In these circumstances, this is not a decision made by the manager as a professional entity, but rather the plaintiff's application to him to change the driver's decision, which was unsuccessful. Even if the manager thus ratified the driver's decision, the determination that the manager's approval of the driver's decision is an administrative decision excluded from the insurance coverage is artificial and sinful for the purpose of purchasing an insurance policy. This is not a matter that was brought to the attention of the manager and he made the decision, but rather a request that was made to him in order to change a decision made by the driver, which the manager did not see fit to change, and the result was that he instructed the driver to travel with the defendant and the other passenger and leave the plaintiff to return home.
- Although the testimony of the defendant's driver was full of holes and contradictions, it is not possible to ignore the testimony of the director according to which he made an administrative-medical decision not to leave a confirmed patient living in Ashdod in the Ashkelon area when the plaintiff who lives in Ashkelon can go to her home, when the evacuation was not for the purpose of receiving medical treatment but for the purpose of transportation for the purpose of isolating the patients from the rest of the population.
As a rule, a confirmed patient was supposed to be in isolation at the time, except for someone who was transported for medical treatment or evacuated to a corona motel, as in our case. Therefore, the plaintiff and the defendant left their home for this trip only and not for other purposes, so that they were prohibited from being outside their home for this purpose.
- As stated, the driver and his manager were expected to find another solution or to make it clear to the defendant that all those registered for that trip would be driven to hotels. At the same time, given the erroneous assumption that the driver and his manager did not allow the plaintiff and the defendant to be transported together, the decision that was made was made with reference to the Corona guidelines at the time, that a confirmed patient would be in isolation from the rest of the population. In these circumstances, even according to the Ayalon representative opinion, this should be regarded as a quasi-medical consideration covered by the policy.
The driver and his manager acted within an erroneous factual basis, according to which the defendant objects to the plaintiff's joining the trip because of her "exposed" clothing, so that this is a matter of omission or negligence and not a deliberate act as stipulated in clause 4(b) of the policy regarding the exclusions. In other words, the driver and his manager did not seek to prevent the plaintiff from entering the ambulance because of personal perceptions they held in relation to her clothing, but rather because of their erroneous assumption that the defendant refuses to accompany her to the ride because of her dress and their misunderstanding, which is again erroneous, that because of this the defendant refused to continue driving and even asked to get out of the vehicle, at a time when confirmed coronavirus patients must be in isolation.