Caselaw

Civil Appeal Authority 51820-02-26 Ehud Feldman v. Nir Epstein - part 2

May 19, 2026
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It was further claimed that there is Delete the lawsuit in limine due to an inappropriate forum.

  1. On December 17, 2025, the motion for summary dismissal was rejected. For our purposes, it was held that the agreement, in which the jurisdiction clause is made, relates to the relationship between Epstein and the American partnership, and the stipulation does not apply to the relationship between Epstein and Feldman himself – i.e., the parties to the proceeding at hand.  It was further determined that the statement of claim relates to representations that preceded the engagement with the partnership, and the claims therein are directed to the pre-contractual stage, and also for this reason the jurisdiction clause does not block the filing of a lawsuit in Israel.
  2. The trial court also rejected the forum's claim of impropriety. This was when it determined that the two parties were Israeli citizens and had a significant connection to it; that Epstein had a reasonable expectation to conduct the proceedings in Israel, given that Feldman was an Israeli lawyer; and that in terms of public considerations, there was a "real interest" for the Israeli court to hear the lawsuit, since the issues at its center relate to Feldman's conduct as an Israeli lawyer, and the dialogue he had with Epstein from Israel.

The application before me

  1. The Ottoman Settlement [Old Version] 1916In summary, Feldman argues that the investment agreement explicitly applies itself to the pre-contractual stages; that leaving a decision that creates a distinction between the partnership and Feldman, who acted as its representative, in place, is liable to create a dangerous precedent and greatly complicate the business activity; that it is liable to cause him a miscarriage of justice if the proceeding is conducted in Israel, and this will even lead to the waste of many judicial and private resources; and that the expectations of the parties, As well as public considerations, justify the investigation of the lawsuit in New York.
  2. 12-34-56-78 Chekhov v. State of Israel, P.D. 51 (2)Epstein, in essence, relies on the rulings of the trial court.
  3. It should be noted that both parties, on the one hand and the other, refer to the judgment of this Court in Civil Appeal 6493/21 Lagziel v. R.S. Design inTax Appeal [Nevo] (02.02.2022) (hereinafter: the Lagziel case). Both are of the opinion that the rulings in this judgment support their position.  As I will clarify below, although the interpretation of the case of Lagziel itself raises some complexity, this is not the case in this case.

Discussion and Decision

  1. After reviewing the application and its response, with its appendices, I have reached the conclusion that the application should be rejected.
  2. The parties disagree on two questions relating to the jurisdiction clause. The first is whether the determination that disputes in relation to the contract will be discussed in New York also applies to Feldman – or does it apply only to the parties listed in the agreement (hereinafter: the personal question).  Second: Does the jurisdiction clause also apply in relation to claims of breach of the Consulting Law, and to representations made at the pre-contractual stage (hereinafter: the pre-contractual question).  In addition, the parties disagree on the question of proper forum.
  3. Before I discuss the matter on its merits, I would like to make a comment first. It is possible that there is some difficulty in the existence of an interpretive discussion with respect to the jurisdictional stipulation in the contract before us by 'local' interpretive tools, in view of a determination in the investment agreement in relation to the choice of law.  The investment agreement states in clause 11.6:

"This agreement shall be governed by and construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the state of New York, without regard to principles of conflicts of law".

  1. 00was copied from Nevoon the face of it, it is quite possible to argue that the entire contract, including the jurisdiction clause, should be interpreted in accordance with New York law (for such a claim, see: Shahar Avraham-Giller "On the Rules of Interpretation of Jurisdictional Clauses, the Choice of Law and the Concept of International Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (following Civil Appeal Authority 6493/21 Lagziel v. R.S. Design Ltd.", 18 Laws 167,  175 (2023) (hereinafter: Avraham-Giller)).
  2. 0However, since the parties before us argued, both of them, according to local law, this can be seen as an implied agreement according to which the jurisdiction clause will be interpreted in accordance with Israeli law (compare: Avraham-Giller, at p. 180).  Therefore, I will turn to the question of the scope of the jurisdiction clause in the tools of the relevant Israeli law.

Interpretation of the jurisdiction clause

  1. As is well known, the question of the interpretation of jurisdictional clauses in contracts was discussed at length in the Lagziel case, to which the parties themselves also referred. The judgment in the Lagziel case itself dealt with the question of the applicability of a jurisdiction clause, which determined that only courts in Belgium would be authorized to hear claims concerning an agreement between a Belgian company and another company.  The question that arose there is whether the foreign jurisdiction clause also applies to the manager of the Belgian company, who signed the agreement on its behalf.
  2. The justices in the Lagziel case were divided both on the issue of the way of interpretation and the outcome.  Justice Stein ruled that in the interpretation of the foreign jurisdiction clause, primacy should be given to language.  In this context, Justice Stein referred  to his opinion, and to the opinion of Justice A. Grosskopf, Other Municipality Applications 7649/18 Bibi Roads Dirt and Development in  a Tax  Appeal v. Israel Railways in  a Tax  Appeal [Nevo] (November 20, 2019) (hereinafter: the Bibi Roads case), and argued that "special importance is given to the language of the place where we are dealing with a contract between two sophisticated business parties that does not raise any interpretive or buyer difficulty.".   Justice Stein added that this is the case, "especially when we are dealing with the special rules of interpretation that apply to the interpretation  of foreign jurisdiction clauses – rules that advocate linguistic-specific interpretation in order to establish certainty in matters of international trade."  With regard to the specific stipulation that was discussed, Justice Stein  ruled that its language clearly indicates that it relates to any party connected to the agreement, and not only against the Belgian company with which the agreement was signed.
  3. Justice Sohlberg gave a different, more stringent meaning to the linguistic-strict interpretation that must be adopted in the matter of foreign jurisdiction clauses.  This follows the judgment  of the Municipality's other applications 724/85 Manu Koi Passenger Lines inTax Appeal v. Dimri et al., IsrSC 42(3) 324 (1988), which was adopted "without kohl and shrek".  According to Justice Sohlberg, the significance of this linguistic-specific method of interpretation is that "the stipulation will not apply, except in cases where it is found that it is explicit and clear, and no interpretive procedure is required to locate it, or to give indications therein."  Therefore, "if it becomes clear that the language is unclear and unequivocal, this will immediately lead to the 'death' of the stipulation, even if by means of an interpretive-linguistic proceeding, without recourse to external circumstances, it would have been possible to reach the conclusion that such a stipulation was indeed established."

The judge also came to the specific question that arose Solberg to a different conclusion than that of the judge Stein.  According to him, there is no dispute that the case provoked Interpretive Question.  According to him, where such a question arises, the language of the stipulation is not unequivocal - In other words, A place where doubt arises - This is sufficient to determine that the stipulation does not apply.  And if the parties wanted it to apply, they should have done so explicitly, "In Rachel, your little daughter."

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