The dispute grows where it is a corporation. This is because the right to a fair trial, which is not one of the rights explicitly stated in the law, is derived as a constitutional right, in the opinion of those who see it as such a right, from free will and human dignity, rights that there is a dispute as to whether they are consistent with the corporation as a legal body (see in this regard: Sitbon, Corporations, ibid., at p. 114).
Of course, in the framework of this proceeding, there is no room to decide the various positions. Even if these are not constitutional rights at all, and even if there are no constitutional rights by virtue of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty that apply to a corporation (as I noted above), there is no doubt, in the words of the Honorable Justice T. Strasberg-Cohen, that: "These determinations, even if they are not included in theBasic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty are reinforced by the law, which raised the human right to liberty, dignity and privacy to the highest level of importance (High Court of Justice 6319/95 Yosef Hachami v. Judge of the Magistrate's Court in Tel Aviv-Jaffa, 51(3) 750, 755 (1997, hereinafter): The matter of the Sages).
The Honorable Justice E. E. Levy also noted this in the Be'er Sheva case, ibid., at p. 156: "The right [to a fair trial] has always enjoyed a high status, and with the enactment of the Basic Laws, it was recognized as a constitutional right derived, according to some, from the right to dignity... and in the opinion of others – from the right to liberty" (for the various approaches to constitutionalism, see, for example: Aharon Barak, Interpretation in Law, Volume Three: Constitutional Interpretation, 431-432 (1994); Barak, The Constitutional Right; Emanuel Gross, "The Procedural Rights of the Suspect or Defendant According to the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty," 13 Law Studies, 155, 169-170 (1996); Boaz Okun and Oded Shaham, "Proper Procedure and Delay of Judicial Proceedings," HaMishpat 5, no. 11 (1995).