Organ theory is designed to deal with the conceptual difficulty in attributing actions, behavior, and thoughts to a corporation that is a legal entity, which lacks biological and psychological human characteristics. The doctrine of organs is not limited to criminal law and applies to all branches of law.
The adoption of the doctrine of organic theory in order to attribute criminal liability to corporations stemmed from the need to find a solution and a way to impose criminal liability on corporations even for offenses of criminal thought, since in English law, from which the basis for imposing liability on a corporation in Israeli law was drawn, the criminal liability of corporations was limited to offenses of absolute liability only (which in modern law was converted to strict liability). The theory of pines makes it possible to attribute his thoughts and intentions, i.e., the mental element of the organ, to the corporation, and to view the behavioral component of the organ as the behavior of the corporation. In other words, at the time of the consolidation of the offense, at the time of the commission of the offense, the behavior and fault of the organization are the behavior and guilt of the corporation.
According to the theory of organs, a corporation will be held criminally liable for an offense committed by an organ in the course of fulfilling its role in the corporation and in order to benefit the corporation. According to the theory of pines, the actions and thoughts of certain human factors within the framework of the corporation, the organs – which operate within their sphere of authority, are attributed to the behavior of the corporation itself. Following the identification, the corporation may be held criminally liable for the very commission of the offense, similar to the liability imposed on a human perpetrator (see: Kremnitzer and Ganaim, The Corporation's Liability, ibid., at p. 59). This was discussed by many of those involved in corporate law. Thus, for example, the words of Bar-Mor, Corporations, ibid., at p. 53: