Civil Case (St.) 3316-12-23 Zion Yedai v. Kfir Kabti

Decision

The issue of this decision is the issue of limiting the Applicant's occupation in the field of bakeries, despite his alleged undertaking not to operate a bakery for the manufacture of baked goods, in the area of the local authority and the area in which the Respondents' bakery operates.  As part of my decision, I will examine the undertaking itself, and I will decide on the dispute before me in light of the case law.

General background and summary of the parties' arguments in a nutshell

1. I have before me the petition of the defendant and the counter-plaintiff (hereinafter: the Applicant) dated July 25, 2024, which concerned his request to allow him to establish a factory for the manufacture of baked goods within the boundaries of the Gedera Local Council, and this, contrary to his alleged undertaking not to establish a bakery in the areas of Gedera and its environs for two years, in a manner that competes with the respondents' bakery.  I will examine this undertaking on its merits, its validity, its meaning, and whether it is possible to stipulate the provisions of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, in the circumstances of the case before me.
2. The plaintiffs (hereinafter: the Respondents or the Plaintiffs) are spouses and owners of equal parts of the Z.  Z.  Bakery.  Know", a bakery that has been operating at 4 Magic Carpet St.  in Gedera for over 30 years (hereinafter and hereinafter: the Mafia).  The applicant worked in the bakery for years starting at the age of 14.  According to the claim, some of the applicant's family members were also employed in the bakery.  Over the past few years, the applicant has actually managed the bakery.  On December 1, 2010, the Applicant entered into a lease agreement with the Respondents, in the framework of which he rented the bakery for one year (hereinafter: the first agreement), for the purpose of operating the bakery in the name of the Respondents - "Yedai Bakery".

3. In clause 18 of the first agreement, the following was stipulated:

"After the expiration of this agreement, the tenant will leave the bakery, and he undertakes not to open a bakery in the area of Yedai Bakery's marketing activity, that is, from Rehovot in the north to Ashkelon in the south.  This prohibition applies to a cooling off period of two years." (Highlights here and below - mine.  18).

During the years following the first agreement, the applicant rented the bakery and operated it without a written agreement being entered into between the parties (at least, no such agreement was presented to me).

4. On December 1, 2019, an additional lease agreement was entered into between the parties (hereinafter: the second agreement), for a period of one year, until November 31, 2020. In the framework of this agreement (entitled "Unprotected Lease for a Business"), it was determined that:

"The purpose of the lease is to operate Yedai Bakery - the production of pita bread, rolls and various baked goods, according to the bakery's format according to this agreement." (Clause 3 of the Agreement).

5. In the framework of the second agreement, rent for one year and other conditions were determined, which characterize a lease agreement for a business.

In clause 11 of this agreement, it was determined that:

"The tenant or anyone on his behalf who will be involved in the management or employment of Yedai Gedera Bakery hereby undertakes not to open a similar business - a pita bakery and various baked goods such as those produced at Yedai Bakery, at a distance of 25 km in each direction."

It should be emphasized that the second agreement did not specify the period of restriction of the applicant's occupation, and it is not clear from the agreement for what period the applicant undertook not to open a competing business.  In any event, and as stated above, the validity of the second agreement in itself is for one year only.

6. In the margins, it should be noted that the plaintiff (who operated the bakery in the past) is an elderly and sick man, who does not operate the bakery, and it is operated by the applicant. The plaintiff's wife, plaintiff 2, is also an elderly woman, who cares for her sick husband, alongside her care for the elderly.  In other words, the applicant has been operating the bakery on his own for years, without the help of the plaintiffs, when they receive the rent for renting the property and the business on its machines.

