The accuser further argues that the identity between the officer – the organ – and the corporation is only for the purpose of attributing the offense he committed to the corporation, and not for the purpose of absolute identification between the two from that moment onwards. According to her, the corporation's criminal liability is crystallized when the offense is committed by its organ. There is no legal basis for the claim that the criminal liability of the corporation, from the moment it was formulated as a result of the acts of the organ, depends in any way on the acts of the organ after the commission of the offense.
The accuser further claims that the criminal proceeding maintains a clear separation between the organ and the corporation. The organ and the corporation are two separate legal entities, each with its own rights and obligations as a defendant. This is reflected in the fact that each person is entitled to a separate legal defense, because each of them can choose whether to admit or deny the offenses attributed to him, whether to claim the confidentiality of documents, etc. According to her, the theory of organs and the attribution of criminal liability to a corporation by virtue of it is a substantive doctrine, which does not apply at all to the investigative stage, which is a procedural stage. This is the stage of gathering evidence, and at that stage, everyone who is called for interrogation testifies about what he knows. It is possible that these acts will later serve as a basis for prosecuting the corporation on the basis of the doctrine of the organs, or it may not be.
The accuser goes on to claim that even according to the tests of the theory of organs, immunity cannot be attributed to society. According to her, it was determined that the actions of the organ should be attributed to the corporation if three conditions are met. First, that the relevant legislation did not intend to exclude a corporation from it, secondly, that the action of the organ was done in the course of the performance of its duties, and finally, whether the action was for the benefit of the corporation. According to her, when a witness draws up an agreement with a state witness and his testimony is liable to incriminate the company, the conditions are not met, since the organist's action in this case was not carried out in the performance of his duties, the organist testifies as a person who was summoned for interrogation and not as an organist, and this is an action that is to the detriment of the corporation.