With regard to the fact that the very existence of a state-witness agreement does not negate the freedom of will in the delivery of a confession that was given, at p. 27, paragraph 47 of the judgment:
"In summary, in my view, the very existence of a witness-state agreement does not, in and of itself, negate the freedom of will to make a confession that was given - within the framework of the agreement - after the signing of the agreement. Despite the fact that the very existence of such an agreement embodies a certain temptation to confess, it cannot be said that it is a temptation that the law views as a negation of free will. We find that one of the factors that led to the invalidation of the confessions given at the stage prior to the signing of the agreement - the temptation and deception inherent in the interrogators' initiative - loses its power at the stage after the signing of the agreement."
With regard to the examination of the question of the free will to give confessions after a state-witness agreement has been signed, at p. 31, paragraph 56 of the judgment:
"As has already been clarified, the existence of the agreement - on the basis of which the confession is made - does not, in and of itself, constitute a temptation that necessarily leads to the negation of free will to the extent that it leads to the invalidation of the confession. The delivery of a confession on the basis of such an agreement does not cause serious and significant harm to the autonomy of the free will of the person who made the confession. Therefore, it must be examined whether, apart from the fact that the confession was given by virtue of an agreement, it was given of good will and freely. For this purpose, it is necessary to examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the submission of the confession, including whether there are circumstances that are liable to erode the freedom of will or cause serious and significant harm to the autonomy of the state's witness in giving his confessions. In the framework of this examination, it would be appropriate to take into account - within the framework of case law and the Issacharov rule in particular - considerations that have the potential to affect the free will of the witness, including the personal characteristics of the state' s witness;his physical and mental state; Understanding the terms of the agreement he signed and the possible consequences of its breach, including the inclusion of the breach clause and understanding its meanings; the circumstances that led to the signing of the agreement; whether pressure, threat, or temptation was exerted prior to the confession (detached, as aforesaid, from the very existence of the agreement), or interrogation means that negated the free will to make the confession; whether the investigating authorities informed the witness of his rights, including his right to consult with a lawyer, and whether he was represented by a lawyer at the time the agreement was signed and the confession was delivered; and whether his rights were violated to a degree that caused serious and significant harm to his autonomy of free will. The considerations included in this list - which is not a closed list - will assist the court in examining the freedom of will of the state's witness in giving his confession. Following the Issacharov ruin in the category we are dealing with, in the outline that I propose to my friends, will serve both the value of discovering the truth, and the protection of the defendant's right to dignity and liberty."