1. During the months of October-November 2023, the Applicant terminated his engagement with the Respondents and at the same time established a bakery products business near the Respondents' bakery.  All this, in light of a dispute between the parties regarding the terms of the continuation agreement between the parties.
2. It appears that there is no dispute that the Applicant operated the bakery on his own in recent years, including purchasing various facilities for the purpose of operating the bakery, alongside original facilities that were left in the bakery by its owners, the respondents.  The Applicant also employed employees in the bakery, some of whom were veteran employees, who were allegedly employed in the past by the Respondents, and the Applicant even took care of their social conditions.
3. In the framework of the proceeding before me, the parties filed mutual claims: on the one hand, the respondents petitioned to recognize the second agreement between them, which allegedly expired one year after the date of its conclusion, and to order the continuation of the lease, as well as to obligate the applicant to pay them the remainder of the rent; The Applicant, for his part, filed a counterclaim concerning various expenses incurred by him on the bakery's employees, as well as in respect of facilities he permitted in the bakery, when he abandoned it at the end of the agreement.  In any event, I am not interested in the decision at hand in deciding these issues, but rather in the petition of the Applicant to allow him to open a bakery for the manufacture of baked goods within the boundaries of the Gedera Local Council, and in the Respondents' argument regarding the prohibition on the Applicant to open a competing bakery within the boundaries of the Gedera Local Council and the surrounding area.
4. For the sake of completeness, I will note that the respondents petitioned, alongside their main claim, to grant temporary relief instructing the applicant (the respondent in the framework of the interim relief) to close the bakery that he opened, to restore the respondents' bakery, and to prohibit him from operating a bakery in violation of the lease agreement.  On December 3, 2023, I granted the request for ex parte temporary relief, limiting the Applicant's use of the Applicant's logo and the kashrut certificate given to the Respondents in the name of their business.  At the hearing of the motion for interim relief at the request of the respondents, in the presence of the parties and the attorney general, on December 18, 2023, and with the consent of the parties and the attorney general, I decided to delete the temporary relief without an order for costs.  In the course of a hearing held before me in the application for interim relief against the Applicant, it became clear that the Applicant has sold and continues to this day as part of his business baked goods that he purchased in other bakeries, and not self-produced baked goods.
5. The applicant is now petitioning to allow him to bake baked bakery products in his business without any restriction and within the boundaries of the Gedera Local Council.  The Applicant's petition was filed, as stated, on July 25, 2024.  The response of the respondents' counsel (11 pages of text, and 217 pages, including appendices!) was submitted on August 12, 2024.  Initially, I scheduled a hearing on the application during the recess, but it did not take place until October 10, 2024.  As part of the hearing, the applicant was cross-examined quite briefly, and the hearing was recorded and transcribed.  After the transcription of the hearing, short summaries were submitted on behalf of the applicant's counsel and summaries of the response on behalf of the respondents' counsel.  The summaries of the answer expanded the scope and therefore I was required to submit an additional series of summaries: summaries of the applicant's counsel and additional summaries of the respondents' counsel.  Now that these have been completed, the time has come to make a decision.
6. The Applicant argues that his occupation should not be restricted and that he should be allowed to open a bakery in which he will produce baked goods by himself, and not only market baked goods from other bakeries, as has been done in the past year.  According to the Respondents, this application fundamentally violates the Applicant's undertaking in the lease agreement to refrain from opening a bakery and/or store for the sale of bakery products and/or products similar to the bakery products and in the vicinity of the Respondents' business, the bakery.  I will review the arguments of the parties in the course of my transmission.

Application for Temporary Relief

13. Before I dive into the issue on its merits, I will note that our matter is in fact a request for temporary relief, moving on to a decision on the case on its merits. In this regard, I have no choice but to mention basic concepts.
14. First, the applicant for interim relief must meet three cumulative conditions: first, the existence of a cause of action - there is a need for the plaintiff to succeed in his claim and that it is not a frivolous claim; The second, that the balance of convenience is tilted in favor of the applicant, i.e., that if the interim relief is not granted, the applicant will suffer greater damage than the damage that will be caused to the respondent or a third party, if the interim relief is granted, and the third is that the application was filed honestly and in good faith [Civil Appeal Authority 645/21 Anonymous v. Anonymous, at paragraph 4 [Nevo] (February 21, 2021); Civil Appeal Authority 3368/22 Erel Electromechanics in Tax Appeal v.  Rotem Safety Ltd., at paragraph 14 [Nevo] (July 6, 2022)].
15. There is a "parallelism of forces" between the first two conditions, and thus the higher the chances of the applicant winning the main proceeding, the more lenient the court will be to lenient the requirement that the balance of convenience clearly tilt in his favor and vice versa [Civil Appeal Authority 5215/22 Ofir Yahalom v. Raphael Cohen, at paragraph 16 [Nevo] (August 18, 2022); Civil Appeal Authority 343/21 Eliyahu Yifrach v.  Israel Lands Authority, at para.  8 [Nevo] (May 9, 2021); Civil Appeal Authority 2553/20 Aviv v.  Smadja [Nevo] (June 7, 2020); Uri Goren 711 (13th edition, 2020)].

