https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/corporate-liability-for-economic-crime-call-for-evidence). In a document prepared by the Ministry of Justice in England as a background to the proposals for change on the subject: Corporate Liability for Economic Crime, these problems are presented in detail (you can see https://consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/corporate-liabilityfor-economic Crime/supporting_documents/corporateliabilityforeconomiccrimeconsultationdocument.pdf.
For this reason, options are being considered to recognize a corporation as committing an offense when the elements of the offense are divided among several organs, as well as to impose direct liability on corporations for failing to prevent or encourage offenses. It should be emphasized that these changes are being proposed, inter alia, in response to the requirements for the prevention of bribery offenses by international corporations as a result of the Convention on the Prevention of Bribery. These issues are not required in the case before me, since the organs are before us, and therefore I will not elaborate on them.
3.2. Attribution of Criminal Liability to a Corporation in Israeli Law
3.2.1. The Rule Regarding the Attribution of Criminal Liability to a Corporation Prior to the Enactment of Section 23 of the Penal Law
The power to impose criminal liability on corporations was recognized in case law as early as 1950 in the judgment from which I opened my decision. Even then, the reason for this was the involvement of the corporations in economic life: in the case of the High Court of Justice 125/50, the Beit Hashita Group v. The Court for the Prevention of the Expropriation of Gates and Speculation, IsrSC 5(1) 113 (published in Nevo, 1950), hereinafter: the Beit Hashita case), where a corporation was sued for criminal law before the Speculation Court, and petitioned the High Court of Justice, inter alia, on the grounds that a corporation was not criminally liable. The Honorable President Zmora, who gave the judgment, referred mainly to the Interpretation Ordinance, which included a corporation in the definition of a person, and ruled that there is no provision in it that indicates that a corporation should be excluded from this definition when it comes to criminal offenses (p. 131 of his judgment). The question was asked, in light of the language of the Ordinance at the time, whether the context of the matter requires exclusion, that is, whether, by the very nature and nature of the corporation, it should not be held criminally liable. The Honorable President Zmora reviews the ruling and states that in light of the involvement of corporations in economic life, they should not be excluded from the application of the criminal law, and in his words (at p. 138 of the judgment):