However, since I have discussed most of the considerations at length within the framework of the disqualification rule, and since most of the considerations are similar, I have no choice but to refer to what I said there. There is no place, certainly not at the preliminary stage, to repeat things. I will only note that in the case before me we are dealing with relatively "weak" rights, since it is a corporation, and in the circumstances that I have detailed. In addition, it is not clear on the basis of what evidence the defendant will be convicted, if convicted, as some of the recipients of the bribes who were sentenced have now been added to the list of prosecution witnesses. In light of the above, in order to examine all the circumstances, as stated in the judgment of the Honorable Justice N. Hendel in the Gottesdiener case, it is necessary to wait in this matter until the conclusion of the main proceeding.
The third argument relates to selective enforcement of the defendant's claims, and I will now turn to the discussion.
5.2.1 Discrimination in Prosecution - Selective Enforcement
The defendant claims, as stated, that the very granting of immunity to Aaronson, Weiss and Hirsch, and her own prosecution, the only one of the bribe-givers, constitutes selective enforcement. The argument of selective enforcement (or selective enforcement) is currently in Israeli criminal law within the scope of the defense from justice claim (section 149 (10) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, according to which the authorities are not permitted to distinguish, for the purposes of prosecution, between similar persons or similar situations on the basis of extraneous considerations that are not for practical reasons (on discretion in prosecution, see: Daniel Friedman, "Judicial Discretion in Criminal Prosecutions," Hapraklit 35 (1983) and Mordechai Kremnitzer, "Does Criminal Law Have a Hand in All?", in: Sefer Daniel - Studies in the Thought of Professor Daniel Friedman (Nili Cohen and Ofer Grosskopf, eds., 2008).