Discussion and Decision

1. After reviewing the applicant's application and its response (as stated, this is a long and detailed response), as well as the minutes of the hearing and the additional summaries on behalf of the parties' counsel, I have reached the conclusion that the applicant's request to open a factory for the manufacture of baked goods of any kind should be accepted.  I will clarify my conclusion and my way of doing things.

The Normative Plane

Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and Case Law

1. The starting point for examining the issue that is the subject of this judgment is in the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, which states that every person is entitled to engage in any occupation, profession or occupation (section 3 of the law), and that a person's occupation is not limited except by a law that is appropriate to the values of the State of Israel, for a proper purpose and to the extent that it does not exceed what is required, or according to a law by virtue of explicit authorization therein (section 4 of the law).
2. In our case, we are not dealing with a law, but rather an agreement between the parties, the details of which we will discuss later.  In this context, we must examine what is the validity of a contractual obligation that restricts freedom of occupation? And does it comply with public policy? In this regard, I have no choice but to refer to section 30 of the Contracts (General Part) Law, 5733-1973, which states that:

"A contract whose conclusion, content, or purpose is illegal, immoral, or contrary to public policy is void."

1. In order to examine the position of Israeli law regarding what is permissible and prohibited in contractual engagements, we will turn to the words of the Honorable President Barak, Other Municipality Applications 6601/96 AES System Inc.  v.  Sa'ar (IsrSC 55 (3), 850, August 28, 2000, para.  7, p.  861.  Hereinafter: AES System Matter:

"Public policy" reflects the basic perceptions of Israeli society regarding the proper level of conduct in contractual relations.  It expresses the position of Israeli law regarding what is permissible and forbidden in a contractual engagement.  The content of public policy varies from company to company; It changes in a given society from time to time on the basic perceptions of Israeli society - and the position of Israeli law - regarding what is permissible and what is forbidden, the judge learns from the totality of the values of the legal system.  The first of these values are the constitutional values of law and the regime.  Therefore, human rights, which are enshrined in the Basic Laws, constitute a central source - if not the only one - from which the judge draws the value data that formulates Israeli 'public policy.'"

20. I will also refer to the judgment of the National Labor Court in Labor Appeal 164/99 Fromer and Zak Point Software Technologies in Tax Appeal v. Redgard in Tax Appeal [Nevo] (June 4, 1999).  hereinafter: the Fromer case).  It should already be noted that most of the case law in the matter deals with contractual obligations within the framework of an employee-employer relationship, and especially in cases where there is a concern of theft of trade secrets, patents, etc., within the framework of the high-tech economy, when we are dealing with the case before me only in a mafia, which does not have trade secrets and patents.

1. For the purpose of formulating public policy regarding stipulations between an employer and an employee for restricting freedom of occupation, and in our case - stipulations according to which upon termination of employment the employee will not compete with his employer and will not make use of the information he received during the period of his employment, the competing principles and interests must be examined, and the proper balance between them must be defined.In this regard, I will refer to the words of the Honorable Justice Yitzhak Cohen Other Municipality Applications 206/72 Migan in Tax Appeal v.  Peer et al., IsrSC 27(1) (at p.  578).  See also: Words of the Honorable Judge David Bechor Other Municipality Applications 155/80 Rav Bariach in Tax Appeal v.  Avraham Amgar (IsrSC 35(1), 817, 8 December 1980.  hereinafter: the Rav Bariach case).  Prior to that, I will note that these rulings were published prior to the enactment of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, and they express the same principles and civil rights that were established in case law prior to the enactment of the Basic Law.  The Honorable Justice Cohen ruled:

"A person is not entitled to exploit for his own benefit information that has been given to him out of a relationship of trust between the moral and the receiver.  This principle has its origin in the laws of equity, and in the relationship between an employer and an employee it is based on a stipulation implicit in an employment contract, which prohibits the employee from disclosing an employer's trade secrets and benefiting to the detriment of the employer from any trade secret or any confidential information that came to him during and as a result of his employment.  However, the employee's implied obligation, which he must fulfill even after the termination of the employment relationship, is limited to confidential information and does not apply to information that is in the public domain and to general professional knowledge and professional experience that the employee acquires through his work..."

