54A(a) is relevant to the requirement of assistance set forth in this section.
This definition is broader than the traditional definition, see for this matter. Kedmi, On the Evidence (2009), 487. I do not find room to expand on the relationship between the two definitions, and for the sake of the matter we will refer to the broader definition. It should be noted, however, that a state witness is "an accomplice to the offense that is the subject of the indictment, and in return for his agreement to cooperate with the authorities and testify against the other accomplices , he is given a 'promise' that he will not be prosecuted criminally in connection with his part in the commission of that offense." (10. Kedmi, ibid.).
Section 54A(a) expands the definition by saying that the consideration is not limited to a promise not to be prosecuted, but can be in the form of any benefit, and it is not only a promise, but it is possible that the benefit was already given before the witness was brought to testify. (10. Kedmi, ibid.).
The "expectation" of an interrogee to be a state witness does not make him so.
See Criminal Appeal 7253/14 Gur Finkelstein v. State of Israel (November 16, 2015):
"I accept the trial court's determination that Ramzi's hope, or expectation, did not make him a state witness, nor even a 'state witness in his opinion'... This is because his interrogators made it clear to him that they were not interested in entering into a state-witness agreement with him, and that the court would be the one to sentence him."
The question of who initiates the negotiations for a state-witness agreement is a fundamental question, since when it comes to the initiative of a defendant, there is no impediment to using the words he said against him in his trial. Later on, I will refer to what is said in this regard in the Turk ruling, and first I will turn to criminal appeal 5825/97 Shalom v. State of Israel, IsrSC 55(2) 933, 948: