The corporation can operate only through the organs, but an organ can act as an organ, and it can act as an individual. Therefore, there is room to impose liability on a corporation only for an action taken by an organ as an organ. That is, by virtue of his position in the corporation. An action of the organ that has nothing to do with its function in the corporation cannot be attributed to the corporation, since in such a case the organ is not identified with the corporation. It is actually a part or application of the functional test for organ definition. The functional test avoids creating a full identity between the corporation and its organs, and its focus is on the act itself and the function of the organization performed by the operation. Thus, for example, if an organizer in a company harms its neighbor against the background of a dispute between them, the matter should not be attributed to the corporation.
The Honorable Deputy President, Justice A. Rubinstein, noted this in the Melisron case (in paragraph 120 of his judgment):
"As for the second test, the question of whether the organist did what he did in the course of fulfilling his duties is not necessarily a simple question. On the one hand, it is clear that activities of a distinctly personal nature, carried out by the organist outside of work hours and in the workplace, were apparently not part of the performance of his duties. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assume that activities carried out by the organ, which are inherently connected to its function, and were carried out in accordance with the instructions of its managers, will fall within the scope of actions within the framework of the performance of its duties. In between, there are many cases. However, it is clear that the approach that was accepted in the case law, and in my opinion rightly, is that the definition of situations that will be included in the expression "in the performance of one's duties" should be interpreted extensively. Thus, for example, it was held that when the organ performs the criminal act on behalf of the company, but in a manner that allegedly deviates from the authorization given to it, this cannot serve as a defense for the corporation against the application of the organ doctrine and the imposition of liability on the corporation due to the actions of the organ (Nehoshtan, at pp. 122-123; National Interest, at pp. 26-27); and even when the company's board of directors objected to the move taken by the organ, the company was found criminally liable for its actions (the Wall case, para. 78); Simply put, the test is, as a rule, whether the organist acted in his hat as a 'corporate person' and not as a private person, and if the answer to this is in the affirmative, this auxiliary test is met."