22. Justice Bechor also ruled (in the Rav Bariach case (at p. 825) that:

"The general rule is that there is a right to freedom of occupation in the profession of an employee who has retired from his employment with his employer.  And if there is an agreement that restricts him from this freedom of occupation after the end of his employment with his employer, two conditions must be fulfilled in order for this restriction to be valid.  The first condition is that it will be necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the employer, from which the employee retired, and the second condition is that it will also be necessary for the benefit of the public in terms of the interest of both parties."

23. It appears from the compilation so far that it is not possible to restrict the freedom of occupation of an employee who has accumulated professional experience in a business during his years of employment there. The restrictions apply only with respect to confidential information, patents, intellectual property and nothing more! I did not find that our interest in this proceeding is information of this kind.

Is there really a fear of infringement of a trade secret?

24. More than necessary, I will note that contrary to what was claimed by the respondents' counsel, we are not dealing at all with trade secrets.

1. In this regard, I will refer to the provisions of Section 5 of the Commercial Torts Law, 5759-1999 (hereinafter: the Commercial Torts Law), which defines a trade secret as follows:

"'Trade secret', 'secret' - business information, of any kind, which is not in the public domain and which cannot be legally disclosed easily by others, the confidentiality of which gives its owner a business advantage over its competitors, provided that its owner takes reasonable measures to maintain its confidentiality."

1. In addition, I will address the provision of section 7(a) of the Commercial Torts Law, which states that:

"A person shall not be liable for theft of a trade secret if one of the following exists: (a) the knowledge contained in the trade secret came to him in the course of his employment with the owner of the trade secret and this knowledge became part of his general professional skills."

1. In accordance with the provisions of the law, the question will be examined whether the undertaking limiting the applicant's occupation, as set out in the lease agreement between the parties, is based on business information that can be classified as a trade secret, and whether the conditions set forth in the law to justify the restriction are met.  All this, given that the agreement in question is a lease agreement, which in essence is not intended to deal directly with business matters.  As stated above, I did not find that in our case there was proof of a violation of a trade secret or even a concern about it.

Restriction of Practice in Jewish Law

28. Before concluding my normative review, I would like to refer to the position of Jewish law regarding the restriction of freedom of occupation, as follows: Rabbi Moshe Sofer (Slovakia, 1762-1839) discusses inResponsa Chatam Sofer (part 2, Yoreh De'ah, paragraph 9) the question regarding the obligation of a slaughterer in the name of Dov, not to slaughter and not to inspect (the slaughter procedure includes acts of slaughter and inspection) while achieving the boundaries of another slaughterer in the name of Chaim. who ordained him to the position of slaughterer and examiner (Shulchan Aruch).  In the words of the questioner:

"A copy of a letter given by the shochet Rabbi Dov to the shochet Rabbi Chaim from the Commander of the Kodesh, letter by letter - to be a sign and a reliable proof in the hand of Hashem (the honorable master) Rabbi Moshe (our teacher and rabbi) Chaim BaMoshe (son of our teacher and rabbi) Yosef z"l Shulchan Shabb (Shochat and Bodek) K.K.  (Kehilat Kodesh) Zabarov as I sign the staff accepts that I should not slaughter and not check myself, and even with another shochet from Balado Moharach (our teacher and Rabbeinu HaRav Chayim) The above, without his knowledge, his consent, and his good will, not by rape, and it is absolutely necessary for me to slaughter any slaughter, both coarse and thin animals, and they are large and small birds, Torah and doves, they are the aforementioned PKK, they are the villages that belong to the slaughter of the aforementioned Moharach, for himself, for others, for reward and for free, and likewise, God forbid, for me to check any test, whether the knife is the lung, the internal examination, the external examination, both myself and with another slaughterer, without the aforementioned Moharach." 30 in a way that will be contrary to his opinion and good will..."

The Chatam Sofer rules in this case that the oath of the slaughterer Dov Le-Chaim must be fulfilled.  The Chatam Sofer also discusses Dov's claim that he was "raped" to swear to life, otherwise he would not have been authorized to slaughter.  However, the Chatam Sofer argues that in monetary law, a pretext is not useful.  In other words, it is not possible to accept the claim of the authorized slaughterer that the authorized slaughterer raped him to take an oath.

