2.2 The accuser's arguments
2.2.a. The accuser's arguments regarding immunity from prosecution
The accuser argues that the conceptual basis for the doctrine of organs in criminal law is to enable the corporations to be criminally prosecuted, since there is nothing new in prosecuting the perpetrators of the offense in flesh and blood. According to the accuser, the theory of organs should be used for the purpose of attributing criminal liability to the corporation at the time of the commission of the offense. In other words, the criminal acts and thoughts of the organ at the time of the commission of the offense must be attributed to the corporation, but afterwards the ways of the corporation and the organ are separate. According to her, when the witnesses, who were senior managers at Siemens Israel, chose to become state witnesses and received immunity, they acted in their caps as private individuals who committed offenses and sought to buy immunity. This action was not done in their capacity as organs of Siemens Israel, especially since at the time they entered into the agreements (or in Weiss's case – accept the immunity), there were no longer managers at Siemens Israel.
According to the accuser, section 23, which deals with the criminal liability of a corporation by virtue of the doctrine of organs, deals with the stage of the commission or crystallization of the offense. According to the accuser, there are protections that will be given to the corporation by virtue of the doctrine of organs, but these are protections that relate to the commission of the offense, and deny the conduct its criminal nature. Thus, according to her, if the organization has a defense of necessity or reliance on a legal situation, at the time of the commission of the offense, this protection will also be available to the corporation. According to her, this is not the case when it comes to the investigation stage, when a person testifies to what he knows, and does not do so in the course of fulfilling his role as an organist.