"Because of their size, complexity, and control of vast resources, corporations have the ability to engage in misconduct that dwarfs that which could be accomplished by individuals. For example, Siemens the German engineering giant, paid more then 1.4$ billion in bribes to government officials in Asia, Africa, Europe, the Middle East and Latin America, using its slush funds to secure public works contracts around the world. There is nothing wrong with recognizing that it was Siemens, not simply some of its officers or employees, who should be held legally accountable"
If the facts alleged in the indictment are proven to be true, then as a matter in principle, criminal liability should be imposed on the defendant.
The defendant does not dispute the very possibility and perhaps the obligation to impose criminal liability on corporations. Its argument is that once the state reached state witness arrangements, by virtue of which immunity was granted to the three organs that gave the bribe, and in light of the identity or identification between the company and the organs, liability can no longer be imposed on the company. For the purpose of discussing this question, I will now examine the theory of organs that currently underlies the criminal liability of corporations and examine whether the conceptual basis for this doctrine requires the defendant's conclusion.
3.1.2. The Conceptual Basis for Imposing Criminal Liability on a Corporation by Virtue of the Doctrine of Organs
There are several theories for imposing criminal liability on corporations. The theory of organs (or senior organs) that attributes to society the behavior and thoughts of the organs, as well as direct responsibility on the company by virtue of conduct in the matter of the prevention of offenses. Since in Israel the doctrine of organs has been adopted, both in case law and in legislation, as a basis for imposing criminal liability on corporations, I will focus below on this doctrine (for imposing direct liability on corporations by virtue of their conduct with regard to the prevention of offenses, see: Sara Sun Beale, Corporate Criminal Liability, ibid., at p. 1498).