In the margins of this matter, I will note that a distinction must be made between the case before me and the answer of the Chatam Sofer in two respects: First, the question regarding the qualification of the shochet is in the realm of prohibition and permit and not in the law of money, in the sense that it is possible that the certified shochet is not fit for slaughter, and that he is liable to stumble upon those who rely on his slaughter.  The second is that this is a complex and not simple technique, unlike in the case before me.

From the general to the individual

29. In our case, the Applicant undertook in the framework of the first agreement to refrain from opening a bakery that competed with the Respondents' bakery in the Gedera area for a period of 24 months. In contrast, in the second agreement, there is no allocation for the period of the occupation restriction.  As stated above, the first agreement is dated December 1, 2010, while the second agreement is dated December 1, 2019 and is valid until November 30, 2020.  Since then, no new written agreement has been concluded, although the parties have actually acted (by oral agreement or by implied agreement) to continue renting the business.  The question is whether it is also possible to learn about the intention of the parties to limit the Applicant's independent occupation in the field of bakeries, despite the fact that no written agreement was entered into in the matter, and even though the main interest of the second agreement is the rental of the property and not the Applicant's working conditions.  In my opinion, the answer to this question is unequivocally negative; And I will clarify my reasoning.
30. First, and as stated above, the second agreement (like the first agreement) is intended to rent the business. Nothing more.  Incidentally, an additional clause was inserted, which is a stipulation of public policy, and it cannot be read more than what is stated therein: i.e., restriction of occupation for one year only until November 30, 2020, all in accordance with the validity of this agreement.  The undertaking in the second agreement is intended to reflect the freedom of engagement between the parties and the Respondents' desire to protect their business, their bakery, in the framework of renting the latter to the Applicant.  However, it should be remembered that restricting a person's freedom of occupation is contrary to the public interest and the legal policy that encourages a free and competitive market.  This is all the more valid when it is not a professional secret but rather a technique that the Applicant has acquired over the years as a result of his work in the field, when in recent years none of the Respondents has accompanied the Applicant in his work.
31. It is important to emphasize that this is only a rental agreement, which does not constitute a framework for employment relations or a relationship of trust that requires exceptional occupational restrictions, and when there is no dispute, we are not dealing with an employee-employer relationship. I would like to emphasize: If it were a relationship between an employee and an employer, it would be possible to accept the claim regarding the acquisition of training, experience, professional secret, knowledge, etc., by the Applicant from the Respondents, but, as stated above, we are not interested in this.  Therefore, this condition deviates from the essence and purpose of the agreement, and therefore it is null and void and is not enforceable (the AES System case).

