The defendant claims three matters that require the cancellation of the indictment in her case for the sake of protection from justice. The first is the issue of delay, which was agreed to be discussed at the end of the main proceeding. The second relates to harm to the defendant as a result of the use of statements and testimonies of state witnesses against her, witnesses who are her organs. In this matter, I have discussed at length in the context of the rule of disqualification. Indeed, the protection from justice is broader and more flexible than the rule of disqualification, both in the sense of the considerations taken into account in its framework, which are broader, and in the matter of the remedy, which is also flexible. In addition, as the court noted in the Borowitz case (p. 830, paragraph 43):
"It should be noted that these are two separate examination tracks intended to promote different moral purposes: the first test is intended to promote broad public interests related to the conduct of criminal proceedings, as justice and fairness. Within the framework of this test there is the "protection from justice", which we discussed above...At the foundation of the second test – which is based on the laws of evidence – is one central public interest, and that is the investigation of the truth. However, even though these are two different and separate tests, there are interactions between them. Thus, for example, the public interest in investigating the truth is one of the possible components of the concepts of justice and fairness... Therefore, giving a negative answer to the question of whether the flaws in the investigation affected the level of proof of the offenses may affect the decision on whether the existence or continuation of the proceeding is justified and fair. The same is true of the opposite of circumstances: the public interests related to the criminal proceeding – including justice and fairness – affect the definition of the concept of "truth" that the proceeding will be expected to establish. Thus, for example, they determine that conducting a criminal proceeding is socially justified and fair only if the incriminating "truth" is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The interests of maintaining the line of justice and fairness may even justify the inadmissibility of certain pieces of evidence for considerations that explicitly go beyond the study of pure factual truth....This is the result of the application of the poisoned fruit doctrine in the same legal systems that recognize it, and it is also one of the possible results of the application of the doctrine of the defense of justice.