Apparently, the constitutional right to due process, which derives from the right to liberty or the right to dignity, will not apply to a corporation. However, it appears that there is no reason to deny various aspects of the right to a fair trial from a corporation, insofar as the nature and nature of a certain protection or arrangement are appropriate to this and to the extent derived from the fact that it is a corporation. Since the right to a fair trial is a general right, I will proceed to examine the individual arrangements, the applicability of which the defendant claims in the case before me: the right to remain silent and the right to self-incrimination.
4.2.1 The right to remain silent and the right (immunity) against self-incrimination
4.2.1.a. The Nature of Rights and the Conceptual Basis for Them
The right or immunity from self-incrimination means that a person will not be compelled to testify that he has committed criminal offenses or to provide evidence and documents that would incriminate him. This halakha is also based on our sources, in the words of Chazal, according to which "a person does not consider himself wicked" (Talmud Sanhedrin, page 9, page 2). Rashi interprets this as a prohibition against accepting a person's confession. The Rambam noted the conceptual basis for this rule (Yad Ha-Ha-Hazka, Hilkhot Sanhedrin, chapter 18, halacha 6):
"The Sanhedrin does not put to death or flog a person who confesses to a transgression, lest he go mad in this matter. Perhaps it is one of those who are bitter to die who stick their swords in their stomachs and throw themselves off the roofs, lest he come and say something that he did not do in order to be killed."
The importance of the rule, its development and its various interpretations, including in comparison to modern laws of evidence , were discussed at length by the Honorable Justice N. Hendel inCriminal Appeal 4179/09 State of Israel v. Alexey Volkov [published in Nevo] (2010, paragraph 3 of his judgment). For interpretation and analysis of halakha, see: Shimshon Ettinger, Evidence in Jewish Law, 222-223 (2011).