1. Moreover, the agreement was entered into when the respondents are not active in the bakery they own, and the applicant is the one who operates the bakery based on the name and reputation of the Yadai bakery owned by the respondents.  I will mention that the plaintiffs are elderly people who have not operated their business for some time, and all their contribution to the mafia is by bearing their name - "Yadai Bakery".
2. In this context, I will note that even if I assume in favor of the plaintiffs that the opening of the bakery by the applicant causes significant harm to their business and may even lead to the theft of trade secrets, the burden is on the plaintiffs to prove these claims clearly and convincingly.  Proving such claims requires the presentation of solid evidence indicating the existence of an actual infringement, such as: unauthorized use of confidential information, protected unique details, or unfair competition (the Fromer case).
3. In our case, the plaintiffs did not meet the required burden of proof and did not present sufficient evidence to support their claims.  In the absence of substantial proof of infringement or damage caused as a result of the applicant's actions, their claims of infringement or theft of trade secrets cannot be accepted, and this strengthens the assumption that there is no reason to restrict the applicant's freedom of occupation.
4. As for the Respondents' claim of theft of trade secrets: The Trade Secrets Law, including Section 5 of the Commercial Torts Law, protects unique information with commercial value that has not yet become the public domain.  However, in our case, this is not information that constitutes a protected trade secret, and no evidence was presented that the applicant made use of unique commercial information or a registered mark protected under intellectual property law.  Therefore, this argument does not have a stable legal basis and cannot justify the restrictions imposed on the applicant.
5. Moreover, the entire purpose of the main claim that is the subject of this proceeding focuses on a side clause that lacks substantial weight in the framework of the lease agreement, but this does not reflect the true essence of the agreement.  The lease agreement is intended first and foremost to regulate the relationship between the tenant and the landlord, including terms related to the use of the leased property, payment of rent, maintenance, and other rights and obligations relating to the leased property.  The stipulation, which in my opinion has expired, regarding the restriction of occupation, appears without any substantive connection to the essence of the agreement, and it was inserted incidentally.
6. A stipulation that restricts the freedom of occupation of a party to an agreement, such as the one discussed here, is not the central part of the lease agreement and is inconsistent with its main purpose.  Moreover, such a restriction contravenes basic principles of the law, including the freedom of occupation enshrined in the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, and cannot be considered a legitimate part of the contractual arrangement.  Therefore, this stipulation is essentially null and void, and has no binding effect in the framework of the lease agreement.
7. The circumstances in which the agreement was drafted and its content lead to the conclusion that the respondents saw the limitation clause in clause 18 of the second agreement - which stipulates the prevention of competition on the part of the applicant for a period of one year (as opposed to the first agreement, in which a restriction of occupation was set for two years) - as a sufficient means of protecting their rights and their business.  In accordance with case law, there is no room to expand or tighten the restriction on the applicant's freedom of occupation beyond what was stipulated in the agreement, especially in view of the fact that the applicant's lifelong occupation was in the field of bakeries.
8. In addition, freedom of occupation is a fundamental right of great weight, and the purpose of this right is to ensure that a person can continue to engage in his profession for the purpose of making a living and promoting his future.  In the circumstances of the case, there is no justification for a broader violation of this right, beyond what was agreed upon between the parties, and therefore there is no reason to impose additional restrictions on the applicant or to extend the period predetermined in the agreement.
9. It should be emphasized that baked goods, being basic food products produced and sold around the world, are considered public domain and do not usually carry the character of a unique trade secret.  Their production is based on knowledge and skills that are accessible to the general public, especially when it comes to pastries sold in routine businesses and not innovative or unique products.  This is all the more valid when in fact the Applicant operated the Mafia on his own during the past few years, when the Respondents were not at his side in the Mafia, and in any case did not instruct him.
10. Also, in the absence of evidence that the production of the pastries in question is based on a protected trade secret or registered patent, there is no justification for restricting a person's freedom of occupation in this field.  Restricting employment in an open and accessible field, such as pastry production, is inconsistent with the principles of law and public policy that encourage a competitive and free market.
11. In the circumstances of the case, I do not find anything wrong with the Applicant making use of the knowledge and experience he acquired during his years of work at the Applicants' Bakery.  This knowledge, which derives from daily work processes and professional experience, is considered part of the employee's personal expertise.  Law and case law distinguish between knowledge that is in the public domain or acquired in the course of work, and protected trade secrets, such as unique formulas, confidential techniques, or information that is not accessible to the public.
12. Moreover, and in continuation of the above, in our case we are dealing with a lease agreement that was entered into between a landlord and a tenant.  This Agreement does not create an employment or trust relationship that requires restrictions on the use of one of the parties' professional skills.  Therefore, there is no reason to claim a breach of obligations on the part of the tenant towards the landlord, especially when the restrictions that apply in the agreement deviate from what is agreed upon by law or contradict basic principles such as freedom of occupation .
