Similarly, the Honorable Justice Strasberg Cohen inCriminal Appeal 5734/91 State of Israel v. Leumi & Co. Investment Bank Ltd., IsrSC 49(2) 4 (1995, hereinafter: Leumi & Co.), where she held that: "In principle, any criminal offense in which the interests protected by it are likely to be harmed by the corporation imposes criminal liability on the corporation."
It seems that there can be no dispute that the offenses attributed to the defendant, including bribery and money laundering, can be attributed to the corporation.
3.2.3.c. The offense was committed as part of the organ's role
This test requires that the organizer committed the offense in the framework of his position in the company. Of course, this does not mean that any position in the company includes the commission of offenses. This was discussed by the Honorable Justice Y. Kedmi in the Nehoshtan case. A distinction must be made between the powers of the organ, which never include the authority to commit an offense, and the role of the organist in the corporation as distinct from being also a private person. In other words, the intention is to distinguish between acts committed by the organist in the framework of his work or tenure in the company and his personal affairs. This condition also derives from the theory of organs itself. If the organ did not act as an organ, but on a personal level, its behavior and thoughts should not be seen as those of the corporation. As the Honorable Justice Strasberg-Cohen noted in the Leumi & Co. case (paragraph 26 of her judgment at p. 27):
"However, the activity of the organ will not always be attributed to the company, and it is required that the activity of the organ be within the scope of its activities for the company. Deviation from the scope of action has implications not only on the company's liability for the act of the organ, but also on the very identification of the organ as the "alter ego" of the company. What is considered an area of action and what is considered a deviation from it? Here we are between two extremes. On the one hand, action in the field of competence as an organ. On the other hand, the action of the organ that cannot be identified with society at all. Between these two extremes there is a wide range of situations."