"Indeed, the defense's failure to bring engineering and anatomical evidence to the issues at hand is liable to strengthen the assumption that the incriminating thesis presented by the accuser has substance. This rule, which is accepted in both civil and criminal proceedings with the necessary changes, further states that where a party is indeed prevented from bringing evidence, the court may, in the absence of a reasonable explanation for this prevention, draw more decisive and extreme conclusions as a function of the importance of the evidence and its significance to the matter" (See: Criminal Appeal 9809/08 Lazarovsky v. State of Israel, at paragraph 55 (November 25, 2010))."
- Delay
- In its summaries, the defense argued against the prolongation of the investigation[372], delay and protection from justice[373], with reference to the provisions of section 57A of the Criminal Procedure Code. An examination of the above shows that this is a claim that was made in weak language, and for good reason.
- Such a claim is a preliminary allegation of a defect or invalidity in the indictment under section 149(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, which must be raised at the beginning of the trial, and in accordance with the provision of section 151 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it can only be raised with the permission of the court. The defense pointed out that in the hearing that took place on February 17, 2025, before the testimony of one of the witnesses, the defense attorney "flooded" the problem "with its severity" and argued that the indictment should be canceled[374], but a review of the minutes of this hearing, which took place long after the response to the indictment was given on March 14, 2024, and after the hearing of the evidence began, shows that the defense did indeed raise an argument against the continuation of the investigation at that hearing, but asked that it be passed in[375] In the framework of a preliminary argument, which will be decided before the trial continues, and accordingly he was asked to submit a motion with all of his arguments, to support the ruling, and this will be forwarded for a response and how to proceed will be [376]considered. However, the defense did not file any motion and raised the argument only in the framework of its summaries, and therefore I did not find weight to give weight to these arguments when the court's approval was not given to raise them and the accuser was not given an opportunity to address them.
- Conclusion
- Criminal Appeal Authority 31432-02-26 Maharev v. State of Israel (February 15, 2026) held:
"This Court has already ruled that "a settled rule in tax law is that a person who relies on an invoice that does not reflect a true transaction for the deduction of inputs, intends in this way, unlawfully, the amount of the tax appellant to pay, and thus constitutes an intention to evade payment of tax" (Criminal Appeal Authority 1054/07 Tzameret Ocean 1988 in Tax Appeal v. State of Israel, para. 5 (February 6, 2007)); This is because the purpose of tax evasion, being the conscience of the offender, is inferred from circumstantial evidence such as the defendant's conduct and external objective circumstances (see: Criminal Appeal 5783/12 Gelm v. State of Israel, paragraph 97 of the judgment of Justice A. Shoham (September 11, 2014))."
- It was also held by the Authority of Criminal Appeal 584-04-26 Adawi v. State of Israel (April 23, 2026):
"As for proving the mental element within the scope of section 117(b) of the Tax Appellate Law – "with the aim of evading or evading the payment of tax" – as Prof. A. Namdar points out, "the existence of a mental element of awareness of the act and the existence of the illegal circumstances is sufficient, whereas the purpose of tax evasion can be learned from the circumstantial evidence and external acts of the taxpayer" (see: Aharon Namdar, Value Added Tax, Vol. 2, 919 (Fifth Edition, 2013); See also: Criminal Appeal 5783/12 Gelm v. State of Israel, paragraph 97 of the judgment of Justice A. Shoham (September 11, 2014)). With regard to the mental element required under section 117(b)(5) of the VAT Law, this court held that "a person who relies on an invoice that does not reflect a true transaction for the deduction of inputs, intends in this way, unlawfully, the amount of taxes that the appellant must pay, and thus constitutes an intention to evade payment of tax" (see: Criminal Appeal Authority 1054/07 Tzameret Aviation 1988 in Tax Appeal v. State of Israel, Paragraph 5 (February 6, 2007); See also: Criminal Appeals Authority 31432-02-26 Maharev v. Tax Authority, paragraph 6 of my judgment (February 15, 2026))."
- From the evidence presented, a clear picture emerges in which an acquaintance was created between defendant 1 and witness Flutzer in order for Plutzer to provide defendant 1 with false invoices of the company "Peleg Chai" not for work or undertaking to perform it, but so that it would be possible to deduct the tax in respect of the invoices in the periodic report of defendant 2 and to avoid paying the tax in respect thereof, in exchange for a commission to Flutzer in the amount of 3% of the value of each invoice. In this framework, and in order to give the transaction a legitimate appearance, defendant 1 acted with sophistication and cunning, issued checks from defendant 2 ostensibly for the Peleg Chai company, but in fact signed Plutzer with a personal guarantee stamp on the back of the checks, and the latter deducted his share of the money in Kfar Saba, received the consideration in cash and transferred the amount, less his commission, to defendant 1. Additional checks in favor of Peleg Chai from Defendant 2 were signed by Flutzer with a personal guarantee to Defendant 1 with a stamp that Defendant 1 held in his office and were delivered by Defendant 3 who deducted them at various ATMs in the city of Tira. Samer Masarwa also deducted a number of such checks , as did Bajat Matar, who received one check for his work, which BenS.P. deducted and left the proceeds with him.
- In contrast to a case in which all the court had in mind was an invoice that did not reflect a true transaction – which, according to case law, is sufficient to indicate an intention to evade payment of tax in the absence of a reasonable explanation – in our case it was proven much more than that that defendant 1 concocted a detailed fraudulent plan and took the necessary steps to that end in order to bring about evasion of tax payment by defendant 2, and that he was assisted by defendant 3 for this purpose.
- Contrary to the defense's argument in its summaries that there is a difficulty in attributing to the defendant a special intent offense in the absence of identification of the organ to which the act and the criminal thought can be attributed[377], there is no such difficulty after the act and criminal thought have been proven in relation to defendant 1, that he himself, as well as defendant 3, attributed to him the ownership and management of defendant 2's company, and even in relation to defendant 3, it became clear that he was an integral part of defendant 1's criminal plan aimed at causing defendant 2 to evade paying tax.
- Verdict:
In light of all of the above