13. In the case at hand, the respondent operates in his field of occupation within the framework of his professional skills, using the knowledge and skills that he has legitimately accumulated during his lifetime.  Since this is not the use of protected confidential information or information that can be defined as a unique trade secret, it cannot be argued that his actions constitute a violation of any prohibition on the use of protected information.
14. Accordingly, the Applicant's application to open a bread manufacturing plant should not be regarded as a reason justifying the prevention of his occupation in the field or the restriction of his freedom of occupation.  Freedom of occupation is a fundamental principle of the legal system, and it is intended to ensure that every person can engage in his field and support himself with dignity, as long as he does not act in contravention of the law or while violating the protected rights of other parties.
15. More than necessary, I would like to clarify that the demand that the Applicant not open a bakery for the manufacture of baked goods within a radius of 25 km from the boundaries of the Gedera Local Council (as determined in the second agreement), or from Rehovot in the north to Ashkelon in the south (as stipulated in the first agreement), is offensive, disproportionate and severely violates the basic rights of the applicant to make a living from the only occupation in which he has chosen to engage from the age of 14.
16. In the margins and not in the margins of their importance, I will note that the applicant retired from the bakery that is the subject of this lawsuit already during the months of October-November 2023, i.e., more than a year ago.  Given that no theft of trade secrets has been proven, and in view of the fact that I have not been presented with an up-to-date agreement in which the restriction of occupation appears, and in light of the fact that in any case the Respondents did not act alongside the Applicant in recent years and taught him (during these years) the secrets of the profession, I see no impediment to authorizing the Applicant to operate a competing bakery alongside the mafia in question.
17. In the margins, I also considered the Applicant's cross-examination and the pearls that counsel for the respondents drew from this interrogation; However, in view of the above, and even if I accept the argument that the Applicant believed from the outset that there was room to restrict his occupation (and I did not get the impression that this is the case), I cannot accept the position in principle that this stipulation that appears in the second lease agreement (which, in my opinion, has expired) and according to which the Applicant's occupation (who is not an employee of the Respondents, as stated above) will be restricted, is a legitimate stipulation.
18. In this context, I will note what I found in this cross-examination: First, the Applicant categorically denies that he learned the secrets of the profession from the Respondents (see: from p.  15, paras.  22 to p.  16, para.  6 of the hearing of October 10, 2024, as well as the question of the plaintiffs' counsel and the answer to it on p.  17, paras.  7-12, which deals with the recipes of the pastry), when the Applicant insists that he acquired his professional experience alone.  The Applicant also denies the claim that the plaintiffs' clients moved with him to the bakery in which he currently operates (p.  16, para.  18).  On a side note, I will note that this appears to be the argument and this is the main concern behind the Respondents' firm objection to the Applicant's petition.  I will also refer to the applicant's statement (at p.  17, paras.  31-32), according to which he would not have invested ILS 200,000 in the respondents' bakery in the three months following his departure from the bakery, and then he left the bakery.
19. Counsel for the plaintiffs placed emphasis on the applicant's undertaking not to establish a competing bakery within the boundaries of Gedera, and on the applicant's response on the matter in the framework of his cross-examination (see: from p.  18, paras.  19 to p.  19, s.  22).  In the framework of his reference to the plaintiffs' counsel's questions on the matter, the applicant makes it very clear that he does not work for a period of about a year (p.  19, para.  12) and that he is burdened with the burden of providing for a family with five children (ibid., para.  16).  The applicant's distress is well reflected in his cross-examination.
20. Towards the end, I will note what I clarified at the beginning of this decision, that we are dealing with a request for relief in the framework of a main proceeding that will continue and be conducted before me.  As part of the main proceeding, the plaintiffs petitioned for the following remedies: to declare that the second lease agreement is still valid today; order the enforcement of the agreement; to obligate the applicant to comply with the provisions of the agreement; award agreed damages as specified in the agreement; All this, along with technical requests, as a split in remedies and legal expenses.  On the other hand, the counterclaim deals with damages caused to the applicant, including for the equipment he purchased for the bakery.  I did not find that my decision overlapped with any of the remedies that arise in the parties' claims.  As stated above, taking into account the provisions of the case law in relation to temporary remedies, and given that the balance of convenience is tilted towards the applicant, that there is a cause for his claim, and that I did not get the impression that it acted in bad faith, and in view of my impression that the balance of convenience is tilted in favor of the applicant, I have found that his request is granted.

Conclusion and Conclusion

52. It emerges from the compilation that no convincing reason was presented before me to limit the Applicant's occupation and to open a bakery within the boundaries of the Gedera Local Council and in its vicinity, alongside the Respondents' bakery. All this, more than a year after the date of the Applicant's retirement from the Respondents' Bakery, and in the absence of a relevant written agreement, as well as in view of the provisions of the case law regarding freedom of occupation.
53. The applicant will be entitled to open a bakery at his request immediately.
54. The respondents will bear the expenses of this application in the sum of ILS 7,500, which will be paid by them to the applicant within 30 days from today.

The secretariat will distribute my decision to the attorney for the parties.

Granted today, January 14, 2025, in the absence of the parties.