The Judge D. Mintz Join the Judge's General Interpretive Position Solberg. However, according to him, The foreign jurisdiction clause in the same matter also applies to the company's manager, by virtue of the doctrine of a contract in favor of a third party.
- Thus, and although there is some difficulty in deriving a clear rule from an interesting issue to Gaziel, it seems that Justice Sohlberg's approach took precedence there (see: Civil Appeals Authority 1091/24 Yuval v. Vigodetsky, para. 16 [Nevo] (May 13, 2026)). The rule that we must apply is therefore this: when an interpretive dispute arises with respect to the applicability of a foreign jurisdiction clause, in the framework of which Shimon argues that the stipulation applies in relation to X, and Reuven argues that it does not apply in relation to X – and where the language of the stipulation is not clear and unequivocal as to the applicability of the stipulation to X – then Reuven's position should be preferred. This, whatever X may be: application to third parties; applicability with respect to non-contractual grounds; being unique or parallel, and more (the Lagziel case, paragraph 22 of Justice Sohlberg's judgment).
- And what is the meaning of the striking? On the personal question in our case, it is clear that there is a real dispute on the question of the applicability of the jurisdiction clause. It is also clear that its language is not clear and unequivocal regarding its applicability with respect to third parties, who are not the formal parties to the contract (in the language of the clause: limited partners and general partners). And dodo: Feldman himself notes that "the general partner in the partnership was ELF ASSETS LLC, and [Feldman] acted and signed the partnership agreement on behalf of the partnership, through the general partner." Thus, according to the rule of interpretation established in the majority opinion in the Lagziel case, the stipulation that is the object of our case does not apply to third parties.
- In fact, this was sufficient to dismiss the application with regard to the jurisdiction clause. For if the stipulation does not apply to Feldman, the law of the lawsuit against him must be clarified in Israel. However, I will note that even with regard to the pre-contractual question, I am of the opinion that the conclusion is similar. In other words, there is a dispute as to the applicability of the jurisdiction clause in relation to the aforesaid claims, and the language of the stipulation is not unequivocal, in such a way that we must be led to determine that it does not apply.
- To be precise: in order to get the impression that the language is unequivocal in this matter, it is sufficient to note the difference between the stipulation in its case and that which was discussed in other municipal applications 4601/02 Rada Electronic Industries inTax Appeal v. Bodstray Company Ltd, IsrSC 58(2) 465 (22.01.2004), which raised a similar question. There, however, the stipulation stated:
"This agreement shall be construed and governed in accordance with the law of the state of Florida and shall be deemed to have been negotiated and performed in the state of Florida. Venue in any dispute arising hereunder shall be in Broward County, Florida".
- And what about us? In support of his argument that the investment agreement in our case explicitly applied itself to the pre-contractual stage, Feldman refers to other clauses in the agreement. The problem is that the reference to other clauses, external to the jurisdiction clause, is an interpretive-linguistic process, of the kind that we must refrain from – including – if we remain faithful to the halakha in the Lagziel case, which instructs us to examine whether the language of the jurisdiction clause itself is unequivocal.
- I didn't even see fit to intervene in the proper forum question. In this regard, the trial court ruled that Feldman did not meet the burden required to prove the claim that Israel was not the proper forum for clarifying Epstein's claim. In particular, it was held that no basis was laid for determining which of the parties had a substantially closer connection to another country – an affiliation that would justify exclusive litigation in that country. After examining the matter, I did not find that there was a flaw in this factual determination of the trial court, and in the legal conclusion derived from it.
- Before concluding, I will address Feldman's argument that leaving the decision in place is liable to deter representatives of international corporations from operating in Israel, and burden business activity. First, as a general matter, I will note this: Indeed, in the laws of contract interpretation in our system, the approach according to which in relation to engagements between business parties, contracts should be interpreted in accordance with the purpose of creating a convenient basis for future engagements (see: Bibi Roads case, paragraph 4 of the judgment of Justice Grosskopf; Civil Appeal 9025/17 A.T.S. Investments Inc. v. Segal Group (Dresden) GmbH and Co.KG, para. 21 [Nevo] (February 19, 2020)). However, this matter is, as stated, within the scope of the general contract interpretation law, whereas with regard to the interpretation of jurisdictional clauses, the majority position in the Lagziel case is that other considerations guide us (the Lagziel case, paragraph 21 of the judgment of Justice N. Sohlberg). In any event, even if I assume that the consideration that concerns the creation of a convenient infrastructure for future contractual engagements between business parties, and in particular international business parties, is the guiding interpretive consideration in our case, it is not at all, in my opinion, that Feldman's position will advance this purpose.
- The application for leave to appeal is therefore denied. Feldman will bear Epstein's expenses in the sum of NIS 10,000.
Granted today, May 19, 2026.