on the conceptual basis of halakha, the possible models for anchoring it; Much has been written about the tests that must be established in the context and the analysis of case law when it was a jurisprudential doctrine (see, among many: Y. Nakdimon, Defense from Justice (first edition, 2004, and later the second edition mentioned above); Ze'ev Segal and Avi Zamir, "Defenses from Justice as a Basis for Dismissing an Indictment – On the Seam Line between Criminal Law and Public Law," Hapraklit 47, 42, 44 (2004); Porat, Constitutional Protection, ibid.; Mordechai Levy, "More on the Essence of the Defense from Justice and the Test for its Acceptance Before and After the Borowitz Judgment," Mishpat 10, 353 (2005); Boaz Okun and Oded Shaham, "Proper Procedure and Delay of Judicial Proceedings," Mishpat 3 265 (1996).
The general test set in the Borowitz case, for examining the applicability of the defense from justice, is (ibid., at p. 807, at paragraph 21):
"The decision on the question of whether the case before the court justifies the application of protection from justice should reflect a proper balance between the totality of the various values, principles and interests involved in the existence of the criminal proceeding. On the one hand, there are the interests that support the continuation of the proceeding, including the prosecution of offenders and the prosecution of offenders; publishing the truth; the existence of mechanisms of retribution, deterrence, and punishment; maintaining public safety; Protecting the rights of the victim. On the other hand, there are the interests that negate, in the concrete case, the continuation of the proceeding, including the protection of the defendant's basic rights; the disqualification of the Authority's unsuccessful moves and its deterrence from taking similar steps in the future; Maintaining the integrity of the judicial process; Maintaining the public's trust in the court."
Later in that paragraph, the court discussed the manner of examination: