"The main purpose of the defense from justice is to ensure the existence of a proper, just and fair criminal proceeding. In principle, therefore, the defense may apply in any case in which the existence of the criminal proceeding substantially impairs the sense of justice and fairness as perceived by the court. The purpose of applying the defense is to do justice to the defendant, and not to hold the law enforcement authorities accountable for their misdeeds. However, in most cases (although not always) the violation of the justice and fairness of the criminal proceeding will be attributed to the improper conduct of the authorities, and in such cases it is indeed incumbent upon the court to criticize its actions."
The conceptual basis for this defense is the protection of the defendant's right to a proper and fair trial and "expresses the broad responsibility of the judicial system for the integrity of the rule of law, which includes supervision of administrative actions of state authorities and refusal to legalize conduct that violates individual rights, or the rule of law, even in the absence of an expected violation of the defendant's defense" (Kitay-Sanjiro, Defense from Justice, p.' 517).
As I have noted, there is a public interest in the integrity and fairness of the law enforcement system, a separate interest from the interest of protecting society and bringing criminals to justice (see in this regard: Nakdimon, Defense from Justice, ibid., at pp. 24-25).
There are three possible models for the court's action in examining defense claims from justice. The first, the model of the court's inherent authority to prevent abuse of proceedings, and the second, the administrative model, according to which the doctrine of protection from justice constitutes an branch of judicial review of the prosecuting authorities, see: Raanan Giladi, "The Criminal Court sitting as a High Court of Justice – The Nir Am Cohen Rule and the Doctrine of Administrative Review in Criminal Cases", Part I, Defense Forces 190, Ltd.4 (2013) Part II, Defense Attorney 202, at p. 4 (2014); Raanan Giladi, "The Doctrine of Administrative Audit in Criminal Cases", in: Sefer Eliyahu Matza, 529 (Aharon Barak, Ayala Procaccia, Sharon Hans and Raanan Galadi, eds., 2015). See also Criminal Appeal 6328/12 State of Israel v. Poldi Peretz [published in Nevo] (2013). The third model is the constitutional model, according to which the defense of justice is a constitutional remedy given to the defendant for a violation of his constitutional rights.