A perusal of the record (P/168) conducted by the witness in relation to the aforesaid shows that on July 25, 2016, at approximately 11:30 A.M., when the witness entered the court cafeteria, Attorney Masalha, the defendant's defense attorney, approached him and asked to speak with him in the "off-the-record" units and that he was able to restore his hope.It was stolen in exchange for the release of the defendant and his son Adi, and the witness replied that he had no authority to agree to such a thing and that he would contact his superiors, and the said was reported to the head of the investigation team, Iluz.
The Conclusions Regarding the Claim of Inadmissibility of P/172 on the Claim of Negotiations for a State-Witness Agreement
- From the evidence that came before me, Testimonies of intelligence personnel, Police Investigators, A/172, and all the evidence and circumstances, and the context of the questions asked and the answers given, The conclusion is:
- There were no negotiations for the signing of a state-witness agreement at any stage, neither in meetings with intelligence personnel nor in the interrogations of the defendant by police personnel, including P/172.
- The negotiations were for the return of the weapons in exchange for a reduction in the sentence of the defendant and his son. It was not suggested, discussed or asked, by any of the parties, at any stage, that the defendant testify against any of his partners in the status of a state witness.
- The initiative in the first stage of the talks with the intelligence personnel was their initiative, but the evidence on which the accuser seeks to convict the defendant is not evidence that was collected in the course of these meetings.
- In the course of the interrogation on 2 August 2016, in the second part (P/172), there were also no negotiations for the defendant to be a state witness, and he was not asked or offered to testify against any of his partners in such a framework. It was said, several times, that "to remove Shadi is a liar," and that the defendant would give his version and testimony, all against the background of the defendant's defense arguments. This is not a request to testify as a state witness, it is not a proposal in the framework of an attempt to reach a state-witness agreement, and these things are related to the defendant's defense argument that he will come and defend himself against Shadi's claims that he is threatened, and the confirmation of the defendant's statement about payments to Shadi. Arguments that complicate the defendant in committing the act, and even aggravate him.
- In the framework of the interrogation on 2 August 2016, the defendant is the initiator, he is the one who leads the second part of the investigation (P/172), and he is the one who wishes to return to the possibility of a reduction in the sentence for what he will give, which means the return of the weapons. In practice, the defendant manages and leads the interrogators, on his own initiative, throughout the course of P/172, in the direction of the possibility of leniency, and the consideration that he will give, when at no stage was it mentioned that it would be in the form of his testimony against Shadi or any other person.
- The defendant is the initiator of a discourse about possible relief, which cannot fall within the framework of the definition of negotiations for a state witness.
- Even if you say that in the framework of P/172 negotiations are taking place that must be crowned as such in preparation for the signing of a state-witness agreement (and it should be emphasized that it has been proven to the contrary as aforesaid), even then it is an initiative of the defendant himself.
- As stated, even when the initiative is of a suspect, it is necessary to check the existence of free will. In our case, viewing P/172 leads to a clear conclusion that the defendant says everything he says out of a completely free will, the defendant says things on his own initiative, leads the interrogators to a discourse on matters that he himself wishes to talk about. Moreover, the investigation should not have continued at all in the matter of this affair, but in another matter, the Arms Affair, but it was the defendant who caused the investigation in the arms affair to continue, he immediately points to P/163, the statement that was taken minutes earlier, raises questions and requests, and continues the subject of this affair, and this only. On his own initiative, with his own repeated requests, to check offers that he claimed were given to him. This is his initiative, it is not about someone who can be claimed to have been tempted to say what he said. There is no basis for this claim or for any claim of deception. The defendant was not misled, he was not presented with any representation that led him to say the words, but he himself is intentional and causes the discourse to take place on this matter.
- From all of the above, the conclusion is that in accordance with the definition of a state witness, to the tests set out in the Tork ruling and in the additional rulings above, evidence P/172 is admissible, even as evidence that can be used against the defendant.
- As stated above, in the Tork ruling it was held that even if a state-witness agreement was signed, this does not in itself invalidate the confessions that were given in its wake, but the existence or non-existence of free will must still be examined. In our case, no agreement was signed, but the degree of the defendant's free will, which is foreseen from the interrogation P/172, his taking the investigation to the areas he wishes it to go, and his initiative being so clear during it, all of these would have led to a conclusion regarding admissibility, even if we were after the signing of an agreement. These words are brought from a lenient and material source.
Therefore, the petty claim, which relies on the claim of the existence of negotiations for a state-witness agreement, is rejected.