These tests are intended to hedge the scope and scope of this head of damage (Civil Appeal 1303/09 Kadosh v. Bikur Cholim Hospital, IsrSC 65(3) 164, paragraph 76 of the judgment of the Honorable Justice Y. Amit and paragraph 39 of the judgment of the Honorable Vice President E. Rivlin (2012)). Hence, not every infringement of the power of choice is an infringement on the "hard core" of autonomy, and not every infringement will formulate a claim of infringement of autonomy for which it deserves to be compensated (for a detailed analysis of the justifications and policy considerations relating to the implementation of the claim of infringement of autonomy, see: Assaf Yaakov, Da Aka Da'aka - The Evolution of an Infringement of Autonomy, Mishpatim 42:5 (2012)).
- In a Class Action (Tel Aviv District) 15310-05-14 Tal v. Brenner [Nevo] (11.7.2016) (hereinafter: The Tal MatterThe Honorable Justice R. Ronen rejected the argument that the bondholder has a right to compensation also due to a violation of autonomy, in the absence of the ability to exercise his right to act on the basis of complete and accurate information, due to a misleading detail in the reports. It was held that this is a clear case in which the infringement is not on the "hard core" of autonomy, but at most on the "power of choice". It was further determined that "Deception regarding the status of a company in the capital market does not entitle you to compensation for infringement of autonomy. If the alleged deception is proven, and it is proven that it caused pecuniary damage to the class members, they will be entitled to compensation for such damage. However, if the existence of pecuniary damage is not proven, there will be no reason to determine that despite the absence of economic harm, the autonomy of the group members was violated." (The Tal Matter, paragraph 124). In my opinion, this position reflects a proper demarcation of claims of infringement of autonomy, and the determination of appropriate boundaries to the "core" of the right to autonomy. This demarcation excludes the "hard core" of human right, which sanctifies autonomy, as well as the claim before me. Hence, the plaintiff did not establish a claim of compensation for the infringement of autonomy.
The attempt to claim an infringement of autonomy in an ever-expanding variety of cases and the difficulty inherent in the expansion of these claims can also be learned from Yitzhak Amit's article, "The Wild Horse of the Infringement of Autonomy" Strasberg-Cohen 465, 494 (2017), which ends with the following words: "From the outset of modest damage in the framework of the tort of negligence, the infringement of autonomy has spread horizontally to various issues that go beyond the scope of medical malpractice and even to various areas of law outside the law of torts. And it grows vertically high in the compensation rates that are awarded in the garden. It seems that the infringement of autonomy is the new wild horse of law, and perhaps, as the poet says, the time has come to stretch the reins and take back a little" (ibid., p. 494).
- Compensation for Pain and Suffering
- The plaintiff claimed in his affidavit that he had suffered losses of time, grief, suffering, anguish, and sleepless nights due to the loss of his money and as a result, he claimed, had been deceived by the defendants. This claim was made without being attributed to any of the causes of action claimed by the plaintiff.
As stated, the plaintiff did not prove the causal connection between the loss of his money and the misleading detail in the report dated September 8, 2013. Hence, even if he suffered suffering, mental anguish and sleepless nights due to the loss of his money, no causal connection has been proven between them and the defendants' actions.
- Conclusion
- As stated, my conclusion is that the defendants should have included in the report of September 8, 2013 the current pores figure, but the plaintiff did not prove that as a result of their omission, he suffered the damage claimed by him.
Hence, the plaintiff did not prove his claim under the Securities Law and the regulations enacted by virtue of it or by virtue of the tort of negligence set forth in the Torts Ordinance, nor was he entitled to compensation for non-pecuniary damage.